Re: testing
Your posts have been coming through. You can check http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en yourself to see if your posts have been received by the group. - Original Message - From: John Mikes To: everything-list@googlegroups.com ; Wei Dai Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2006 5:42 AM Subject: testing This is the 3rd time I send a 'test' to myself. I receive list-post on this gmail address, but my mail does not show up, neither here nor on the YAHOO-mail address I unsubscribed from. Am I still on the "No e-mail" exclusion? Or does the listserve not recognise my mailing? John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: testing
The listserver was experiencing a lot of "computer pain" recently and that prevented it from function normally :) John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: This is the 3rd time I send a 'test' to myself. I receive list-post on this gmail address, but my mail does not show up, neither here nor on the YAHOO-mail address I unsubscribed from. Am I still on the "No e-mail" exclusion? Or does the listserve not recognise my mailing? John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
testing
This is the 3rd time I send a 'test' to myself. I receive list-post on this gmail address, but my mail does not show up, neither here nor on the YAHOO-mail address I unsubscribed from. Am I still on the "No e-mail" exclusion? Or does the listserve not recognise my mailing? John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Jef Allbright wrote: peterdjones wrote: Moral and natural laws. An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, but there is no convincing some people). As ethical objectivism is a work-in-progress there are many variants, and a considerable literature discussing which is the correct one. I agree with the thrust of this post and I think there are a few key concepts which can further clarify thinking on this subject: (1) Although moral assessment is inherently subjective--being relative to internal values--all rational agents share some values in common due to sharing a common evolutionary heritage or even more fundamentally, being subject to the same physical laws of the universe. (2) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is "good" is what is assessed to promote the agent's values into the future. (3) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is "better" is what is assessed as "good" over increasing scope. (4) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is increasingly "right" or moral, is decision-making assessed as promoting increasingly shared values over increasing scope of agents and interactions. From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be no objective morality, nor any absolute morality, it is reasonable to expect increasing agreement on the relative morality of actions within an expanding context. Further, similar to the entropic arrow of time, we can conceive of an arrow of morality corresponding to the ratcheting forward of an increasingly broad context of shared values (survivors of coevolutionary competition) promoted via awareness of increasingly effective principles of interaction (scientific knowledge of what works, extracted from regularities in the environment.) Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive a practical system of social decision-making based on (1) increasing fine-grained knowledge of shared values, and (2) application of increasingly effective principles, selected with regard to models of probable outcomes in a Rawlsian mode of broad rather than narrow self-interest. I apologize for the extremely terse and sparse nature of this outline, but I wanted to contribute these keystones despite lacking the time to provide expanded background, examples, justifications, or clarifications. I hope that these seeds of thought may contribute to a flourishing garden both on and offlist. - Jef Well said! I agree almost completely - I'm a little uncertain about (3) and (4) above and the meaning of "scope". Together with the qualifications of Peter Jones regarding the lack of universal agreement on even the best supported theories of science, you have provided a good outline of the development of ethics in a way parallel with the scientific development of knowledge. There's a good paper on the relation facts and values by Oliver Curry which bears on many of the above points: http://human-nature.com/ep/downloads/ep04234247.pdf Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Brent meeker writes: > > > >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain > >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good > >> and > bad > >> That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. > >> good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) > >> evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as > >> it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do > >> that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, > >> because that's what "feels good" means, a feeling you want to have. > > > > But it is not an absurd question to ask whether something we have > > evolved to think is good really is good. You are focussing on the > > descriptive aspect of ethics and ignoring the normative. > > Right - because I don't think there is an normative aspect in the objective sense. > > >Even if it > > could be shown that a certain ethical belief has been hardwired into our > > brains this does not make the qustion of whether the belief is one we > > ought to have an absurd one. We could decide that evolution sucks and we > > have to deliberately flout it in every way we can. > > But we could only decide that by showing a conflict with something else we consider good. > > >It might not be a > > wise policy but it is not *wrong* in the way it would be wrong to claim > > that God made the world 6000 years ago. > > I agree, because I think there is a objective sense in which the world is more than 6000yrs old. > > >> >beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis > >> > argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would > >> ultimately > produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational > >> inclusion of certain > groups as inferior, they were right: we could > >> breed superior humans following > Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps > >> on other worlds evolution has made such > programs a natural part of > >> life, regarded by everyone as "good". Yet most of > us would regard > >> them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. > >> > >> Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular > >> movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded > >> people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't > >> trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily > >> limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced > >> voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think > >> anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). > > > > What about if we tested every child and allowed only the superior ones > > to reproduce? The point is, many people would just say this is wrong, > > regardless of the potential benefits to society or the species, and the > > response to this is not that it is absurd to hold it as wrong (leaving > > aside emotional rhetoric). > > But people wouldn't *just* say this is wrong. This example is a question of societal policy. It's about what *we* will impose on *them*. It is a question of ethics, not good and bad. So in fact people would give reasons it was wrong: Who's gonna say what "superior" means? Who gets to decide? They might say, "I just think it's bad." - but that would just be an implicit appeal to you to see whether you thought is was bad too. Social policy can only be judged in terms of what the individual members of society think is good or bad. > > I think I'm losing the thread of what we're discussing here. Are you holding that there are absolute norms of good/bad - as in your example of eugenics? Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see if I can summarise: Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason, whether that be evolution, what their parents taught them, or what it says in a book believed to be divinely inspired. Perhaps all of these reasons can be subsumed under "evolution" if that term can be extended beyond genetics to include all the ideas, beliefs, customs etc. that help a society to survive and propagate itself. Now, we can take this and formalise it in some way so that we can discuss ethical questions rationally: Murder is bad because it reduces the net happiness in society - Utilitarianism Murder is bed because it breaks the sixth commandment - Judaism and Christianity (interesting that this only no. 6 on a list of 10: God knows his priorities) Ethics then becomes objective, given the rules. The meta-ethical explanation of evolution, broadly understood, as generating the various ethical systems is also objective. However, it is possible for someone at the bottom of the heap to go over the head of utilitarianism, evolution, even God and say:
Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > Brent meeker writes: > >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good >> and > bad >> That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. >> good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) >> evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as >> it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do >> that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, >> because that's what "feels good" means, a feeling you want to have. > > But it is not an absurd question to ask whether something we have > evolved to think is good really is good. You are focussing on the > descriptive aspect of ethics and ignoring the normative. Right - because I don't think there is an normative aspect in the objective sense. >Even if it > could be shown that a certain ethical belief has been hardwired into our > brains this does not make the qustion of whether the belief is one we > ought to have an absurd one. We could decide that evolution sucks and we > have to deliberately flout it in every way we can. But we could only decide that by showing a conflict with something else we consider good. >It might not be a > wise policy but it is not *wrong* in the way it would be wrong to claim > that God made the world 6000 years ago. I agree, because I think there is a objective sense in which the world is more than 6000yrs old. >> >beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis >> > argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would >> ultimately > produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational >> inclusion of certain > groups as inferior, they were right: we could >> breed superior humans following > Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps >> on other worlds evolution has made such > programs a natural part of >> life, regarded by everyone as "good". Yet most of > us would regard >> them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. >> >> Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular >> movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded >> people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't >> trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily >> limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced >> voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think >> anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). > > What about if we tested every child and allowed only the superior ones > to reproduce? The point is, many people would just say this is wrong, > regardless of the potential benefits to society or the species, and the > response to this is not that it is absurd to hold it as wrong (leaving > aside emotional rhetoric). But people wouldn't *just* say this is wrong. This example is a question of societal policy. It's about what *we* will impose on *them*. It is a question of ethics, not good and bad. So in fact people would give reasons it was wrong: Who's gonna say what "superior" means? Who gets to decide? They might say, "I just think it's bad." - but that would just be an implicit appeal to you to see whether you thought is was bad too. Social policy can only be judged in terms of what the individual members of society think is good or bad. I think I'm losing the thread of what we're discussing here. Are you holding that there are absolute norms of good/bad - as in your example of eugenics? Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see if I can summarise: Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason, whether that be evolution, what their parents taught them, or what it says in a book believed to be divinely inspired. Perhaps all of these reasons can be subsumed under "evolution" if that term can be extended beyond genetics to include all the ideas, beliefs, customs etc. that help a society to survive and propagate itself. Now, we can take this and formalise it in some way so that we can discuss ethical questions rationally: Murder is bad because it reduces the net happiness in society - Utilitarianism Murder is bed because it breaks the sixth commandment - Judaism and Christianity (interesting that this only no. 6 on a list of 10: God knows his priorities) Ethics then becomes objective, given the rules. The meta-ethical explanation of evolution, broadly understood, as generating the various ethical systems is also objective. However, it is possible for someone at the bottom of the heap to go over the head of utilitarianism, evolution, even God and say: "Why should murder be bad? I don't care about the greatest good for the greatest number, I don't care if the specie
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is "famous" for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that "goodness" is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of "good", I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me. Not at all. It becomes bad when he refers or "justify" his act in the *name* of any "unnameable virtue". It's not clear what "bad" refers to in the above. It seems as though you are asserting an absolute standard of "bad" while claiming there can be no absolute standard of "good". My personal judgment of good or bad would not be so clear cut. If someone does me an act of kindness I consider that good. If he refers it to some "unameable virtue", e.g. he says he did it in the name of God or Capitalism, then I may consider it a little less good - but not bad. It is hard to define those unnanmeable virtue except that "true" is already one of those and "good", "just" etc. are obvious derivative of "true". But I must say that I am talking about some ideal case, and I can imagine context where nuance should be added. You can, for example, give a vaccine to a child. The child is unhappy about that because the vaccine has some distasteful taste or because he is afraid of needles, and you can make short your justification by saying "it is for your own good". Here you don't act in the name of good, you just sum up a long explanation based on the idea that a disease is not good for your child. Well even here the complete explanation is better in the case the child has no idea of any relationship between the vaccine and the disease. But even the most complete possible explanation must end at some point with something that is explicitly or implicitly good. But I think we agree that this good, in the explanation, must be something the child accepts as a personal good. Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept that because of feelings of empathy for others. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
peterdjones wrote: Moral and natural laws. An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, but there is no convincing some people). As ethical objectivism is a work-in-progress there are many variants, and a considerable literature discussing which is the correct one. I agree with the thrust of this post and I think there are a few key concepts which can further clarify thinking on this subject: (1) Although moral assessment is inherently subjective--being relative to internal values--all rational agents share some values in common due to sharing a common evolutionary heritage or even more fundamentally, being subject to the same physical laws of the universe. (2) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is "good" is what is assessed to promote the agent's values into the future. (3) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is "better" is what is assessed as "good" over increasing scope. (4) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is increasingly "right" or moral, is decision-making assessed as promoting increasingly shared values over increasing scope of agents and interactions. From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be no objective morality, nor any absolute morality, it is reasonable to expect increasing agreement on the relative morality of actions within an expanding context. Further, similar to the entropic arrow of time, we can conceive of an arrow of morality corresponding to the ratcheting forward of an increasingly broad context of shared values (survivors of coevolutionary competition) promoted via awareness of increasingly effective principles of interaction (scientific knowledge of what works, extracted from regularities in the environment.) Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive a practical system of social decision-making based on (1) increasing fine-grained knowledge of shared values, and (2) application of increasingly effective principles, selected with regard to models of probable outcomes in a Rawlsian mode of broad rather than narrow self-interest. I apologize for the extremely terse and sparse nature of this outline, but I wanted to contribute these keystones despite lacking the time to provide expanded background, examples, justifications, or clarifications. I hope that these seeds of thought may contribute to a flourishing garden both on and offlist. