Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Returning to your example, if God creates a person, call him A, and a day
> later kills him, A will be really dead (as opposed to provisionally dead) if
> there will never be any successor OM's to his last conscious moment. Now,
> suppose God kills A and then create
George Levy writes:
Psychological copying is much less stringent than Physical copying. It
requires that the person being copied feels the same as the original, "a la
Turing test." This introduce the intriguing possibility of psychological
indeterminacy which allows me to regard myself as the
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Here is another way of explaining this situation. When there are multiple
> parallel copies of you, you have no way of knowing which copy you are,
> although you definitely are one of the copies during any given moment, with
> no telepathic links with the others or
Hal wrote:
> Those are interesting speculations, but I don't think it
> really makes sense to imagine travelling between the worlds
> of the Tegmark multiverse.
> There are no causal connections between them of the type that
> would be necessary for an information packet to travel in the
> way
Hal Finney writes:
Consider an experiment where we are simulating someone and can give
them either a good or bad experience. These are not replays, they are
new experiences which we can accurately anticipate will be pleasant
or unpleasant.
Suppose we are going to flip a biased quantum coin, on
I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed
body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell
Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the
coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or position,
Ben Goertzel writes:
> I recently wrote a blog entry on time travel
>
> http://www.goertzel.org/blog/blog.htm
>
> and Tom Buckner followed up with an interesting comment on the potential
> for time travel in Tegmarkian multiple universes.
Those are interesting speculations, but I don't think it re
Hal Finney writes:
I guess I would say, I would survive death via anything that does not
reduce my measure. If I am stopped here, I should be started over there,
or back then, or when such-and-such happens. If my measure is conserved
then I can be happy. If it can be increased, I will be that
Hi,
I recently wrote a blog entry on time travel
http://www.goertzel.org/blog/blog.htm
and Tom Buckner followed up with an interesting
comment on the potential for time travel in Tegmarkian multiple
universes.
(You can see it by going to the bottom of the page
and clicking where it
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Yes; hence, everyone is immortal. But leaving that much-debated issue aside
> for now, I'm not sure that I understand what, if anything, you would accept
> as a method of surviving the death of your physical body. Would you consider
> that scanning your brain at the
> Hal Finney writes:
> >God creates someone with memories of a past life, lets him live for a
> >day, then instantly and painlessly kills him.
> >
> >What would you say that he experiences? Would he notice his birth and
> >death? I would generally apply the same answers to the 10^100 people
>
In the thought experiments I have recently proposed, I should have specified
*functionally* exact copies. Millions of neurons die in a normal adult brain
every day, and generally this loss isn't even noticed, so the sort of detail
which would make the uncertainty principle a significant consider
On Sat, Jun 18, 2005 at 02:02:01PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> In practice most people believe that consciousness does not depend
> critically on quantum states, so making a copy of a person's mind would
> not be affected by these considerations.
It is interesting that there is still no publicly
R. Miller writes:
(snip)
The above mechanism would still work even if, as in my thought experiment,
there were 10^100 exact copies running in lockstep and all but one died.
Each one of the 10^100-1 copies would experience continuity of
consciousness through the remaining copy, so none would r
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