On 22.7.2013, at 16.43, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2013 at 04:04:03PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
Yes, it is possible and even typical that many small parties get their best
results in the same district. One simple fix (and one step more complex
algorithm) is to allocate full quota
On 22.7.2013, at 23.50, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/22/2013 05:37 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 22.7.2013, at 16.43, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
That might produce a sensible result, I'll see if I can modify the
code to do something like this.
I think that approach is at least quite easy to
On 20.7.2013, at 13.07, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/19/2013 11:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 19.7.2013, at 10.18, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In such cases, I would also suggest a few of the seats of the
parliament be given by a centrist- or minmax-based method (e.g.
Condorcet,
Some random notes. Please treat them as such. Just trying to point out what PAL
representation looks like from different angles.
I guess the key feature of PAL representation is the dynamic size of the
districts. In this thread one central theme has been practical reforms in the
Norwegian (or
On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 08:23:04AM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
I do feel that distributing first seats to small parties first makes
more sense, especially considering that certain small parties (such as
Rødt) got a lot of support in districts with large cities, but nearly
no support in other
On 21.7.2013, at 14.42, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 08:23:04AM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
I do feel that distributing first seats to small parties first makes
more sense, especially considering that certain small parties (such as
Rødt) got a lot of support in districts with
On 07/19/2013 11:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 19.7.2013, at 10.18, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In such cases, I would also suggest a few of the seats of the
parliament be given by a centrist- or minmax-based method (e.g.
Condorcet, CPO-SL with few seats, or possibly even minmax approval
or
I have kept up with this thread only intermittently. It seems to have
strayed significantly far away from its subject line, and while I've been
interested in some of the points that have been made, it's hard to
summarize the thread as a whole.
There is one point I've wanted to make, which seems a
On 07/19/2013 07:45 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 18.7.2013, at 23.36, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(And now that I think about it: if it's desired, it should be
possible to make n-proportional apportionment methods for n2 --
e.g. a method that tries to balance regional representation,
national
On 19.7.2013, at 10.18, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In short, multiple constraints might mean that the results over here
depends on what happens over there in a way that's not easy to understand.
And the more constraints you add, the harder it could get.
One could estimate the level of
On Thu, Jul 18, 2013 at 01:15:17PM +0200, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Alternatively you could go the other way, distribute seats to parties in
district the same order they won the seats, but then you'll get the
opposite effect, that small parties may not win a seat in a district
where they got 10%
On Thu, Jul 18, 2013 at 03:07:19PM +0200, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
There are still some issues:
Turns out there are several issues with distributing seats. I'm not
going to go into details about these issues now, because I thought out a
new method that doesn't have these issues and is arguably even
On 07/18/2013 08:13 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Thoughts are welcome, and sorry for the amount of mails, I'm having a
lot of spare time at the moment.
Could you try implementing Balinski's primal-dual method? It's somewhat
explained in the Wikipedia article on biproportional apportionment,
On 18.7.2013, at 14.15, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
the percentage of the votes the party received in the
district that plays a role
This expression is actually ambigious. It could mean percentage of the votes of
the district votes or percentage of the votes of the party votes.
It could be an
On 18.7.2013, at 21.13, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
For each district and each party, calculate the quotient.
Quotient = partyDistrictVotes / (2 * partyDistrictSeats + 1)
In the category of simple and straight forward algorithms, here is one approach.
- first use SL to determine at national level
On 18.7.2013, at 23.36, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(And now that I think about it: if it's desired, it should be possible to
make n-proportional apportionment methods for n2 -- e.g. a method that tries
to balance regional representation, national representation, and
representation of
On Sun, Jul 07, 2013 at 11:27:21PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
Alternatively, instead of running Sainte-Laguë in each county, you could
run SL on the national result (distributing all 169 seats), something
which would produce a representation percentage very close to the actual
result, and then
On 18.7.2013, at 3.11, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
so the party gets
the seat in the district with the highest:
partyVotePercent / (2 * partyDistrictSeats + 1)
Will the size of the district impact the results? (i.e. 20% of the votes in a
district that has 6 seats altogether should always
On 7.7.2013, at 23.49, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But this raises the question of where the regional MPs should reside.
Two approaches (just thinking out loud). 1) One could have multiple layers from
single member districts to counties etc. I recommend natural historical
borderlines, not
On Fri, Jul 05, 2013 at 11:37:55PM +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I still am not quite sure how it works, because your quotient
description only refers to the county count, not the national count,
and I would expect the leveling seats to make use of both.
I'm fairly certain that the
On 7.7.2013, at 16.16, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jul 05, 2013 at 11:37:55PM +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The argument then
is that if you add in lots of very small parties, any of them might
become a kingmaker and so get extremely disproportional amounts of
power.