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Moral and natural laws. An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, but there is no convincing some people). At first glance, morality looks as though it should work objectively. The mere fact that we praise and condemn people's moral behaviour indicates that we think a common set of rules is applicable to us and them. To put it another way, if ethics were strongly subjective anyone could get off the hook by devising a system of personal morality in which whatever they felt like doing was permissible. It would be hard to see the difference between such a state of affairs and having no morality at all. The subtler sort of subjectivist (or relativist) tries to ameliorate this problem by claiming that moral principles re defined at the societal level, but similar problems recur -- a society (such as the Thuggees or Assassins) could declare that murder is OK with them. These considerations are of course an appeal to how morality seems to work as a 'language game' and as such do not put ethics on a firm foundation -- the language game could be groundless. I will argue that it is not, but first the other side of the argument needs to be put. It is indisputable that morality varies in practice across communities. But the contention of ethical objectivism is not that everyone actually does hold to a single objective system of ethics; it is only that ethical questions can be resolved objectively in principle. The existence of an objective solution to any kind of problem is always compatible with the existence of people who, for whatever reason, do not subscribe. The roundness of the Earth is no less an objective fact for the existence of believers in the Flat Earth theory.(It is odd that the single most popular argument for ethical subjectivism has so little logical force). Another objection is that an objective system of ethics must be accepted by everybody, irrespective of their motivations, and must therefore be based in self-interest. Again, this gets the nature of objectivity wrong. The fact that some people cannot see does not make any empirical evidence less objective, the fact that some people refuse to employ logic does not make logical argument any less objective. All claims to objectivity make the background assumption that the people who will actually employ the objective methodology in question are willing and able. We will return to this topic toward the end. Some people insist that anyone who is promoting ethical objectivism and opposing relativism must be doing so in order to illegitamately promote their own ethical system as absolute. While this is problably pragmatically true in many cases, particularly where political and religious rhetoric is involved, it has no real logical force, because the contention of ethical objectivism is only that ethical questions are objectively resolvable in principle -- it does not entail a claim that the speaker or anyone else is actually in possession of them. This marks the first of our analogues with science, since the in-principle objectivity of science coincides with the fact that current scientific thinking is almost certainly not final or absolute. ethical objectivism is thus a middle road between subjectivism/relativism on the one hand, and various absolutisms (such as religious fundamentalism) on the other. The final objection, and by far the most philosophically respectable one, is the objection on that moral rules need to correspond to some kind of 'queer fact' or 'moral object' which cannot be found. Natural laws do not correspond in a simplistic one-to-one way with any empirically detectable object, yet empiricism is relevant to both supporting and disconfirming natural laws. With this in mind, we should not rush to reject the objective reality of moral laws on the basis that there is no 'queer' object for them to stand in one-to-one correspondence with. There is, therefore, a semi-detached relationship between natural laws and facts -- laws are not facts but are not unrelated to facts -- facts confirm and disconfirm them. There is also a famous dichotomy between fact and value (where 'value' covers ethics, morality etc). You cannot, we are told, derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is the fact/value problem. But, as Hume's argument reminds us, you cannot derive a law from an isolated observation. Call this the fact/law problem. Now, if the morality is essentially a matter or ethical rules or laws, might not the fact/value problem and the law/value problem be at least partly the same ? (Note that there seems to be a middle ground here; the English "should" can indicate lawfulness without implying either inevitability, like a natural law, or morality. eg you "should" move the bishop diagonally in chess -- but that does not mean you will, or that it is unethical to do so. It is just against the rules of ches
Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see if I can summarise: Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason, whether that be evolution, what their parents taught them, or what it says in a book believed to be divinely inspired. Perhaps all of these reasons can be subsumed under "evolution" if that term can be extended beyond genetics to include all the ideas, beliefs, customs etc. that help a society to survive and propagate itself. Now, we can take this and formalise it in some way so that we can discuss ethical questions rationally: Murder is bad because it reduces the net happiness in society - Utilitarianism Murder is bed because it breaks the sixth commandment - Judaism and Christianity (interesting that this only no. 6 on a list of 10: God [intuitive people] knows his [know their] priorities) Ethics then becomes objective, given the rules. The meta-ethical explanation of evolution, broadly understood, as generating the various ethical systems is also objective. However, it is possible for someone at the bottom of the heap to go