Hi, me again on the same subject, which I haven't done much work on
since the last time I sent a message- but possibly enough to realise how
little I know so far about game theory.
I think a good point to start with, if we're trying to work out what
types of games/election methods simply
Hey kids, it's been a long time!
I'm paddling around in my own uninteresting eddy in voting theory still. I
was wandering if anyone on this list knows of any articles about the
conditions for an election system / game to be adequately informed by
ordinal preferences - that is, the conditions
Sounds quite a bit like QuickBasic/QBasic, which are BASIC type languages
with named subroutines, etc. Means there may be a prospect of us forcing
our programs on each other!...
On Sun, 8 Apr 2001, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Well, the closest I could get to information was
Well, the closest I could get to information was
http://www.org2.com/opl-ref/
which tells me that OPL is a BASIC type language. If that's so, I may be
able to help on some of the details. But probably not on starting up.
On Fri, 6 Apr 2001, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
The new computer that I've been
On Tue, 27 Mar 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Mr. Harper wrote-
Here's a stupid example:
11 ABCDEF
10 BCAEFD
9 CABFDE
Let's see... who's the Nanson winner?
59 A
59 B
62 C
If A gets excluded, B wins. If B gets excluded, C wins. Geez, it _is_ a
good stupid example. No real
Freck, freck, freck. Bored and tired and forgetful. Should be C gets
excluded with the highest reverse Borda score and A wins. Freck. Freck.
Freck.
On Tue, 27 Mar 2001, David Catchpole wrote:
On Tue, 27 Mar 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Mr. Harper wrote-
Here's a stupid example:
11
This spam is getting really, really annoying. Can we do something about
it? The world is getting really awful when spammers claim electronic mail
lists are individual "people who enjoy gambling".
On Wed, 21 Mar 2001, Enrique Bird wrote:
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED][SMTP:[EMAIL
Well, I like pottering about with multiple winners, though I don't like
expressing preferences. On a practical level I favour STV methods, but if
you want more sophisticated and slightly more fair methods then I think
hybrid Condorcet methods appeal the most. What do I mean? Well, say
there's 5
On second thoughts the "reverse d'Hondt" idea isn't so crash hot if you
want non-complexity. Maybe simple d'Hondt would be the way to go...
On Fri, 16 Mar 2001, David Catchpole wrote:
Well, I like pottering about with multiple winners, though I don't like
expressing p
The argument isn't that BC is manipulable. In fact, being one of the few
election methods that could be described in some way as "monotonic" (not
necessarily an orthodox way!), Borda is eminently resistant to
manipulation. However- and this is a big however- Borda is not fair. It
fails a basic
On Sun, 11 Mar 2001, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I like the idea of a demonstration poll, but voting on which months
are best is difficult, it seems to me. It's something that many
people don't have an opinion on.
... which probably will make the pattern of results more appealing, seeing
as though
Both yield equal proportionality - Droop yields the better degree of
_fairness_ and strategy-proofness because Droop is the natural quota even
given a Hare quota. In a Hare quota election, aggregations of candidates
should strive for a Droop quota for each of their members if they know
what's
Mostly, the rules call for a random selection.
On Sun, 18 Feb 2001, Martin Harper wrote:
What is the correct way to deal with draws in IRV - ie, in an election
between A,B,C,D, where C and D tie for lowest numbers of first place
votes. Should both C and D be eliminated? Or should one be
nds before that).
-Original Message-----
From: David Catchpole [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Monday, 19 February 2001 8:56
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] draws in IRV
Mostly, the rules call for a random selection.
On Sun, 18 Feb 2001, Martin Harper wrot
Doubtless a by-election.
On Mon, 19 Feb 2001, LAYTON Craig wrote:
There is usually random selection in the first or last round (I recall a
coin toss being used in one election). However, there is a little known
rule of mass elimination in Australia, that eliminates all candidates
except
Rolling would be Approval - an arbitrary system which is only effective
(like every other election method) given perfect information. Its only
advantage, that it involves no real insincerity, is a false one, because
it can only make that claim because Approval has no intuitive "sincere"
vote.
How about-
It's effective by its standards only given perfect information. All
election methods are defensible by their standards given
perfect information.
