Re: [Emu] New Version Notification for draft-janfred-eap-fido-02.txt

2024-03-03 Thread Michael Richardson
Jan-Frederik Rieckers wrote: > I just posted a new version of the EAP-FIDO draft. > We had some discussion on the name "EAP-FIDO" at the last IETF and we > have come up with some name options since, but none of them resonate > with me yet. I see the issue. > I have started

Re: [Emu] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-15

2024-03-03 Thread Alan DeKok
On Mar 3, 2024, at 2:05 PM, Alexander Clouter wrote: > Took me a moment to figure out what David was pointing to but I think you are > incorrect. > > In Section 5.3 (Computing the Compound MAC), you are calculating the MAC > through blind concatenation and there is no machinery in there to di

Re: [Emu] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-15

2024-03-03 Thread Alexander Clouter
On Sun, 3 Mar 2024, at 15:52, Alan DeKok wrote: >> If not, then in theory a MITM might be able to remove the last >> server-to-peer outer TLV and prepend it to the peer-to-server TLVs, or vice >> versa, and the MAC would be the same. However, each side knows which outer >> TLVs >> it sent before t

Re: [Emu] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-15

2024-03-03 Thread Alexander Clouter
On Sat, 2 Mar 2024, at 18:20, David Mandelberg wrote: >> Maybe a TEAPv2 could use ALPN for the TLS jacket to avoid this..erk, I think >> I may have suggested something that could be retro fitted here without >> impacting existing implementations; assuming they would just ignore the ALPN. > > ALPN

Re: [Emu] [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-15

2024-03-03 Thread Alan DeKok
On Mar 2, 2024, at 1:20 PM, David Mandelberg wrote: > If it's not feasible to require server authentication before sending > Identity-Hint, then maybe at least document what information can be leaked by > it and in what circumstances? Or maybe recommend that implementations don't > send it by

Re: [Emu] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-15

2024-03-03 Thread Alan DeKok
On Mar 1, 2024, at 10:21 PM, David Mandelberg via Datatracker wrote: > > (nit) If I understand the TEAP version negotiation and Crypto-Binding > correctly, the negotiated version is not cryptographically verified until > either (1) after the first inner method is completed or (2) just before the

Re: [Emu] New Version Notification for draft-janfred-eap-fido-02.txt

2024-03-03 Thread Jan-Frederik Rieckers
Thanks so much for the comments. I'll respond to some from the top of my head, the others I'll address some time next week. On 03.03.24 13:39, Alexander Clouter wrote: Section 4.1.2 - It just popped up as an idea in my reply to the the SEC review of TEAP but... EAP-TLS sub-method

Re: [Emu] New Version Notification for draft-janfred-eap-fido-02.txt

2024-03-03 Thread Alexander Clouter
On Fri, 1 Mar 2024, at 21:08, Jan-Frederik Rieckers wrote: > Comments are welcome, as always. Section 4.1.2 - It just popped up as an idea in my reply to the the SEC review of TEAP but... EAP-TLS sub-methods have been copying the version bits since forever. Maybe it is time to break