Kevin,
This new Quick Runoff (QR) method suggestion of yours does nothing to shake
my opinion
that IRV is the best LNHarm method.
Monotonicity: We still have an unusual monotonicity problem in that a
candidate who lacks a majority over the candidate previous to him in
first-preference order,
On May 23, 2010, at 5:14 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
I realized that QR can be generalized for any number of candidates and
still retain LNHarm, Plurality, and resistance to the usual type of
burial strategy. To me this makes the method surprisingly good.
The philosophy is to elect the
Juho wrote (23 May 2010):
snip
/ 1. Rank the candidates. Truncation is allowed. Equal ranking is not
// planned for (but we could come up with something).
// 2. Label the candidates A, B, C, ... Z in descending order of first
// preference count.
// 3. Let the current leader be A.
// 4.
Hi,
I just want to confirm that A does indeed win both of these in QR:
6: AC
5: BA
2: CB
2: C
6: AC
5: BA
2: CB
2: CA
The two voters' new preference gives A a majority over B, but in the
absence of a majority previously, A won by default.
Kevin
Election-Methods mailing list -
I like this method, and would like to discuss the behavior with the simple
three-candidate center squeeze scenario, as compared to IRV.
If IRV falls victim to center squeeze, then the centrist candidate is
candidate C in QR. Thus, for them to win, two things must happen: B has a
majority win over
True, I missed the majority part.
Juho
On May 24, 2010, at 10:38 AM, C.Benham wrote:
Juho wrote (23 May 2010):
snip
1. Rank the candidates. Truncation is allowed. Equal ranking is not
planned for (but we could come up with something).
2. Label the candidates A, B, C, ... Z in descending
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Lun 24.5.10, C.Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
But in contrast to e.g. SPST, a small center candidate can't be so easily
sunk by the presence of a stronger but futile extremist candidate. So
I do see improvement here.
I'd be interested in seeing a 3-candidate
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Lun 24.5.10, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com a écrit :
I like this method, and would like to discuss the behavior with the simple
three-candidate center squeeze scenario, as compared to IRV.
If IRV falls victim to center squeeze, then the centrist candidate is
Hello,
I realized that QR can be generalized for any number of candidates and
still retain LNHarm, Plurality, and resistance to the usual type of
burial strategy. To me this makes the method surprisingly good.
The philosophy is to elect the candidate with the fewest first-preferences
(think