On Fri, 9 Feb 2001, Bart Ingles wrote:
Catchybacca wrote:
Rolling would be Approval - an arbitrary system which is only effective
Non-PR multiwinner election methods - this subject has fascinated me ever
since I started considering the possibility of separate executive
assemblies as an alternative to Westminster and presidential institutional
forms. It's also an interesting topic given the contemporary
situation in
---
History never repeats itself. It stutters.
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 07:53:12 +1000
From: Jamie Thomas Alcock [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: What if...
[pain]
Votes:
ABC
ABC
ABC
BAC
BAC
CAB
CAB
CAB
CAB
Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether
or not they can express them on their ballots_, then plurality fails a
Condorcet criterion.
On Mon, 11 Dec 2000, Martin Harper wrote:
Markus Schulze wrote:
Plurality can
Elucidate?
On Mon, 11 Dec 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
David Catchpole wrote:
Votes:
ABC
ABC
ABC
BAC
BAC
CAB
CAB
CAB
CAB
Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether
or not they can express them on their ballots_, then plurality fails
But they 'don't'. The phenomenon of splitting is well known in practice.
On Mon, 11 Dec 2000, Martin Harper wrote:
David Catchpole wrote:
Votes:
3 ABC
2 BAC
4 CAB
Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether
or not they can express them
I think Martin's point is correct and insightful. The central problem of
voting theory is insincerity- the divergence of the best vote from the
directed vote.
On Tue, 12 Dec 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
Martin Harper wrote (in part):
At the very least, it can change what a 'sincere' vote is -
It's debatable whether it counts as bribery. Most of the cases being
brought up in Australia involved clear preferences prior to any exchange
of money. It's a stretch to think the Dems in Lilley would have
preferenced the Libs. However, the Dems were also short on money, meaning
it's unlikely
I would say 1,1,2,2,3 was my preference if I were to vote with some equal
rankings, though given certain rules I don't see any fundamental
difference from 1,1,3,3,5 if you're voting in an STV election (I've got a
pet STV system specifically designed to handle indifferant/equal
rankings that has a
of Senate preference deals become very important as most voters
vote "above the line" so that their preferences are prepared by the
party they voted for and are not written on the ballot.
On Mon, 4 Dec 2000, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig Layton,
dear David Catchpole,
Rob wrote (
On Sun, 3 Dec 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
LAYTON Craig wrote:
Sorry in my rather hasty example, there are supposed to be 5 candidates,
with the voters preferences being:
A=BC=DE
My question being, how can you (in a relatively simple fashion) allow a
voter to vote like this? What
On Sat, 2 Dec 2000, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Fri, 1 Dec 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
The grass is always greener...
Yup. I found a more detailed story here:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/politics/2000/12/item20001202100144_1.htm
It seems a contribution was made to the Australian Democrats by
On Fri, 10 Nov 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
David,
I'll accept most of your arguments - we are approaching this in a rather
different fashion.
In order for this to be the case, you must assume the following; the
actors
preferences correspond to utility outcomes (often not the case);
On Tue, 7 Nov 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
-Original Message-
From: David Catchpole [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, 7 November 2000 16:02
To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
Subject: RE: [EM] Voting methods utility
If we're to express any meaningful concept of utility we have to do
ther rules Pareto efficiency _implies that rule_. Which means if you
replaced that rule with Pareto efficiency, you'd get the same result.
On Tue, 7 Nov 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
David Catchpole wrote:
I think it's wholly appropriate to discuss utility when discussing voters'
_
Interesting... definitely interesting... Intuition tells me this system
would be majoritarian, which knocks out the number one nasty feature of
Borda. I think I'll have a fiddle around with this system!
On Thu, 26 Oct 2000, Michael A. Rouse wrote:
This is my first post, and I haven't had a
On Sun, 8 Oct 2000, JanetRAnderson wrote:
May I interrupt your discussion for a moment to ask a couple of questions?
(I currently chair Washington Citizens for Proportional Representation and I
believe this list began from our Web site. I have been a silent member of
the list for the last
There's always JK Galbraith's North Dakota Plan...
