From: Richard Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Cranor's method (was unranked IRV, cumulative, etc.)
[This message is not in displayable format]
Richard,
Some of your messages are showing in the digest
as nothing but the error message you see above.
Forest Simmons wrote:
In any case, if Cranor's method were used in public elections, there
should be a little check box on the ballot that asks if you want your
ballot Cranor optimized or not. If you check yes, then your ballot is
supplemented with the Cranor optimized ballot. The original
Dear participants,
Mike wrote (25 Apr 2001):
This is a re-posting of a message from Steve Eppley, that
speaks to the issue of antisocial behavior.
It should be added that Steve Eppley posted this mail
after I had asked him whether his IBCM method violates
mononotonicity. Steve considered this
You're right, Martin, just like Bush winning when Gore got the popular
vote.
I think that it would be extremely rare that the two winners would be
different; grading pass/fail probably wouldn't change who graduates at
the top of the class. The law of large numbers works for discrete random
Mr. Simmons wrote-
A more recent example: even a dud like Gore would have received more than
50% approval in the last election. Do we want to lower our standards below
that level?
---
D- Whether Mr. Gore (or Mr. Bush) could/would get a majority if a reform
method was being used is more than a
From: Forest Simmons
Subject: Re: The None of the Above Chorus:
At the other extreme, suppose we have 100 candidates for a
single position. Shouldn't at least one of them be
outstanding enough to get more than 50% approval? If not,
I would say, What a dismal bunch of clown clones!
One
From: Joe Weinstein
Subject: Re: [EM] Five Slots and Cranor
Many discussions - here in EM-list postings as elsewhere -
presume wrongly that voters care only about
instrumentality and therefore that optimal voter
'strategy' concerns only instrumentality and not also
effective expression.
How do you unsubscribe to this mailing list?
Richard Moore wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
If I understand correctly, this tactic will neither help nor hinder
our
friends. It will not hinder our friends because the method is
monotonic.
It will not help our friends, because you cannot
In my Plurality WDSC failure example, the 5/6 should be replaced with
1/2. Half of the 60% who prefer A to B have C as their favorite.
Then, with 1/2 of the 60% who prefer A to B having C as their favorite,
if any of those 1/2 vote for A, then they're reversing a preference.
If they don't
Blake wrote:
The main argument that has been brought in favour of Schulze is that
in a simulation, it achieved a slightly better approximation of
ratings than did Ranked Pairs, both falling behind Borda. It seems to
me that there are problems with choosing Schulze on this basis. There
is
Rob LeGrand wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">There may be a Condorcet completion method that satisfies the same criteria and is better on SU, butsomehow I doubt it.
I was thinking about this recently. If a completion method is going to be biased toward
higher SU, then it will have to be able to pick a
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Give the win to the candidate with the highest median score, i.e. the
candidate whose list of scores has the highest median.
D- There is more than a minor problem involving public education regarding
*ANY* *complex* reform method.
In other words -- there is a
I would suggest limiting NOTA variations to executive and judicial office
elections.
Legislative bodies do not (and never should) go out of existance and can fill
any vacancies if the voters reject all of the executive and judicial office
candidates.
Rob wrote:
One reason the beatpath idea appeals to me so much, despite the fact that
it's
not obviously optimal, is that it's so simple. It may not be as intuitive
as
Ranked Pairs to the average voter, but to me it's mathematically more
aesthetically pleasing, whatever that means. There may be
http://info.greenwood.com/books/0275965/0275965864.html
Behind the Ballot Box
A Citizen's Guide to Voting Systems
By Douglas J. Amy (2000)
Richard has written about how one thing he likes about margins is
that it looks nice on a certain diagram. Rob L.G. likes it because
it has pleasing symmetry.
These things are all very nice, but they're rather distant from
the reason why we want single-winner reform. We wanted to get
rid of
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