I must be missing something. Could you give an example in which the
approval winner is not the winner of the method?
Forest
On Mon, 10 Mar 2003, Steve Eppley wrote:
On 10 Mar 2003 at 11:36, Kevin Venzke wrote:
My recent MinMax message concluded with a
half-hearted attempt at a system
On Sun, 9 Mar 2003, Olli Salmi wrote:
Forest,
I've found this method of yours fascinating.
At 18:45 +0200 6.2.2002, Forest Simmons wrote:
One option might be to decay a voter's ballot based on the position of the
elected candidate on the ballot... a sort of Borda-based decay setup
On Thu, 13 Mar 2003, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote:
Forest,
This is an interesting idea.
I was trying to do some examples with it, but I'm not
sure how to create the four matrices. These are the
ballots I was trying to use:
12: A at 10 (fill 8 and 2 circles)
11: B at 7 (fill 4, 2,
Dear Steve,
what I once called Approval Seeded Bubble Sort but would now (for
increased respectibility) call the Local Kemenization of the Approval
Order is a member of the family of methods that satisfy your conditions
(1) and (2).
We initialize with the approval order and then, starting at the
Small wrote:
Forest Simmons said:
For example, MinMax(pairwise opposition) satisfies the FBC when equality
at the top is allowed. This method chooses as winner the candidate
whose maximum pairwise opposition is minimal.
...
As near as I can tell this is the simplest deterministic pairwise
On Thu, 20 Mar 2003, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
20 ABCD
20 BCAD
20 CABD
13 DABC
13 DBCA
13 DCAB
then we would have
60 A=B=CD
13 DABC
13 DBCA
13 DCAB
The max opposition would still be 60 for D
Here's a strategy free method that will work in certain situations:
The main requirement is that there has to be an incumbent or status quo
option.
The voters indicate which candidates they prefer over the status quo. If
the status quo is the Condorcet Winner (i.e. no alternative is preferred
Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's consensus
thresholds for the various candidates.
If your consensus threshold for candidate X is 80 percent, that means that
you would be willing to support candidate X if more than 80 percent of the
other voters were also willing to
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 12:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 04/03/2013 12:01 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's consensus
thresholds for the various candidates.
If your consensus threshold for candidate X is 80
...@gmail.comwrote:
2013/4/3 Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 12:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 04/03/2013 12:01 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's consensus
thresholds for the various candidates
Here's a Condorcet IRV Hybrid similar to Benham's version:
Use IRV to eliminate candidates until one of the remaining candidates
covers the other remaining candidates.
The rationale for this proposal is that a candidate who merely beats
(pairwise) the other remaining candidates may not be
On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 2:43 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
wrote:
On 04/05/2013 09:37 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
The following observation about Condorcet IRV Hybrids has probably
already been made (but I have been gone for a while):
These hybrids have no good defense
the decision. This
solves the problem of systematic irrationality by allowing for a real
consensus in the primary, one with reasons behind it, the validity of
which can be discussed and debated before making a decision.
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/
Forest
Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin,
etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess
them up.
But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between
the method A winner and the method B winner? If the two winners are the
of the two methods, which one
chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most order
reversals, etc.
The same experiment could be done with any two methods.
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:56 PM, Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2
Kevin,
thanks for your thoughtful response. See some inline responses below:
Message: 3
Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 19:51:03 +0100 (BST)
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: em election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] How to find the voters' honest preferences
Message-ID:
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@t-online.de
wrote:
On 09/09/2013 11:50 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Kristofer,
Thanks for your insights and considerations regarding the method and my
questions.
It is true as you noted that there is no game theoretic incentive
of
30 A
3 AC
15 C=A
4 C
15 C=B
3 BC
30 B
Candidate C still wins under IA/MPO, even though this is a violation of
Plurality.
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 15:21:35 -0700
From: Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Try this method
Kevin,
good work!
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi Forest,
...
Unfortunately, I realized that an SFC problem is possibly egregious:
51 AB
49 CB
B would win easily, contrary to SFC (which disallows both B and C). But
more alarmingly it's a
not mistaken, this MC compliant method still satisfies the FBC,
Plurality, etc. and even satisfies Mono-Add-Plump, but not Mom-Add-Top.
What do you think?
Forest
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi Forest,
De : Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu
On Thu, Oct 10
Kevin,
In the first step of the variant method MMPO[IA = MPO] (which, as the
name suggests, elects the MMPO candidate from among those having at least
as much Implicit Approval as Max Pairwise Opposition) all candidates with
greater MPO than IA are eliminated.
I have already shown that this
.
De : Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu
À : Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
Cc : em election-meth...@electorama.com
Envoyé le : Samedi 12 octobre 2013 13h58
Objet : Re: MMPO(IAMPO) (was IA/MMPO)
Kevin,
In the first step of the variant method MMPO[IA = MPO] (which, as the
name suggests
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