On Fri, Mar 23, 2001 at 04:53:24PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >You'll have to define what "effectively decide" means and how to apply that
> >concept generally. (Have you introduced it before? I think this is the
> >first time I've seen it.)
>
> I thought the meaning to be obvious in th
>From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>On Wed, Mar 21, 2001 at 09:39:10PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > He thinks he is only 1/101 likely to be in round 1. However, he
>also knows that if he _is_ in round 1, the effect of his actions will be
>magnified 100-fold. Thus he will push button 2.
On Wed, Mar 21, 2001 at 09:39:10PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote:
> First, it's nice to see that you accept my resolution of the "paradox".
> But I have a hard time believing that your point was, in fact, the
> above. You brought forth an attack on anthropic reasoning, calling it
> parado
Wei Dai wrote:
> This experiment is not a "game", since the action of each participant only
> affects his or her own payoff, and not the payoff of the other player.
> Actually you can do this with just one participant, and maybe that will
> make the paradoxical nature of anthropic reasoning clear
>From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: Jacques Mallah <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 06:14:58PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > Effectively it is [a game], since Bob has a Bayesian probability of
>affecting Alice and so on.
>
>He doesn't know whether he is Alice or Bob, but he
On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 11:56:33PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> OOPS! My mistake. So you always push button 1. I still don't see the
> paradox.
The paradox is that if you always push button 1, you end up with $-18. If
you always push button 2 instead, you end up with $0.
On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 06:14:58PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote:
> Effectively it is, since Bob has a Bayesian probability of affecting
> Alice and so on.
He doesn't know whether he is Alice or Bob, but he does know that his
payoff only depends on his own action. "Bob has a Bayesian probabili
OOPS! My mistake. So you always push button 1. I still don't see the
paradox.
Brent
On 20-Mar-01, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 08:10:10PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> I don't see any paradox. This is no different than:
>>
>> If you push button 1, you will lose $9.
>> If you pus
On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 08:10:10PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I don't see any paradox. This is no different than:
>
> If you push button 1, you will lose $9.
> If you push button 2 you will win $10 one time out of 101 at random.
> The other 100 times out of 101 you will lose $10.
>
> If you p
I am resending this because I sent it several hours ago and it hasn't
shown up. So if it posts twice you know why.
>From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>I'm sorry for this greatly delayed response. I shouldn't have sent off the
>original message right before I hoped onto a plane and moved t
On 20-Mar-01, Wei Dai wrote:
> Suppose the new experiment has two rounds. In each round the
> participant will be given temporary amnesia so he can't tell which
> round he is in. In round one he will have low measure (1/100 of
> normal). In round two he will have normal measure. He is also told:
>From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>I'm sorry for this greatly delayed response. I shouldn't have sent off the
>original message right before I hoped onto a plane and moved to Boston. If
>anyone can't remember what this thread was about, please see
>http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2514.ht
I'm sorry for this greatly delayed response. I shouldn't have sent off the
original message right before I hoped onto a plane and moved to Boston. If
anyone can't remember what this thread was about, please see
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2514.html.
On Thu, Mar 01, 2001 at 03:14:03AM -
--- rwas rwas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I had proposed an experiment very similar to a
> friend
> some years back concerning identity and
> consciousness.
>
> We start with a machine that can download, upload,
> and
> run consciousness. It can also manipulate the
> functioning of the brain of
Wei Dai wrote:
>Consider the following thought experiment.
>
>Two volunteers who don't know each other, Alice and Bob, are given
>temporary amnesia and placed in identical virtual environments. They are
>then both presented with three buttons and told the following:
>
>If you push 1, you will lo
>From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Consider the following thought experiment.
>
>Two volunteers who don't know each other, Alice and Bob, are given
>temporary amnesia and placed in identical virtual environments. They are
>then both presented with three buttons and told the following:
>
>If you
I don't see a paradox here. In the latter situations, the volunteers
are acting in accordance with different information, ie that of their
measures. If they were not aware of their measures, they would have to
assume a 50/50 chance of being A or B, hence would choose button 1.
Wei Dai wrote:
> The paradox is what happens if we run Alice and Bob's minds on different
> substrates, so that Bob's mind has a much higher measure than Alice's.
I fail to understand the paradox. In the case where they are on the same
substrate, they are more likely to push button 2. OK
In th
Wei writes:
> If you don't think this is paradoxical, suppose we repeat the choice but
> with the payoffs for button 2 reversed, so that Bob wins $10 instead of
> Alice, and we also swap the two minds so that Alice is running on the
> substrate that generates more measure instead of Bob. They'll a
Consider the following thought experiment.
Two volunteers who don't know each other, Alice and Bob, are given
temporary amnesia and placed in identical virtual environments. They are
then both presented with three buttons and told the following:
If you push 1, you will lose $9
If you push 2 and
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