Re: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines?
Stephen Paul King wrote: I am asking this to try to understand how Bruno has a problem with BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy substancial universe. It seems to me that the term machine very much requires some kind of stuffy substancial universe to exist in, even one that is in thermodynamic equilibrium. I fail to see how we can reduce physicality to psychology all the while ignoring the need to actually implement the abstract notion of Comp. I really would like to understand this! Sets of zero information fail to explain how we have actual experiences of worlds that are stuffy substancial ones. It might help if we had a COMP version of inertia! Even Descartes realised the incompatibility between Mechanism and Weak Materialism (the doctrine that Stuff exits), in his Meditation. I think Stuff has been introduced by Aristotle. Plato was aware, mainly through the dream argument, that evidence of stuff is no proof, and he conjectured that stuff was shadows of a deeper, invariant and ideal reality, which is beyond localisation in space or time. My question is why do you want postulate the existence of stuff. The only answer I can imagine is wanting that physics is fundamental. But that moves makes both physics and psychology, plus the apparent links between, quite mysterious. No doubt that Aristotle errors has accelerated the rise of experimental science and has made possible the industrial revolution. But Aristotle stuff has been only use to hide fundamental question which neither science nor technics will be able to continue to hide. Dennett argues that consciousness, for being explained at all, must be explained without postulating it. I think the same is true for matter, space, time, and any sort of stuff. But, now, with comp, what I say here becomes a consequence of the movie graph argument or of Maudlin's article computation and consciousness. See Maudlin or movie in the archive for more explanation or references. You can also dismiss the movie/Maudlin argument if both: 1) You grant me the comp apparition of physics through the proof of LASE 2) You accept some form of OCCAM razor (the concetual form used by Everett or by most 'everythingers'). Regards, Bruno
RE: Algorithmic Revolution?
Colin Hales wrote ... Not really TOE stuff, so I?ll desist for now. I remain ever hopeful that one day I?ll be able to understand Bruno?. :-) Ah! Thanks for that optimistic proposition :-) Let us forget the AUDA which needs indeed some familiarity with mathematical logic. But the UDA? It would help me to understand at which point you have a problem. For example I understand where Hall Finney stops, although I still does not understand why. I got a pretty clear idea where and why Stephen King disagrees. This can help me to ameliorate the presentation. You could also help yourself through the formulation of precise questions. Perhaps you did and I miss it? (*) Bruno (*) My computer crashed badly some weeks ago and I use the university mailing system which is not so stable. Apology for funny spellings, RE:RE:-addition in replies, lack of signature, etc.
Everything need a little more than 0 information
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] There is no problem is saying that all computations exist in platonia (or the plenitude). This is a zero information set, and requires no further explanation. Stricly speaking I disagree. The expression all computations needs Church thesis for example. And Church thesis is a non trivial bag of info. But I see where is the point. The all computation set is a zero information set, but is not a zero meta-information set, should we say. Same for all numbers, all sets You still need to define axiomatically numbers or sets. There will always be some mysterious entity we need to postulate. That is why I postulate explicitely the Arithmetical Realism in comp. Too vague Everything could lead to inconsistencies. Bruno
Re: Is classical teleportation possible?
Stephen Paul King wrote: I found these statements: http://www.imaph.tu-bs.de/qi/concepts.html#TP Teleportation with purely classical means is impossible, which is precisely the observation making the theory of Quantum Information a new branch of Information Theory. This is correct. What the authors mean is that Quantum teleportation is impossible to do by purely classical means. They are not saying that classical teleportation is impossible. They say that because some quantum algorithm has been shown runnable by purely classical gates (but even this can be ambiguous, so be careful taking the context of the paper into account). Regards, Bruno
Re: Everything need a little more than 0 information
Gentlemen (and Ladies, if some be present here), I offer you a small bit of wisdom and irony, presented in a bit of humor. Statement of vernacular AND mathematical truth: The universe is an ODD PLACE. (!) [i.e., it is imbalanced and -not- fundamentally symmetric] PROOF: -infinity --- [zero] --- +infinity The symmetric infinities balance and cancel each other out, leaving an entity~identity having no complement; an 'odd' remainder. So, when all is said and done, the universe is essentially an 'odd place'.:-))) Jamie Rose ps. then again, you might want to do what I am doing: looking to build a more complete mathematics in which some states of [one] and [zero] are equal to each other. ! :-) jr Marchal Bruno wrote: From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] There is no problem is saying that all computations exist in platonia (or the plenitude). This is a zero information set, and requires no further explanation. Stricly speaking I disagree. The expression all computations needs Church thesis for example. And Church thesis is a non trivial bag of info. But I see where is the point. The all computation set is a zero information set, but is not a zero meta-information set, should we say. Same for all numbers, all sets You still need to define axiomatically numbers or sets. There will always be some mysterious entity we need to postulate. That is why I postulate explicitely the Arithmetical Realism in comp. Too vague Everything could lead to inconsistencies. Bruno
Re: Everything need a little more than 0 information
Russell Standish writes to Bruno Marchal: As you have well pointed out, the set of all descriptions can be computed in c time (c = cardinality of the reals) on an ordinary Universal Turing Machine via the UD. It is, however, a nonclassical model of computation. That doesn't sound right to me. Time in the context of a UTM should be discrete, hence the largest cardinality relevant would be aleph-null, the cardinality of the integers. Are you sure that c is necessary? Hal Finney
Re: Everything need a little more than 0 information
Dear Hal, The set of all descriptions has at least the cardinality of the Reals by the Diagonalization argument by definition. Please recall how Cantor used the Diagonalization argument to prove that the Reals had a larger cardinality that that of the integers. If the Set of all Descriptions is all inclusive then it must containt any description that is constructable using pieces of each and every other description and thus can not has the same cardinality as that of the integers. I have a question: Where does Cantor's continuum hypothesis apply to this? (if at all) Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, November 29, 2002 9:04 PM Subject: Re: Everything need a little more than 0 information Russell Standish writes to Bruno Marchal: As you have well pointed out, the set of all descriptions can be computed in c time (c = cardinality of the reals) on an ordinary Universal Turing Machine via the UD. It is, however, a nonclassical model of computation. That doesn't sound right to me. Time in the context of a UTM should be discrete, hence the largest cardinality relevant would be aleph-null, the cardinality of the integers. Are you sure that c is necessary? Hal Finney