On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Craig Layton wrote:
This is part of the problem: the disproportionate power of geography. If 5
million people in Florida have a particular point of view they have a lot of
power (and even more
On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
While it is unarguably crucial to discuss the ideal single winner method
(both simply in terms of the logic of majoritarian decision making on
specific issues and in cases eg presidential elections, where only one
winner is possible), are you all sure
I don't quite get you. Are you asking about alternatives to exclusion?
On Wed, 4 Oct 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
Yep, but I was considering the basis for excluding candidates in the first
place. If, for a moment, you accept the system of electing by quotas and
distributing surplus votes at
Oh sheet- correction
On Thu, 5 Oct 2000, David Catchpole wrote:
But aren't all those alternatives also exclusion schema? The exclusion
scheme I suggested was that, rather than excluding on the basis of first
preference aggregates, when an exclusion has to be made, one does
ogressively eliminate the lowest
ranked (courtesy of Markus Schulze) or eliminating the bottom candidates
using a quota, and redistribute their votes at a reduced transfer value (if
I understand Craig Carey correctly).
Craig
-Original Message-
From: David Catchpole [mailto:[EMAI
Hi Layton,
where Nc is the number of candidates remaining that have not been elected
or excluded, one can conduct a "sub" STV election of Nc-1 candidates. The
candidate left over can be excluded.
On Wed, 4 Oct 2000, LAYTON Craig wrote:
I'm new to this mailing list (so hi).
I was wondering
Problem is though that the US Presidential election system distorts the
vote by its "winner takes all" selection of delegates from each
State. Meaning, say, a huge number of voters in a huge State like
California have their vote float away into insignificance 'cause they
didn't support the
Hell no, FPP is _not_ monotonic. If one ranks one's real preference
first rather than one's "lesser evil" [sic], a repugnant candidate can
win. Tell me that's not nonmonotonicity.
On Mon, 2 Oct 2000, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
EM list--
I forgot to add another advantage of FPP over IRV:
On Wed, 13 Sep 2000, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
They may be part of the
dreaded orthodoxy
Thank you for asserting that there's an academic voting system
orthodoxy. But did anyone say they dreaded it? I merely indicated
that I don't respect it or value it.
Jeez, I sure hope you get your sarcasm
On Tue, 12 Sep 2000, David Catchpole wrote:
According to the ISI citation index,
TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE - WHAT IS THE QUOTA
HOLZMAN R
DISCRETE APPLIED MATHEMATICS
22: (2) 133-141 FEB 1989
has references
No, Nanson is _not_ a multi-winner method (there are Condorcet analogues
for multi-winner elections, but they have a general structure that their
Condorcet-analogue sets of winners, if they exist, are selected, using a
selected method, say STV, when compared to each of the other
candidates). It's
rtant"
-Eugene McCarthy
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2000 16:30:30 +1200
From: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: David Catchpole [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Preoccupied with coughing up blood, 'The ring and the book'
I saw your botch up at the EM
matical Society, c1999.
- Basically anything they can get their hands on that relates in the
slightest to their field of interest.
On Fri, 8 Sep 2000, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Sat, 9 Sep 2000, David Catchpole wrote:
For feck's sake people, can we stop bagging voting theorists
has a name, but I can't remember it for the moment. Maybe Craig
should test its results vs. his implicit IFPP method.
On Sat, 9 Sep 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
At 13:25 00.09.09 +1000 Saturday, David Catchpole wrote:
On Sat, 9 Sep 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
At 22:31 00.09.08 +1000 Friday, David
It has indeed, seeing as though there's actually a big _three_, Labor and
two conservative parties, the Liberals (the big big conservatives) and the
Nationals (the little big conservatives). Especially in my neck of the
woods (Queensland), where we have difficulty determining the difference
Ok- I tried to send a 30 K attachment to the list, but I haven't received
the message yet and neither have I received a "message not sent" message.
Does this mean Rob has to approve it, or is it well and truly lost in
cyberspace?