over the head of utilitarianism, evolution, even God and say: "Why should murder be bad? I don't care about the greatest good for the greatest number, I don't care if the species dies out, and I think God is a bastard and will shout it from hell if sends me there for killing people for fun and profit. This is my own personal ethical belief, and you can't tell me I'm wrong! And the psychopath is right: no-one can actually fault him on a point of fact or a point of logic. In the *final* analysis, ethical beliefs are not a matter of fact or logic, and if it seems that they are then there is a hidden assumption somewhere. Stathis Papaioannou A bit convoluted and somewhat embellished, but essentially: correct. And violence need not be the standard for an ethic leading to problematic results. The 19th century Christian sect Shakers abhord reproduction & proseletyzing. They were non-violent devout prayer based people, but their 'ethic' led to their own extinction. As impartial evaluators, it is sometimes difficult for us to unemotionally unbiasedly categeorize human dynamics. There are in any given human millieu a -variety- of parameter which have actionable behaviors that can be categorized beneficial/unbeneficial, preferrable/ unpreferrable, good/bad, constructive/destructive, encouraging/disencouraging, not-evil/evil. Any one parameter, or group of parameters can become the 'situational standard bearer' and other parameters fall where they may. We value 'individuality' but some cultures sacrifice individuals for the security of the collective. Different cultures will resist sacrificing until deemed absolutely necessary. Others have a lesser requirment; may even proactively sacrifice for strategic motivations. And the 'positive' motivation is labelled 'altruism' - sacrifice in the promotion of and alternative (sic-'greater') benefit. An 'evil' of one parameter re-cast as a 'good' for another. Killers -do- have a rationale and 'logic' they function under. And it can be 'objectively correct'. IF -- if and only if - the parameters' assumptions/decisions are accepted as utile, correct, tenable. Jamie --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cosmological Theodicea - JOINING post
Hi Maurizio, Le 11-déc.-06, à 14:29, Maurizio Morabito a écrit : Hello everybody I am a 39-year-old male with a Master in Engineering, a scientific background and an enduring passion for Cosmology I have been elaborating something along lines similar to Tegmark's myself for a few years, albeit starting from a more philosophical point of view I appreciate Tegmark's "mathematicalism". But I cannot follow him in the details because he assumes a naive relation between an observer and a "physical" universe. Precisely, if we assume there is a level where we are turing-emulable, I have argued(*) that the physical laws should emerge from a sum on all computations capable of supporting my current computational state. Eventually this makes physics a branch of computer science. At the same time this gives physics a predominant role in the sense that physics is no more related to some special mathematical structure, but to a sort of sum (perhaps a generalized integral à-la Feynman) on all mathematical structures. My original question was something like this: "Given that I am physical being, can a tree in my thoughts be any less physical than a tree in my garden?" Are you open to the idea that the tree in the garden is no more physical than the tree in your eyes? A little like if "physical reality" was the result of a video game. Actually I would argue physics emerge from an infinity of "video games" which mathematical existence can be justified already in weak axiomatic of the natural numbers (with addition and multiplication) or from any specification of any universal turing machine. Tegmark is a bit too quick on the mind/body relationship (to make it short). Here's my current stance on the topic (I presume the titles are giveaways...): God’s Many Dices (I) - The Science of Parallel Universes (an extended commentary of Tegmark's): http://omnologos.wordpress.com/2006/10/23/god%e2%80%99s-many-dices-i- the-science-of-parallel-universes/ http://tinyurl.com/y565d2 God’s Many Dices (II) - The Philosophy of Parallel Universes (introductory remarks on the philosophical consequences of parallel universes) http://omnologos.wordpress.com/2006/10/24/god%e2%80%99s-many-dices-ii- the-philosophy-of-parallel-universes/ http://tinyurl.com/y4udnp In the second article I propose an answer to the Theodicea question (namely, God doesn't just "allow evil" to happen: God allows "everything" to happen). I haven't come across that before (is anybody else here interested in the topic?) What is the difference between "everything exists" (the main line of this list) and God allows everything to happen. What is that "God" and how does the fact that It allows everything to happen solve the "theodicea question". Is a God allowing Darfur "good" ? Does "God" allows everything to happen, or is "God" not able not to allow everything to happen (in that case your "God" has no relationship with the Christian God and with the traditional theodicea question, as some have reminded me recently in the list. Anyway, having just joined I'll now lurk for a while You are welcome, regards maurizio Blog (English): http://omnologos.wordpress.com Blog (Italiano): http://mauriziomorabito.wordpress.com Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Brent meeker writes: > > > >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain > >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good > >> and > bad > >> That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. > >> good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) > >> evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as > >> it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do > >> that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, > >> because that's what "feels good" means, a feeling you want to have. > > > > But it is not an absurd question to ask