Re: [Emu] draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13: Client re-validation of server authority information during resumption

2020-08-10 Thread Alan DeKok
On Aug 10, 2020, at 11:58 AM, Terry Burton  wrote:
> Reading "Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3" I find the text potentially
> misleading when it comes to resumption within TLS 1.3, specifically
> for the case where the peer wishes to re-validate the certificate
> originally provided by the server during the initial handshake using
> only its locally cached data and without redoing the handshake, e.g.
> to determine that the original certificate hasn't expired or been
> revoked.

  I suspect that the client needs to cache the server certificate, and 
associate it with the session ticket.  The certificate can then be re-validated 
on fast reconnect.

> 
> 5.7.  Resumption
>   ...
>   To perform resumption in a secure way, the EAP-TLS peer and
>   EAP-TLS server need to be able to securely retrieve authorization
>   information such as certificate chains from the initial full
>   handshake.
>   ...
>   There are two ways to retrieve the cached information from the
>   original full handshake.
>   ...
>   The second method for retrieving cached information is
>   via [RFC5077] or [RFC8446], where the TLS server encapsulates the
>   information into a ticket and sends it to the client.  The client can
>   subsequently do resumption using the obtained ticket.  Note that the
>   client still needs to cache the information locally.

  Hmm... yes, it should be nice to discuss *what* information is cached, and 
why it is cached, and what is done with it to re-validate it.

> In TLS 1.3, the PSK ticket is defined as being encrypted using a key
> that only the server knows. Even without encryption, the format for
> the ticket is opaque to the client with only a suggested format
> presented in RFC 8446.
> 
> How is the original handshake data determined? A casual reading of the
> text seems to imply that the client performs some verification using
> the encapsulated information within the ticket.

  If so, that should be clarified.  The ticket is an opaque blob to the client.

> However I believe that the intent is to use the full PSK blob, or some
> digest thereof, as a key to lookup the corresponding cached handshake
> data.
> 
> Perhaps this could be made clearer?

  I agree.

  Alan DeKok.

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[Emu] draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13: Client re-validation of server authority information during resumption

2020-08-10 Thread Terry Burton
Hi,

Reading "Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3" I find the text potentially
misleading when it comes to resumption within TLS 1.3, specifically
for the case where the peer wishes to re-validate the certificate
originally provided by the server during the initial handshake using
only its locally cached data and without redoing the handshake, e.g.
to determine that the original certificate hasn't expired or been
revoked.


5.7.  Resumption
   ...
   To perform resumption in a secure way, the EAP-TLS peer and
   EAP-TLS server need to be able to securely retrieve authorization
   information such as certificate chains from the initial full
   handshake.
   ...
   There are two ways to retrieve the cached information from the
   original full handshake.
   ...
   The second method for retrieving cached information is
   via [RFC5077] or [RFC8446], where the TLS server encapsulates the
   information into a ticket and sends it to the client.  The client can
   subsequently do resumption using the obtained ticket.  Note that the
   client still needs to cache the information locally.


In TLS 1.3, the PSK ticket is defined as being encrypted using a key
that only the server knows. Even without encryption, the format for
the ticket is opaque to the client with only a suggested format
presented in RFC 8446.

How is the original handshake data determined? A casual reading of the
text seems to imply that the client performs some verification using
the encapsulated information within the ticket.

However I believe that the intent is to use the full PSK blob, or some
digest thereof, as a key to lookup the corresponding cached handshake
data.

Perhaps this could be made clearer?


Thanks,

Terry

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