Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the majority
criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the
51: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
4: Center Right Left.
The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election.
However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.
Just to point out the obvious here: Center would lose even with up to 49% of
the vote in this
2011/7/5 Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the
majority
criterion for
On 3.7.2011, at 20.34, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not like this system and believe it is improper to call it
Condorcet. It seems to have all the same flaws as IRV -
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most fair to elect
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop
quota seems to go hand in hand with IRV and
On 4.7.2011, at 16.33, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times.
If you want the most popular single candidates to be elected
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop
quota seems to go hand
To be clearer:
In your scenario 55% of people hate 50% of the winners and 45% hate
(ranked last) 50% of the winners. If the Center and Right win, only
45% of the voters hate 50% of the winners and everyone else is happy.
In summation:
In your example, applying the Droop quota criteria, 100%
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not like this system and believe it is improper to call it
Condorcet. It seems to have all the same flaws as IRV - hiding the
lower choice votes of voters, except if the voter voted for some of
the less popular candidates. Thus, I can see there may be lots of
cases when
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not like this system and believe it is improper to call it
Condorcet. It seems to have all the same flaws as IRV - hiding the
lower choice votes of voters, except if the voter voted for
Ross Hyman wrote:
A Condorcet divisor method proportional representation procedure is
presented that is a variant of Nicolaus Tideman’s Comparison of Pairs of
Outcomes by Single Transferable Vote (CPO-STV) and Shultz STV but
requires the determination of fewer candidate set comparisons than
the Condorcet winner.
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 22:20:52 -0700 (PDT)
From: Ross Hyman rahy...@sbcglobal.net
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
Message-ID:
1309584052.63357.yahoomailclas...@web83607.mail.sp1.yahoo.com
A Condorcet divisor method proportional
representation procedure is presented that is a variant of Nicolaus Tideman’s
Comparison
of Pairs of Outcomes by Single Transferable Vote (CPO-STV) and Shultz STV but
requires the determination of fewer candidate set comparisons than either. The
method
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