whether something we have > > evolved to think is good really is good. You are focussing on the > > descriptive aspect of ethics and ignoring the normative. > > Right - because I don't think there is an normative aspect in the objective sense. > > >Even if it > > could be shown that a certain ethical belief has been hardwired into our > > brains this does not make the qustion of whether the belief is one we > > ought to have an absurd one. We could decide that evolution sucks and we > > have to deliberately flout it in every way we can. > > But we could only decide that by showing a conflict with something else we consider good. > > >It might not be a > > wise policy but it is not *wrong* in the way it would be wrong to claim > > that God made the world 6000 years ago. > > I agree, because I think there is a objective sense in which the world is more than 6000yrs old. > > >> >beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis > >> > argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would > >> ultimately > produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational > >> inclusion of certain > groups as inferior, they were right: we could > >> breed superior humans following > Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps > >> on other worlds evolution has made such > programs a natural part of > >> life, regarded by everyone as "good". Yet most of > us would regard > >> them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. > >> > >> Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular > >> movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded > >> people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't > >> trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily > >> limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced > >> voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think > >> anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). > > > > What about if we tested every child and allowed only the superior ones > > to reproduce? The point is, many people would just say this is wrong, > > regardless of the potential benefits to society or the species, and the > > response to this is not that it is absurd to hold it as wrong (leaving > > aside emotional rhetoric). > > But people wouldn't *just* say this is wrong. This example is a question of societal policy. It's about what *we* will impose on *them*. It is a question of ethics, not good and bad. So in fact people would give reasons it was wrong: Who's gonna say what "superior" means? Who gets to decide? They might say, "I just think it's bad." - but that would just be an implicit appeal to you to see whether you thought is was bad too. Social policy can only be judged in terms of what the individual members of society think is good or bad. > > I think I'm losing the thread of what we're discussing here. Are you holding that there are absolute norms of good/bad - as in your example of eugenics? Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see if I can summarise: Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason, whether that be evolution, what their parents taught them, or what it says in a book believed to be divinely inspired. Perhaps all of these reasons can be subsumed under "evolution" if that term can be extended beyond genetics to include all the ideas, beliefs, customs etc. that help a society to survive and propagate itself. Now, we can take this and formalise it in some way so that we can discuss ethical questions rationally: Murder is bad because it reduces the net happiness in society - Utilitarianism Murder is bed because it breaks the sixth commandment - Judaism and Christianity (interesting that this only no. 6 on a list of 10: God knows his priorities) Ethics then becomes objective, given the rules. The meta-ethical explanation of evolution, broadly understood, as generating the various ethical systems is also objective. However, it is possible for someone at the bottom of the heap to go over the head of utilitarianism, evolution, even God and say: "Why should murder be bad? I don't care about the g
RE: computer pain
Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > Brent meeker writes: > >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good >> and > bad >> That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. >> good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) >> evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as >> it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do >> that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, >> because that's what "feels good" means, a feeling you want to have. > > But it is not an absurd question to ask whether something we have > evolved to think is good really is good. You are focussing on the > descriptive aspect of ethics and ignoring the normative. Right - because I don't think there is an normative aspect in the objective sense. >Even if it > could be shown that a certain ethical belief has been hardwired into our > brains this does not make the qustion of whether the belief is one we > ought to have an absurd one. We could decide that evolution sucks and we > have to deliberately flout it in every way we can. But we could only decide that by showing a conflict with something else we consider good. >It might not be a > wise policy but it is not *wrong* in the way it would be wrong to claim > that God made the world 6000 years ago. I agree, because I think there is a objective sense in which the world is more than 6000yrs old. >> >beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis >> > argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would >> ultimately > produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational >> inclusion of certain > groups as inferior, they were right: we could >> breed superior humans following > Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps >> on other worlds evolution has made such > programs a natural part of >> life, regarded by everyone as "good". Yet most of > us would regard >> them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. >> >> Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular >> movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded >> people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't >> trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily >> limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced >> voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think >> anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). > > What about if we tested every child and allowed only the superior ones > to reproduce? The point is, many people would just say this is wrong, > regardless of the potential benefits to society or the species, and the > response to this is not that it is absurd to hold it as wrong (leaving > aside emotional rhetoric). But people wouldn't *just* say this is wrong. This example is a question of societal policy. It's about what *we* will impose on *them*. It is a question of ethics, not good and bad. So in fact people would give reasons it was wrong: Who's gonna say what "superior" means? Who gets to decide? They might say, "I just think it's bad." - but that would just be an implicit appeal to you to see whether you thought is was bad too. Social policy can only be judged in terms of what the individual members of society think is good or bad. I think I'm losing the thread of what we're discussing here. Are you holding that there are absolute norms of good/bad - as in your example of eugenics? Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see if I can summarise: Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason, whether that be evolution, what their parents taught them, or what it says in a book believed to be divinely inspired. Perhaps all of these reasons can be subsumed under "evolution" if that term can be extended beyond genetics to include all the ideas, beliefs, customs etc. that help a society to survive and propagate itself. Now, we can take this and formalise it in some way so that we can discuss ethical questions rationally: Murder is bad because it reduces the net happiness in society - Utilitarianism Murder is bed because it breaks the sixth commandment - Judaism and Christianity (interesting that this only no. 6 on a list of 10: God knows his priorities) Ethics then becomes objective, given the rules. The meta-ethical explanation of evolution, broadly understood, as generating the various ethical systems is also objective. However, it is possible for someone at the bottom of the heap to go over the head of utilitarianism, evolution, even God and say: "Why should murder be bad? I don't care about the greatest good for the greatest number, I don't care if the species dies out, and I think God is
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is "famous" for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that "goodness" is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of "good", I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me. Not at all. It becomes bad when he refers or "justify" his act in the *name* of any "unnameable virtue". It is hard to define those unnanmeable virtue except that "true" is already one of those and "good", "just" etc. are obvious derivative of "true". But I must say that I am talking about some ideal case, and I can imagine context where nuance should be added. You can, for example, give a vaccine to a child. The child is unhappy about that because the vaccine has some distasteful taste or because he is afraid of needles, and you can make short your justification by saying "it is for your own good". Here you don't act in the name of good, you just sum up a long explanation based on the idea that a disease is not good for your child. Well even here the complete explanation is better in the case the child has no idea of any relationship between the vaccine and the disease. Although a lobian machine has no idea of what is an absolutely true sentence, she can have genuine approximation of true for restricted set of sentences and I can imagine similar definable restricted notion of good. We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative use of a notion like "goodness". It prevents also idolatry toward names or descriptions of "good", "true", "correct". With comp a judge can put a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the machine deserves jail. OK. That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal. So one can say, "I did that because I think it was good to do so." And I can try to persuade you that you should think it good too. It's just wrong to assume that there is a knowable, objective "good". Indeed. As far as there is a knowable good, it cannot be objective. As far as there is an objective good, it is not knowable *as such*. (It can be accidentally knowable but then not as an "objective good". I guess this is related with the popular belief that "Roads to Hell are paved with good intentions" (approximate translation from the french). Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC). Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the "angel" Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine (that does not follow logically). I know "I" am lobian, assuming comp or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am consistent and I still less know if I am correct. Bruno Yes, I understand and agree with that. But you are using "know" in an absolute sense. In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably correct belief, one can know many things - though of course not that one is consistent. OK. (To be sure I am indeed using "know" in an absolute sense, even in the theatetical sense: meaning that "knowable p" = " p & provable p"). To split the hair a bit, if "know" is used with a nuance of "probability" we can "know" our consistency (obvious: we can bet on it), so that in your last assertion I would say you were also using "know" in the absolute sense. But I think we mainly agree. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [E