While I see
On 07/07/2013 10:27 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.7.2013, at 16.16, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Alternatively, instead of running Sainte-Laguë in each county, you
could run SL on the national result (distributing all 169 seats),
something which would produce a representation percentage very
close to
On 4.7.2013, at 21.39, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
that we're using 1.4 as the first divisor in Sainte-Laguë
is what's making it difficult for smaller parties to get a foothold
I can see the followig factors that influence the ability of the smallest
parties to get seats:
- constituencies /
On 07/04/2013 08:39 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Thu, Jul 04, 2013 at 07:18:18PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
That doesn't sound so different from leveling seats. In the
Norwegian system, you give each county an extra seat, but this
seat is assigned based on the difference betweeen the seats so
far
Some late comments follow.
Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
The short answer to why not vote directly for persons? would be that
in Norway there's more focus on the goals of a party rather than the
goal of its politicians, and some may argue that the extra abstraction
layer is a good thing, as well as
On 07/04/2013 08:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
In principle ability to vote for persons helps populist candidates.
My best understanding is that in Finland, that uses open lists, well
known candidates (from sports, TV etc.) probably have slightly better
chances to win a seat when compared to
On 4.7.2013, at 13.55, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/04/2013 08:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
In principle ability to vote for persons helps populist candidates.
My best understanding is that in Finland, that uses open lists, well
known candidates (from sports, TV etc.) probably have
On Thu, Jul 04, 2013 at 07:18:18PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
That doesn't sound so different from leveling seats. In the Norwegian
system, you give each county an extra seat, but this seat is assigned based
on the difference betweeen the seats so far allocated (on county by county
basis) and
Kristopher Munsterhjelm wrote (30 June 2013):
Would you suggest that the elimination ordering only be calculated based
on the votes of those who currently don't get any representation?
No, because that is only provisional. You'd have to go back to using quotas
for that to be maybe ok. So votes
On 06/30/2013 03:02 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
**
Kristofer Munsterhjelm**wrote (29 June 2013):
The combined method would go like this:
1. Run the ballots through RP (or Schulze, etc). Reverse the outcome
ordering (or the ballots; these systems are reversal symmetric so it
doesn't matter). Call
On 06/29/2013 01:27 AM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 03:04:13PM +0200, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This gave me an idea.
We seem to agree that it's notably the exclusion part that may end up
excluding a party that is preferred by many, but just isn't their first
preference.
I'm
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (29 June 2013):
The combined method would go like this:
1. Run the ballots through RP (or Schulze, etc). Reverse the outcome ordering
(or the ballots; these systems are reversal symmetric so it doesn't matter).
Call the result the elimination order.
2.
On 06/27/2013 03:12 AM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Greetings!
I'm new here, I'm not a mathematician and merely a layman on the subject
of voting methods so please grant me some leeway, but do feel free to
correct any misconceptions I may have.
Briefly about my goals:
I'm trying to find a better
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 12:51:02PM +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I don't have proof that it wouldn't degenerate into a raw populist
competition, though, so I can certainly see your point. I just don't
know of any examples of STV-like methods failing or leading to raw
populism in the
Another option is to introduce weights on each party for a given region.
Say that the Northern Norway region has 6 leveling seats. Then you
calculate the desired outcome for the NN region as a whole (using
Sainte-Laguë) and compare this to the current outcome (by adding up all the
county
Vidar Wahlberg wrote (28 June 2013):
I'm sticking to quota election because I don't fully grasp how to apply other
methods (Sainte-Laguë, for instance) to determine when to start excluding
parties.
Vidar,
Here is a hopefully clearer rewording of my suggestion:
*Use the best formula for
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 03:04:13PM +0200, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This gave me an idea.
We seem to agree that it's notably the exclusion part that may end up
excluding a party that is preferred by many, but just isn't their first
preference.
I'm sticking to quota election because I don't fully
Vidar,
I'm a bit confused about the details of the method you say is used in Norway.
You write that voters may rank parties in a preferred order instead of only
being able to vote for a single party. but further down you refer to the one
person, one vote system.
Since you are not attempting
On Thu, Jun 27, 2013 at 08:31:23AM -0700, Chris Benham wrote:
I'm a bit confused about the details of the method you say is used in Norway.
You write that voters may rank parties in a preferred order instead of only
being able to vote for a single party. but further down you refer to the
Vidar wrote:
If I'm not to use a quota, but rather something like Sainte-Laguë as it's done
today, how would I know when to start excluding the smaller parties?
When one (or more) of them doesn't have a seat according to the initial (trial)
apportionment.
*Use the best formula for
Greetings!
I'm new here, I'm not a mathematician and merely a layman on the subject
of voting methods so please grant me some leeway, but do feel free to
correct any misconceptions I may have.
Briefly about my goals:
I'm trying to find a better alternative to the voting system used in
Norway
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