Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> >Suppose you will again be simultaneously teleported to Washington
> >and Moscow. This time you will have just one copy waking up in each.
> >Then you will expect 50-50 odds. But suppose that after one hour,
> >the copy in M
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> >Suppose you will again be simultaneously teleported to Washington
> >and Moscow. This time you will have just one copy waking up in each.
> >Then you will expect 50-50 odds. But suppose that after one hour,
> >the copy in Moscow gets switched to
Hal Finney writes:
So let me try an interesting variant on the experiment. I think someone
else proposed this recently, the idea of "retroactive causation".
I won't put that exact spin on it though.
Suppose you will again be simultaneously teleported to Washington
and Moscow. This time you wi
>-Original Message-
>From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 12:38 AM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: RE: Copies Count
>
>
>Hal Finney wrote:
>
>>
>>Jesse Mazer writes:
>> &
Jesse Mazer writes:
> It's a bit hard for me to come up with a satisfactory answer to this
> problem, because I don't start from the assumption of a physical universe at
> all--like Bruno, I'm trying to start from a measure on observer-moments and
> hope that somehow the appearance of a physical
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you say that because you think running multiple identical copies
of a
> given mind in parallel doesn't necessarily increase the absolute measure
of
> those observer-moments (that would be my opinion)...
...
Suppose we are going to flip a bi
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> I agree that you will have a 90% chance of waking up in Moscow, given that
> that is the *relative* measure of your successor OM when you walk into the
> teleporter. This is the only thing that really matters with the copies, from
> a selfish viewpoint: the relative
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Here is another way of explaining this situation. When there are
multiple
> parallel copies of you, you have no way of knowing which copy you are,
> although you definitely are one of the copies during any given moment,
with
> no telepathic lin
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Here is another way of explaining this situation. When there are multiple
> parallel copies of you, you have no way of knowing which copy you are,
> although you definitely are one of the copies during any given moment, with
> no telepathic links with the others or
Hal Finney writes:
Consider an experiment where we are simulating someone and can give
them either a good or bad experience. These are not replays, they are
new experiences which we can accurately anticipate will be pleasant
or unpleasant.
Suppose we are going to flip a biased quantum coin, on
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