I'm sorry sir, my computer ate my floppy disk. Meaning I probably won't be
able to send the finished Cyberian Electoral Commissioner's Friend in a
hurry. Thankfully, tommorow is a public holiday thanks to our State Fair,
but I'll probably be too busy studying for an electromagnetic theory exam
on
Just for your edification- I'm writing a program in Q-BASIC (ya, ya, I can
hear you sniggering from here) to aid the Electoral Commissioner
conducting STV elections for Cyberia ( http://vcc.4mg.com ). I might
consider putting it up, along with the proposed legislation that
accompanies it. It
I think it's very important that we start branching out beyond the written
word when we give our explanations. Mikes's example is a good one of how
piccies can be a very useful tool. I know that it has sometimes been
difficult to express oneself on this list (especially to certain newer,
On Fri, 2 Jun 2000, Steve Eppley wrote:
The following data, calculated by software written to simulate
many voting methods, supports my contention that MTM dominates
Schulze in the head-to-head comparison of whether voters would
prefer one's winners more than the other's winners.
Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 08:52:37 +1000 (GMT+1000)
From: David Catchpole [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Ooh... I think he's riled.
Now, look, (I hate it when media interviewees use that cliche), I don't
like Approval, but the simple fact
On Tue, 30 May 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
Thanks David. It makes us all seem so thoughtless. I specifically
include you now that you said you are not impressed.
What motivated my nasty message is the simple fact that you have indicated
a posititve feature demonstrated by approval voting and
Whoa. Pareto. I'm impressed. Not.
On Sun, 28 May 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] asked me to forward yet another Approval example. Respond
to him and not me.
-
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Here is an improved example:
99 ABCDEFGHIJ
1 J
Total Votes =
find a biased cutoff which would be used in the
simulation. Assuming the utility range is 0..1, the bias value could be
either 0, 1, or rand(1.0) where a new random value is obtained for each
voter. Something like an 80:20 weighting (80% ideal value, 20% bias)
might be a reasonable place to s
,... etc.)
Does anyone else feel like writing an introduction to or an article on
some issue that relates to theory of voting?
On Thu, 18 May 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
You mean there's more than one? Jeez.
David Catchpole wrote:
I've sent them / him a copy of the message.
On Wed, 17 May
Here's an idea I had for how we can best put our expertise in one
well-organised place- we have some kind of dynamic text, really an archive
of documents on the web- I'd call it the "Psephocrina" (psepho, as in
psephology and crinos , as in endocrinology- so Psephocriny or
Psephocrina is the
I've sent them / him a copy of the message.
On Wed, 17 May 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
What about Polytopes?
David Catchpole wrote:
Here's an idea I had for how we can best put our expertise in one
well-organised place- we have some kind of dynamic text, really an archive
Urrk. Which reminds me- my recent quest (well, yeah- maybe 6 months
ago) for a convenient way to index multiwinner rankings led me to the
arcane world of lattice theory. Didn't do much good, but it did occur to
me that those interested in analysis of beatpath methods might want to
afford it a
Well, after some degree of procrastination, I've decided to mutiny from
Craig's list. Blah.
Politeness be sugared, politeness be hanged,
Politeness be jumbled and tumbled and banged.
It's simply a matter of putting on pace,
On Mon, 10 Apr 2000, Norman Petry wrote:
You however, have decided that the correct method must fail the Condorcet
criterion. It's an interesting choice, but not one I agree with. I'm
curious whether or not David Catchpole, who also seems to have a strong
interest in both STV
egroups has been merging with onelist, so we can expect some
interruptions. By the way,the URL links to a specific archive, which might
be the problem.
On Fri, 7 Apr 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
I am writing to (a) get the topic in the subject field, for
browsers o www.egroups.com.
Also,
Errrm... No comment.
On Mon, 3 Apr 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
I sent a message to Mr Ossipoff by accident. Please disregard
the wording in it, Mr Ossipoff. This mailing list is a vehicle
for informing others of what seems to be completely false
information but ill defined to a degree
On Wed, 29 Mar 2000, Markus Schulze wrote:
Suppose that p(B,A) is the calculated probability that
you change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
when you vote A B C D sincerely. Suppose that
p(B,C) is the calculated probability that you change
the winner from candidate B to
On Sat, 18 Mar 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Have any estimates been done with a relatively large number of tests to get
some rough idea of percentage distributions for 2 or more choices in REAL
public elections ?
