Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

On 03 Sep 2005, at 20:54, Hal Finney wrote:Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology.  The problem isthat sometimes you use "comp" as if it is the same as computationalism,and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the ChurchThesis and Arithmetical Realism.  Maybe

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Bruno writes: I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away from YD could be more confusing. I think that is probably true about the

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Hal Finney, You say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who

Re: subjective reality

Hi Norman, I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify this. So, this like postulating that a powerless God exists.

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Hi Norman, A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe. If your universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from your perspective. Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Bruno writes Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality without invoking Church thesis. That's funny. My doctor never explains

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Hal writes That simple mathematical objects have a sort of existence is probably unobjectionable, but most people probably don't give it too much thought. For most, it's a question analogous to whether a falling tree makes a noise when there's no one there to hear it. Whether the number 3