Re: Everything is Just a Memory
Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > There is a widespread confusion between two kind of idealism. > > 1) There is solipsism, sometimes called "subjective idealism". It is > (as James Higgo said) the doctrine that I am dreaming, that I am the only > builder of reality, and all other people are just zombie. > This is a ridiculous doctrine, although it can be used to illustrate > some philophical point, like the concept of zombie. > It is a ridiculous doctrine, because a doctrine is something you > communicate, and why should someone try to communicate things to > zombie. So solipsisme (like some strong form of positivism) is > self-defeating. I don't agree that this is a ridiculous doctrine, or that a believer in solipsism should not communicate. A solipsist may communicate with others, even if he believes they are not conscious, in order to get information and ideas. In his model of the world, certain information comes to him only through interaction with the outside. If he is to work out his ideas in fullness, he can best do so by interacting with the outside world. This may involve bouncing ideas off of other people, and even trying to persuade them, in order to test the quality of his ideas. It is like a believer in more conventional philosophies who finds it useful to write his ideas down on paper (or on a computer), in order to clarify them and look for problems and new approaches. He doesn't think the paper or computer is conscious, but this method of interacting with the outside world can still be productive. The real problem with solipsism, IMO, is that it fails to predict or explain why the world is the way it is. Fine, I'm dreaming. Why? Why am I dreaming that I live in a lawful universe? And why do I have dreams within the dream, and those dreams are not of a lawful universe? None of this is explained. Contrast this with other approaches to philosophy, such as the all- universes models we have been discussing. These approaches have the potential to truly explain why the universe is lawful, and why we see things in roughly the way they are. It might even turn out that our very universe is, by some measures, the most probable one to exist. We don't know for sure that things will work out this way, but at least the potential is there. This makes it a very productive avenue to explore. It is hard to see how solipsism could begin to provide this kind of explanation. Hal
Re: Everything is Just a Memory
Fritz Griffith wrote to Russell: >I'd like to hear just one good reason why you are dismissing these ideas. >You seem to have a lot of ignorance towards solipsism (whatever exactly that >is), yet you don't give any reasons why. As best as I can understand, you >think my ideas are crossing too far into philosophical territory, where >nothing gets accomplished. This often happens when too many assumptions are >made. I took the opposite approach, however; I made no assumptions, and >used logic and reasoning to draw my conclusions. Please point out just >where this theory goes wrong. Idealisme is the Platonist idea that only ideas exists. There is a widespread confusion between two kind of idealism. 1) There is solipsism, sometimes called "subjective idealism". It is (as James Higgo said) the doctrine that I am dreaming, that I am the only builder of reality, and all other people are just zombie. This is a ridiculous doctrine, although it can be used to illustrate some philophical point, like the concept of zombie. It is a ridiculous doctrine, because a doctrine is something you communicate, and why should someone try to communicate things to zombie. So solipsisme (like some strong form of positivism) is self-defeating. 2) There is all form of objective idealism. Some "mind-like" predicates are taken as more fundamental than matter or physicalist predicates. It can be number (Pythagorism) mathematical structure (Platonism), or extravagant set of mortal to god-like entities (like in some Indian idealist school). Reading Griffith's post, unlike Russell, but like Higgo, I don't have concluded that Fritz Griffith was solipsist, though. It seems to me he defended a sort of objective idealism (like me BTW), even if his use of the word "memory" is a little vague. But is not the discussion-list a tool for helping us to make our ideas clearer? Concerning the (logical or physical, whatever) link between memories, observer-instant, worlds, etc. This is a very difficult matter. I say a little more in the post I will send to Jacques Mallah. Bruno
Re: Turing Machines Have no Real Time Clock (Was The Game of Life)
In a message dated 01/14/2000 1:48:25 PM Pacific Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > Your first sentence is complete codswallop, and your second sentence > is bizarre. Prove it! > > > > > In a message dated 01/13/2000 5:58:18 PM Pacific Standard Time, > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > > > > Who say's the world is quantized? > > > > If the world was not quantized the comp hypothesis would not hold. In fact, > > > It would be impossible for physical constants to have any definite value, > > since there would not be any reference to anchor them with. > > > > George Levy > > > > > > I looked up codswallop in the dictionnary and I was very surprised to find that it is a recent British word coined around 1963. It means "nonsense." OK. This is your opinion. First sentence: The comp hypothesis depends on Turing Machines which are inherently discrete. A continuous universe would not by emulable by a Turing Machine. Read Bruno's latest post. He has a much better grasp of this issue then me. Second sentence: To prove that if physical constants are to take any definite value, the universe must be quantized. Let us say that there exist a TOE based on one single physical constant X (for example Planck's constant). Without loss of generality, we can say that the value of X is 1, since there is no other constant to compare it to. Assuming that a Turing machine is used to apply this TOE to solve poblem and calculate any quantity in the world then any quantitiy derived from this TOE would have to belong to the set of integers -- including space time and energy. We can extend this reasonning to TOE's that include n arbitrary physical constants. George Levy