Well-the biggest problem is that the mean and standard dev. of this
majority
On Fri, 17 Mar 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
David Catchpole wrote:
I'll announce the approval/cumulative voting strategy that I think is
useful for voters with little information about other voters. There are n
candidates. Vote for the n/2 or n/2 + 1 candidates you most prefer.
Any
On Fri, 17 Mar 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
David Catchpole wrote:
On Fri, 17 Mar 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
The proven optimal strategy when no strategy info is available is to
vote for candidates for whom the voter gives above-average utilities
As in above-median ; ? I take
On Thu, 16 Mar 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
'Equal information' has no analogy to equal richness or equal power.
Hell yeah, it does. By "Equal information" we mean equal knowledge about
the opinions and responses of other voters- and, in most cases, that =
power = wealth quite definitely.
An
On Thu, 16 Mar 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:
This sounds like the block voting method used in most U.S. city
council-type elections. I can see how the vote would be split by three
or more factions contesting for all of the seats (because voters are
limited to 8 choices), and I can see how
I'll announce the approval/cumulative voting strategy that I think is
useful for voters with little information about other voters. There are n
candidates. Vote for the n/2 or n/2 + 1 candidates you most prefer.
Any other suggestions?
On Fri, 17 Mar 2000, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
It's sometimes
rences?. (I
will call that truncation resistance. It is a property that STV
satisfies, as some books point out).
I prompt Mr David Catchpole and Demorep1 to tell us (or me), if it is
tolerable to allow that property to be not satisfied. I am suspecting
that people in the UK mi
I'm on several egroups lists which have an open submission policy, and I
have to say that I haven't had spam within memory on any of them.
On Fri, 10 Mar 2000, Rob Lanphier wrote:
One measure that I use to limit spam to this list is to not allow email
from those that are not list members.
On Sat, 11 Mar 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Which is the highest head to head majority (and thus the most likely correct)
? 65 BC (with C being the most likely clone)Duh ?
A voting paradox will still exist in several cases in which, at least, the
addition of a close clone will punish
from a subset.
Thanks, David Catchpole.
On Sun, 5 Mar 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Mundane example-
A group of folks want to go out together.
Proposed choices- movie, sports event, bar, etc.
Some folks may not care about certain choices- neither for or against.
However, what about the people who are indifferent between
That is such a faulty version of utility I don't know why I'm
responding! Sorry, no offence really intended, but where's the point and
reason in zero means neutral (do not care)? Care about what? The common
utility formalism attaches a comparative value (utility) to each outcome,
according to
I'm not quite sure of what you mean, but, for instance, there's no way to
produce rankings such that |{AB}|=|{BC}|=|{CA}|=total all
votes. Could someone clarify?
On Sat, 26 Feb 2000, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Blake--
You have in your possession Bruce Anderson's proof that
for every
Sorry it took me so long to respond. I've had a week without internet
(gasp!)
On Sun, 30 Jan 2000, Blake Cretney wrote:
David Catchpole wrote:
On Sun, 30 Jan 2000, David Catchpole wrote:
Can someone refresh my memory- where a candidate A has a majority beat
path to candidate B and B
On Sun, 30 Jan 2000, Markus Schulze wrote:
The exact mathematical formulation of beat path GMC looks as follows:
"X Y" means that an absolute majority of the voters
strictly prefers candidate X to candidate Y.
"There is a majority beat path from X to Y" means that
(1) X Y or
ority or a tie..." and "majority beat path" were redefined
accordingly, the statement below would be true. Consider a vote-cycle
ABCDEA . In order for D-E-A not to constitute a vote-cycle in
itself,
ABCDA. Similarly,
ABCA. So there's a demonstration.
On Sun, 30 Jan 2000, David Catchpole
Que wha...? OK... what purpose does this serve, making comments about
other members of the list, some of which are dubious, to say the least
(though yes, Demorep is indeed a woman, and came out as one in the first
few weeks of the list).
How about everyone spill the beans about their personal
A formalism is the strcture in which the exposition is put (couched). For
instance, in Quantum Physics, the formalism most often applied is the
Dirac formalism, which is the one with Bras and Kets, but other formalisms
are also useful.
