RE: Bruno's argument
John M > > Colin, > the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and > ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to > find better and more fitting words... > (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those > better fitting wods). > You wrote: > >... *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with > respect > >to us that we label 'physical'...< > Do I sense a separation "us" versus the 'rest of the universe'? > I figure it is not a relation between "them" (the rest of the universe) > and > "us" (what is this? God's children?) especially after your preceding > sentence: > > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably > 'in > > it'.< > I am looking for distinctive features which help us 'feel' as ourselves in > the total and universal interconnectedness. The "closeness" > (interrelation?) > vs a more remote connectivity. > The 'self', which I do not expropriate for us. > I have no idea about 'physical', it reflects our age-old ways of > observing > whatever was observable with that poor epistemic cognitive inventory our > ancestors used reducing mindset, observation and explanation to their > models > (level of the era). > 40 or 50 orders of spatial magnitude down deep, space and matter merge into their common organisational parent. There is no 'separateness', we have never justified that, only assumed it and seen no convincing empirical evidence other than a failure of science to sort out consciousness because of the assumption. Whatever the depth of structure, we humans are ALL of it. The existence of consciousness (qualia) is proof that the separateness is virtual (as-if). IMO the separation is merely a delineation - a notional boundary supported by our perception systems. Just because a perceived boundary is closed does not mean that it is not 'open' in some other way down deep in the structure of the universe. So I guess we are in agreement here. > Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's > vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it > conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we > may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word for > it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the > Turing > or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. > > John M > Not sure I follow you here. All abstracted computing everywhere is 'as-if'. None of the input domains of numbers or anything else are ever reified. We simply declare a place to act like it was there and then behave as if it were. The results work fine! I'm writing this using exactly that process. Looks 'as-if' I'm writing a letter no? :-) Qualia requires that form of computation executed by the 'natural domain'... IMO it's computation..it just doesn't fit neatly into our limited idealized mathematics done by creature constructed of it from within it. The natural world does not have to comply with our limited abstractions, nor does the apparent existence of an abstraction that seems to act 'as-if' it captures everything in the natural world. Abstractions are just abstractions... ultimately it's all expressed as patterns in the stuff of the universe... IMO If there's any property intrinsic and implicit to the reality of the universe (whatever it is, it is it!) then the abstraction throws it away. Cheers Colin hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
Lambda.
We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
Cheers
On Thu, Jul 27, 2006 at 11:08:04AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> This is actually a very interesting paper, by Starkman and Trotta. I had
> seen some mention of it but hadn't tracked it down. Here is the abstract:
>
> The paper basically shows that observers (or civilizations) can last
> longer in universes with smaller CC's. The CC eventually puts an end
> to the observations that can be made, because the expansion gets too
> fast and there is no longer enough energy density. The higher the CC,
> the sooner this happens. With CC's as high as what we observe, the
> theoretical lifetime of civilization is much shorter than in universes
> with smaller CC's.
>
> The authors choose to use as their measure, the number of times the
> CC can be measured in a given universe. This makes low-CC universes
> have a much higher measure, because the window for CC observations is
> longer in those. Hence they conclude that the highest probability is
> for a CC much smaller than we observe, and so our own CC value cannot
> be explained anthropically.
