I have trouble finding value in the specific label non-approved.
All that I do not rank share being liked less than any others - as do
those I assign lower ranks than others I indicate liking better.
DWK
On May 5, 2009, at 2:02 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, May 5, 2009 at 6:28 PM, Dermot
Dermot Cochran wrote:
On 30 Apr 2009, at 17:24, Raph Frank wrote:
Another option would be to have the voter submit a ranked ballot and
also have an approval threshold candidate. All candidates ranked
higher than that psuedo-candidate would be considered approved.
However, that gives voters
Dan Bishop wrote:
You could use Plurality (with vote-splitting between equally ranked
candidates) to determine surpluses and a different method to determine
eliminations. For example,
[snip]
So the winning set is {Andre, Escher, Gore}. Coincidentally, the same
as the CPO-STV result.
Raph Frank Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 6:33 PM
Also, I think later no harm basically means won't
compromise. I am not sure that it is even a desirable
criterion for a method to have and think that the fact that a
method that doesn't meet later no harm is a not major issue.
I don't
2009/5/1 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk:
One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for strategic
voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in
some
order other than the sincere 'first to last' order of preference because the
voter knows that some feature of
On May 1, 2009, at 6:02 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
2009/5/1 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk:
One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for
strategic voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in
some
order other than the sincere 'first to last' order of preference
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 3:56 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
The strategy is effectively identical in both versions, despite the
difference in form. That is, in both your mechanisms it seems apparent on
the face of it that a voter would not have a motivation, strategic or
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On May 1, 2009, at 6:02 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
2009/5/1 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk:
One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for
strategic voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in
some
order other than the sincere 'first to
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 6:53 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
If there are two seats and the left and right factions are of equal
size, and both have respective centrists, the outcome should have a left
centrist (which is close to the median voter of the left faction) and
Raph Frank wrote:
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 6:53 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
If there are two seats and the left and right factions are of equal
size, and both have respective centrists, the outcome should have a left
centrist (which is close to the median voter of the
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 8:27 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
The problem in using any other method than Plurality for counting the votes
in an STV method is that of elimination. If someone votes for A with
strength 1 and B with strength 0.5, and A wins, then how much do
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The problem in using any other method than Plurality for counting the
votes in an STV method is that of elimination. If someone votes for A
with strength 1 and B with strength 0.5, and A wins, then how much do
you downweight that voter? The A voters should be
A nice feature of PR-STV is that it still meets the Droop Criterion no
matter who you pick to eliminate in rounds where no candidate meets
the quota (assuming you don't eliminate an elected candidate).
However, there doesn't seem to be much discussion on using a better
elimination method.
The
On Apr 30, 2009, at 9:24 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
A nice feature of PR-STV is that it still meets the Droop Criterion no
matter who you pick to eliminate in rounds where no candidate meets
the quota (assuming you don't eliminate an elected candidate).
However, there doesn't seem to be much
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 5:42 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
The problem with these approaches (a problem, anyway) is that they abandon
later-no-harm. That seems a rather high price to pay.
Well, the first suggestion, where the approval ballot is separate from
the ranked ballot
On Apr 30, 2009, at 10:33 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 5:42 PM, Jonathan Lundell
jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
The problem with these approaches (a problem, anyway) is that they
abandon
later-no-harm. That seems a rather high price to pay.
Well, the first suggestion, where
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 6:47 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
Well, we can disagree about that, no doubt. For me, it's a high priority to
eliminate or reduce strategic considerations from the actual voting act, and
LNH eliminates a big one.
However, if the approval and rank votes
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