Really, Craig, confusing (dementing?) references to blue
The question may well become one of asking whether the addition of clones
should help or harm their side. In the interests of participation, I
addition (removal) should not harm (help) the side. This is the basis
behind the "no splitting" rules I put up in the dim distant past. (Note,
Craig-
ordinary preferential method (the 2
candidate 1 winner formula) in a probability form. Obviously that can be
done for all methods. Any disputes over tie probabilities can be excluded.
At 15:40 16.12.99 , David Catchpole wrote
Craig wrote:
If that is the STV method, then the second choice can't harm the
candidate of the first preference. The word "false", could be changed
to the word "true".
Yes, second preferences can't harm the candidate of the first preference.
However, first preferences can harm the
Distribution of power under stochastic social choice rules
Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Bezalel Peleg
Econometrica Vol 54 No 4
Abstract: This paper considers stochastic social choice rules which, for
every feasible set of alternatives and every profile of individual
orderings, specify social choice
Wha the? (more further down)
Message 3: ---
Subject: RE: The family of "regular" probabilistic (stochastic) electoral systems
At 13:48 12.12.99 , David Catchpole wrote:
On Wed, 8 Dec 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ...
D-
A simple example-
Ja, vat ist das problem? Obviously, A's removal will _increase_ B's
probability of winning to unity. Regularity is cool with this- it would
rather be offended if the reverse occured. Note the use of corresponding
brackets for (removal) and (decrease). This saves me "respectively"
bullshit or (i)
PS. I've decided to call it the Saari Octahedron from now on, seeing as
though it really isn't cubic or even rhomboid.
On Wed, 8 Dec 1999, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig,
it seems to me that you walked into Saari's trap.
Although you don't promote the Borda Method, you
use Saari's
On Wed, 8 Dec 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part--
Okay- "Regularity" is the name used earlier by Albert Langer (Craig might
recognise the name ;) ) to describe the probabilistic analogue of IIA. It
goes like this-
The addition (removal) of a candidate does
On Thu, 9 Dec 1999, Craig Carey wrote:
I doubt cubes have a place in voting theory. If the 3 candidate either win
or lose, then the cube has no interior, it is just 8 points. It hardly matters
if it is a
Well, it's not a cube per se, but rather an octahedron formed by the
intersection of
Saari also uses a triangle, but the triangle doesn't go far enough in an
analysis of what's a possible configuration of votes and what's not.
That's where the Saari octahedron kicks in in his analysis.
On Fri, 10 Dec 1999, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig,
you wrote (9 Dec 1999):
I am
ackage for REDUCE. REDUCE runs in LISP.)
-
A rule of Mr Catchpole is examined and rejected for requiring that a
method (where the papers are constrained to be just 3) is FPTP...
At 15:39 08.12.99 , David Ca
Probably wouldn't have desired effect as preferences would still flow from
party voters outside an electorate. Picture it- if a candidate A fails to
win in an electorate but is voted first by all party voters, A will still
be elected amongst the "top-ups."
On Tue, 30 Nov 1999, Craig Carey wrote:
On Mon, 22 Nov 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ACT could decide to go head-to-head with National to increase its own
strength in opposition, turning its back on any co-operative election
campaign, the paper said.
I love it when the loony right decide to split the vote! NZ uses FPTP in
its
chant. They have been debating on a different level,
they are on a religious level.
To them, Droop is a Religious Belief. Something they are required to
believe without question.
And now this David Catchpole comes along and confirms that Droop's
proportionality is based on religious be
On Thu, 25 Nov 1999, Craig Carey wrote:
At 12:11 25.11.99 , David Catchpole wrote:
Better to side with the mainstream than with an irrational cult, D.
Why is it better to side with the mainstream, Mr Catchpole?.
Where it's a choice between a crowd of people and a small herd of
lemmings
Hi Craig-
On Fri, 19 Nov 1999, Craig Carey wrote:
With the removal of a candidate A, either-
(i) A was one of the old winners; or
(ii) There's no change; or
(iii) Of those who rank some possible combination of winning candidates
including A over the old and new winning combinations, at
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