Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-04 Thread James Gilmour
I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should stick to the same two parties forever. I don't get it. of course,

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-04 Thread Juho Laatu
On 4.6.2012, at 13.49, James Gilmour wrote: I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should stick to the same two parties

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-04 Thread James Gilmour
what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? Only if you think that third parties and independents should nor run, and there should be only two parties, then Plurality is fine. On 4.6.2012, at 13.49, James Gilmour wrote: These contributions to this discussion

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-04 Thread Juho Laatu
On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote: A system that counts the proportions at national level (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also gerrymandering can be avoided this way. Yes, the votes could be summed at national level and the seats allocated at national

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-04 Thread Juho Laatu
On 5.6.2012, at 1.52, James Gilmour wrote: On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote: A system that counts the proportions at national level (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also gerrymandering can be avoided this way. Yes, the votes could be summed at national

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-03 Thread Jameson Quinn
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-03 Thread Juho Laatu
On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are only one or

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-03 Thread Juho Laatu
P.S. In Soda the Approval related problems with more than three potential winners might be easier to handle than in Approval. In Soda we may have all information of the voter approvals and the candidate preferences available, and this may lead to negotiations and consensus decision on how the

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-03 Thread robert bristow-johnson
On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk ... One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-03 Thread Jameson Quinn
2012/6/3 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk ... One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-02 Thread Jameson Quinn
2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the method pretty much fails Fails compared to what? At its worst, approval

Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion

2012-06-02 Thread Juho Laatu
On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the method pretty much fails