Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the original and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels that he is the one true copy persisting through time How would it feel any different if he weren't? He

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18 July 2016 at 15:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 18/07/2016 3:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 18 July 2016 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > So in your duplication scenarios, the case in which the original is >> duplicated, but

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18/07/2016 3:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote: So in your duplication scenarios, the case in which the original is duplicated, but continues to exist, the closest continuer

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18 July 2016 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 16/07/2016 5:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 15 Jul 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 15/07/2016 12:38 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 14 Jul 2016, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > There is no single

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/17/2016 8:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 18/07/2016 12:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 11:54, Bruce Kellett

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18/07/2016 1:25 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 18/07/2016 12:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 11:54, Bruce Kellett

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18 July 2016 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 18/07/2016 12:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 18 July 2016 at 11:54, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > > I have said several times that probability is a problem for the Everettian >> or MWI

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 16/07/2016 5:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jul 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 15/07/2016 12:38 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jul 2016, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: There is no single 1p view -- there are three possible 1p views in the triplication scenario. Right. The

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18/07/2016 12:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 11:54, Bruce Kellett > wrote: I have said several times that probability is a problem for the Everettian or MWI view. This is not a problem of defining a

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 18 July 2016 at 11:54, Bruce Kellett wrote: I have said several times that probability is a problem for the Everettian > or MWI view. This is not a problem of defining a measure over a possible > infinite number of worlds -- though that is certainly a problem that

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/17/2016 6:06 PM, PGC wrote: Assuming this sort of ontology the phenomenological multiplayer video game section of subjective machine experience requires that persistence via its own definition. Persistence, continuity in time, I understand. Without that you couldn't identify PGC of

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 16/07/2016 4:32 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jul 2016, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett wrote: that anything new actually happens. He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a distracting irrelevance to the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 16/07/2016 4:28 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jul 2016, at 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 15/07/2016 9:42 am, Jason Resch wrote: I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave one to both John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The questionnaires each had 8 questions: 1. What city

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sunday, July 17, 2016 at 8:05:59 PM UTC+2, Brent wrote: > > > > On 7/17/2016 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The duplicating machine cannot introduce a telepathic link which would > > be mandatory for having an experience of both cities at once, so that > > the candidate would write "I

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/17/2016 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The duplicating machine cannot introduce a telepathic link which would be mandatory for having an experience of both cities at once, so that the candidate would write "I see W and M". That simply never happens, or computationalism is false. It's

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

On 14 Jul 2016, at 21:49, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​​>>> ​The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue which one". ​​>> ​The better prediction about WHAT? ​> ​About the first person experience ​There is no such