>
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Re: Bruno's argument
Colin, the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to find better and more fitting words... (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those better fitting wods). You wrote: >... *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with respect >to us that we label 'physical'...< Do I sense a separation "us" versus the 'rest of the universe'? I figure it is not a relation between "them" (the rest of the universe) and "us" (what is this? God's children?) especially after your preceding sentence: > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably 'in > it'.< I am looking for distinctive features which help us 'feel' as ourselves in the total and universal interconnectedness. The "closeness" (interrelation?) vs a more remote connectivity. The 'self', which I do not expropriate for us. I have no idea about 'physical', it reflects our age-old ways of observing whatever was observable with that poor epistemic cognitive inventory our ancestors used reducing mindset, observation and explanation to their models (level of the era). Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word for it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the Turing or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. John M - Original Message - From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 6:11 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument > >> >> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me > to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other >>> contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my > views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then > it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that computations are > implemented as a result of physical processes, even if a separate > physical reality did exist. It may yet be the case that consciousness > is >>> only the result of special physical processes, perhaps brains and > digital computers but not rocks or the mere existence of computations > as >>> mathematical objects, but then this would entail giving up >>> computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations contribute > to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's >>> suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this > preserves computationalism either. >>> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do >> not require a physical basis" and "computations do not >> require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical >> implemented by a wide variety of systems) >> >> > > The distractions of language in this are so subtle. The word 'physical' is > so laden with preconceived notions. I wish I could think of a better word > but I can't. Perhaps a better way of couching it would help: > > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably 'in > it'. > *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with respect to > us that we label 'physical' > *the entire thing could be called a computational domain but based on > computing done with 'objects' that are nothing like the idea of number we > are used to. A particular 'number' in our universe could be > colin.brain.cell.molecule.atom.proton.quark.a.s.d.fetc. There need > be no 'next' or 'previous' number in the sense we are used to - that comes > from our thinking. The number is actually an organisational hierarchy > only. > > Pick up a pencil, hold it. Say to yourself "The universe has computed a > pencil". > > These numbers interact with each other according to whatever is > computationally adjacent (this has nothing to do with space or what we > would call physically adjacent...space can be what it looks like when you > are in it).. for example 'adding' three of these (above) numbers involves > creating the right context of adjacency and voila... a 'proton' (plus some > remainder rubbish which can go away and do something else...) Basically > the gigantic cellular automata. > > The computations done with these 'numbers' is what we are. For the sake of > a name call the numbers 'entropy numbers'. > > 'AS-IF' COMPUTATION > What we can do is arrange this 'intrinsic computation with entropy > numbers' to behave 'as-if' idealised numbers existed and obey rules > according to the idealised domain of those numbers, if it actually existed > (presumably in the legendary platonia). Nowhere in any of this 'as-if' > computation does any of the structural 'entropy numbers' have any clue as > to
RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > > > physical > > > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation > > with the appropriate > > rule mapping physical states to computational states. > > I don't think such mappings are valid > a) without constraints on the simplicity of the mapping rules > or > b) without attention to counterfactuals/dispositions > > > > Attempts are made to put constraints on what > > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > > uncomfortable idea, but it > > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > > blessed by God or something. > > I don't know where you get that idea. Dispositions are physically > respectable. Simplicity constraints are the lifeblood of science. The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented radioactive decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we got our hands on one of these computers and monitored its internal states it would seem completely random; but if we had the Klingon manual, we would see that the computer was actually multiplying two numbers, or implementing a Klingon AI, or whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid because it's a dumb way to design a computer? Would it make any difference if the Klingons were extinct and every copy of the manual destroyed? What about if the exact same states in a malfunctioning human computer arose by chance, before the Klingons came up with their design? Having the manual is necessary to make the computer useful, so that we can interact with it, but it doesn't magically *create* computation where previously there was just noise. > > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > > physical universe at all > > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > > femtosecond. > > Hmmm. So much for the quantitative issue. What a strange view of > physics you have. This says nothing about physics. There may well be a physical universe, with orderly physical laws, and our computers would have to be of the familiar type which will consistently handle counterfactuals in order to be of use to us. But I think it is trivially obvious that any computation is hiding in noise just as any statue is hiding in a block of marble. This is not very interesting unless you say that computation can lead to consciousness. You could specify that only brains can lead to consciousness, or that only non-solipsistic computations with inputs and outputs based on physical reality can lead to consciousness, but that's not straight computationalism any more. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation > > with the appropriate > > rule mapping physical states to computational states. > > I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct > states. It's all very well > to imagine a mapping between a rock and my computer idealized as isolated > closed systems - but in > fact they are not isolated close systems. When you're talking about > simulating the universe in > computation it has a lot more states than a rock and it isn't close either. The rock could be running all the required computations *in parallel*. > >Attempts are made to put constraints on what > > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > > uncomfortable idea, but it > > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > > blessed by God or something. > > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > > physical universe at all > > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > > femtosecond. That's an absurd > > amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me > > (although I can't at the > > moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, and the > > computations are implemented > > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. > > Or by virtue of there being universes. Sure: there may be a physical universe, and there may be something special about brains - i.e. only brains or some restricted subset of possible computation devices might be able to run conscious programs. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other >> contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet be the case that consciousness is >> only the result of special physical processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere existence of computations as >> mathematical objects, but then this would entail giving up >> computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's >> suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this preserves computationalism either. >> Stathis Papaioannou > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > The distractions of language in this are so subtle. The word 'physical' is so laden with preconceived notions. I wish I could think of a better word but I can't. Perhaps a better way of couching it would help: *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably 'in it'. *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with respect to us that we label 'physical' *the entire thing could be called a computational domain but based on computing done with 'objects' that are nothing like the idea of number we are used to. A particular 'number' in our universe could be colin.brain.cell.molecule.atom.proton.quark.a.s.d.fetc. There need be no 'next' or 'previous' number in the sense we are used to - that comes from our thinking. The number is actually an organisational hierarchy only. Pick up a pencil, hold it. Say to yourself "The universe has computed a pencil". These numbers interact with each other according to whatever is computationally adjacent (this has nothing to do with space or what we would call physically adjacent...space can be what it looks like when you are in it).. for example 'adding' three of these (above) numbers involves creating the right context of adjacency and voila... a 'proton' (plus some remainder rubbish which can go away and do something else...) Basically the gigantic cellular automata. The computations done with these 'numbers' is what we are. For the sake of a name call the numbers 'entropy numbers'. 'AS-IF' COMPUTATION What we can do is arrange this 'intrinsic computation with entropy numbers' to behave 'as-if' idealised numbers existed and obey rules according to the idealised domain of those numbers, if it actually existed (presumably in the legendary platonia). Nowhere in any of this 'as-if' computation does any of the structural 'entropy numbers' have any clue as to what it is doing. The manipuluated 'symbols' are just patterns in the adjacency of the numbers. 'VIRTUAL MATTER' Imagine this huge cellular automata - a computation performed by simple adjacency of entities in an organisational hierarchy - the numbers in it that represent the organisation of me and you is what we call matter. As computation it is actually derived from an axiomatic initial conditions and a set of logical rules, forming a massively parallel calculus. if 'number a' (a cell in the CA) is matter it is a proof in this calculus if 'number b' (a cell in the CA) is matter it is a proof in this calculus then what is the status within the CA the 'difference' between two cells in the CA? The difference has been computed just as exquisitely accurately, but no computational proof exists in the sense that a and b were proven. It is 'as if' the computation was performed...but it was not actually performed. Therefore if a is matter, b is matter, then (a_to_b) is 'as-if' matter - virtual matter. You can see this in any of the CAs Stephen Wolfram's book. Each cell is actually computed. The _difference_ between any two cells is not computed explicity but is as perfectly proven. These are godellian unproven truths in their squintillions. Now ask yourself the one question Stephen Wolfram didn'k himself: Q. "Under what conditions can it be like something to 'be' an object in a CA?" A. When the object in the CA behaves 'as-if' it is interacting with some other part of the CA. Under these circumstances the unproven truths - the virtual matter riddling the CA can be used to paint a computational picture of any other part of the CA. The trick is that the numbers in the CA have to do it... no act as-if'. But the machine that does the 'as-if' symbolic computation throws away all the virtual matter in the process of manipulating symbols only meaningful to a third
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Saibal Mitra writes:
> From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
> > it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
> > The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
> > systematic exploration. Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
> > universes, are even worse.
>
> I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse.
I should clarify, I meant that our ideas are even worse in terms of
systematic exploration of all the possibilities, because we generally
consider an infinity of possible universes, while the string theory
landscape predicts (some people say) about 10^500 possible universes.
> If you read some recent articles,
> e.g.:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227
>
> you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure,
> probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the
> "handwaving" stage.
This is actually a very interesting paper, by Starkman and Trotta. I had
seen some mention of it but hadn't tracked it down. Here is the abstract:
"We revisit anthropic arguments purporting to explain the measured value
of the cosmological constant. We argue that different ways of assigning
probabilities to candidate universes lead to totally different anthropic
predictions. As an explicit example, we show that weighting different
universes by the total number of possible observations leads to an
extremely small probability for observing a value of Lambda equal to or
greater than what we now measure. We conclude that anthropic reasoning
within the framework of probability as frequency is ill-defined and
that it cannot be used to explain the value of Lambda, nor, likely,
any other physical parameters."
The paper is pretty technical but I thought I could understand the gist
of it. The cosmological constant ("Lambda") is a repulsive force which
drives galaxies apart in the Big Bang model. Until a few years ago it was
thought to be entirely theoretical, but since then observations indicate
that it is real, and that the universal expansion is accelerating.
The question then becomes what would happen in universes with different
values of the CC.
The paper basically shows that observers (or civilizations) can last
longer in universes with smaller CC's. The CC eventually puts an end
to the observations that can be made, because the expansion gets too
fast and there is no longer enough energy density. The higher the CC,
the sooner this happens. With CC's as high as what we observe, the
theoretical lifetime of civilization is much shorter than in universes
with smaller CC's.
The authors choose to use as their measure, the number of times the
CC can be measured in a given universe. This makes low-CC universes
have a much higher measure, because the window for CC observations is
longer in those. Hence they conclude that the highest probability is
for a CC much smaller than we observe, and so our own CC value cannot
be explained anthropically.
This is in contrast to earlier results which used different measures, such
as the number of galaxies, and found that our CC results were consistent
with anthropic considerations. The authors argue that their measure is
at least as philosphically justifiable as those earlier papers, and their
real point is that no measure can be justified as better than another,
hence all anthropic reasoning is just hand-waving.
In our terms we might put it like this. The new paper essentially uses a
measure which is the number of possible observer-moments in the universe.
Universes with a high CC go through a "big rip" process eventually,
accelerating to a super-expansion mode and presumably putting an end
to observers. Universes with a low or zero CC go through this much
later or not at all, allowing for more observer-moments. Hence this
measure gives a bonus to universes that last a long time.
Earlier papers apparently looked at a snapshot of time similar to the
present day, and in effect based the measure on the number of observers
(assumed to be proportional to the number of galaxies). So we have a
distinction between an observer-moment measure and an observer measure.
The two apparently give very different results, the OM measure preferring
long-lasting universes while the observer measure is more interested in
the size of the universe.
I guess I'll stop here and see if there is more interest. To leave with
a few questions: Is there any fundamental way to decide which measure
is "best"? Do the OM measure and the observer measure really give
different results, and is that significant? Are there other measures
that might be used, and what results would they get? And finally, will
this apparent failure of anthropic reasoning discredit the concept among
working physicists? As I mentioned, I've already seen it used in a blog
common on Woit's blog that I pointed to the other day, in just that way.
Hal Finney
--~--~--
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > d the computations are implemented > > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. > > Or by virtue of there being universes. Something, anyway. You don't get implementation for free. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > > physical > > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with > the appropriate > rule mapping physical states to computational states. I don't think such mappings are valid a) without constraints on the simplicity of the mapping rules or b) without attention to counterfactuals/dispositions > Attempts are made to put constraints on what > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > uncomfortable idea, but it > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > blessed by God or something. I don't know where you get that idea. Dispositions are physically respectable. Simplicity constraints are the lifeblood of science. > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > physical universe at all > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > femtosecond. Hmmm. So much for the quantitative issue. What a strange view of physics you have. > That's an absurd > amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me > (although I can't at the > moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, Any finite quantitiy is infinitely greater than zero. I *can* think of a disproof! > and the computations are implemented > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Assuming Platonism has been proved, whcih it hasn't. (NBB "implemented" means a lot more than "theoretically true" !!!) > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > >>There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do >>not require a physical basis" and "computations do not >>require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be >>physical >>implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with > the appropriate > rule mapping physical states to computational states. I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct states. It's all very well to imagine a mapping between a rock and my computer idealized as isolated closed systems - but in fact they are not isolated close systems. When you're talking about simulating the universe in computation it has a lot more states than a rock and it isn't close either. >Attempts are made to put constraints on what > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > uncomfortable idea, but it > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > blessed by God or something. > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > physical universe at all > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > femtosecond. That's an absurd > amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me > (although I can't at the > moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, and the > computations are implemented > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Or by virtue of there being universes. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes: > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > physical > implemented by a wide variety of systems) Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with the appropriate rule mapping physical states to computational states. Attempts are made to put constraints on what counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this uncomfortable idea, but it doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially blessed by God or something. So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any physical universe at all exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a femtosecond. That's an absurd amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me (although I can't at the moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, and the computations are implemented anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to > start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. > Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the > implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to > make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of > physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet > be the case that consciousness is only the result of special physical > processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere > existence of computations as mathematical objects, but then this would entail > giving up computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations > contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's > suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this > preserves computationalism either. > > Stathis Papaioannou There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do not require a physical basis" and "computations do not require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
