Russell's book + UD*/strings
Hi Russell, I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book. Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you have sacrifice perhaps a bit of rigor. I am still not sure about your most basic assumption, but I see we share a big amount of the philosophy. I am already glad you did take into account 1/5 of my earlier remarks, I wish you at least five next editions ;-). To be honest I don't think you really get the comp idea, and it is a good think your work does not really rely on it. Now I will not hide the pleasure I have when seeing the 8 hypostases (even the sixteen one!) sum up through their modal logic in table 71 page 129. I will neither repeat my olds comments nor make new one, but hope our future discussion will give opportunities to clarify the possible misunderstandings and relationship between our approaches. I let you know that I will be very busy from now until end of october, so that I will be more slow for the comments' replies (or more grave for the spelling mistakes if that is possible). == Russell wrote On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 03:23:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-sept.-06, ˆ 07:01, Russell Standish a Žcrit : Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite string of symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing. You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all formula as theorems. But a theory which contains all formulas as theorems is inconsistent. I am afraid you confuse some object level (the strings) and theory-level (the theorems about the strings). Actually, I was wondering if you were making this confusion, owing to the ontological status you give mathematical statements. The Nothing, if interpreted in its entirety, This can make sense only if you tell us how to interpret a string or how you interpret the Nothing, I mean formally. From this I infer that your nothing is an informal theory of infinite strings. Also I give only ontological status to object in the scope of an arithmetical existential statement. For example I do believe in the existence of prime numbers. must be inconsistent, of course. Only a theory can be inconsistent. But I don't see a theory. Our reasoning about it need not be, and certainly I would be grateful for anyone pointing out inconsistencies in my writing. That is why I would insist to be as clear as possible so that the inconsistencies are more easy to find. Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a professional logician, and you try to convey something informally. But I think that at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects, like strings. I'm not that informal. What I talk about are mathematical objects, and one can use mathematical reasoning. The formal/informal distinguo has nothing to do with the mathematical/non-mathematical distinguo. Nor with rigorous/non-rigorous. 100 % of mathematics, including mathematical logic is informal. Now, logicians studied formal theories or machines because it is what they are studying. But they prove things about formal systems in an informal way like any scientist. In some context formal and informal are relative. Of course a description of a formal system looks formal, but we reason *about* those formal systems. Now, if your strings are all there is, I wait for an explanation of what those strings does formally, but I am not asking to formalize your reasoning in your string-language, unless for illustrative purpose in case you want to illustrate how a string interprets something. Like we can explain how a brain or more simply how a turing machine can interpret some data. To be sure, given that your strings are infinite I have no clue how the strings can interpret things. I should note that the PROJECTION postulate is implicit in your UDA when you come to speak of the 1-3 distinction. I don't think it can be derived explicitly from the three legs of COMP. I'm afraid your are confusing the UDA, which is an informal (but rigorous) argument showing that IF I am digitalisable machine, then physics or the laws of Nature emerge and are derivable from number theory, and the translation of UDA in arithmetic, alias the interview of a universal chatty machine. The UDA is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes explicitly consciousness (or folk psychology or grandma psychology as I use those terms in the SANE paper) and a primitive physical universe. With this, the 1-3 distinction follows from the fact that if am copied at the correct level, the two copies cannot know the existence of each other and their personal discourse will differentiate. This is an illusion of projection like the wave packet *reduction* is an illusion
TEST
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Re: Russell's book + UD*/strings
On Tue, Sep 26, 2006 at 04:10:32PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Russell, I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book. Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you have sacrifice perhaps a bit of rigor. I am still not sure about your most basic assumption, but I see we share a big amount of the philosophy. I am already glad you did take into account 1/5 of my earlier remarks, I wish you at least five next editions ;-). That's a bit like the old chinese curse - I wish you live in interesting times! To be honest I don't think you really get the comp idea, and it is a good think your work does not really rely on it. It is true that my work is an independent line of work, but probably related. I am interested in the connections, however. Now I will not hide the pleasure I have when seeing the 8 hypostases (even the sixteen one!) sum up through their modal logic in table 71 page 129. I will neither repeat my olds comments nor make new one, but hope our future discussion will give opportunities to clarify the possible misunderstandings and relationship between our approaches. Indeed. I let you know that I will be very busy from now until end of october, so that I will be more slow for the comments' replies (or more grave for the spelling mistakes if that is possible). == This can make sense only if you tell us how to interpret a string or how you interpret the Nothing, I mean formally. Interpretation is by an observer. Formally, the observer is a map from a string to an integer. To understand why the observer is such a formal object requires informal modelling talk, obviously. From this I infer that your nothing is an informal theory of infinite strings. It is a mixture of both. The formal part is not so interesting, but necessary to get some interesting conclusions. Also I give only ontological status to object in the scope of an arithmetical existential statement. For example I do believe in the existence of prime numbers. Whereas I think the whole notion of existence is highly dubious. :) must be inconsistent, of course. Only a theory can be inconsistent. But I don't see a theory. I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent, but perhaps there is not much difference between interpretation and theory. Would you say There is a red flower is a theory, or merely an interpretation of an image? If it were possible to view the entire Nothing, it would be an inconsistent interpretation. However it is not so possible, and indeed it may be true that it is impossible to have an inconsistent interpretation (I do not assert this however). Our reasoning about it need not be, and certainly I would be grateful for anyone pointing out inconsistencies in my writing. That is why I would insist to be as clear as possible so that the inconsistencies are more easy to find. Indeed - however we do have a difference in emphasis. Yours is towards more formal models, but with obscure modeling relations, whereas I prefer to spend more effort on the modeling relation than with the formal content (the formal content of my ideas are small, no doubt why you are disappointed!) In that respect, I am more the physicist, and you the mathematician. :) Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a professional logician, and you try to convey something informally. But I think that at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects, like strings. I'm not that informal. What I talk about are mathematical objects, and one can use mathematical reasoning. The formal/informal distinguo has nothing to do with the mathematical/non-mathematical distinguo. Nor with rigorous/non-rigorous. 100 % of mathematics, including mathematical logic is informal. Now, logicians studied formal theories or machines because it is what they are studying. But they prove things about formal systems in an informal way like any scientist. Well, yes - we probably are using the word formal differently then. For me, a formal system is a mathematical system with the modelling relation thrown away. Triangles without trangular shaped paddocks for example. In some context formal and informal are relative. Of course a description of a formal system looks formal, but we reason *about* those formal systems. Now, if your strings are all there is, I wait for an explanation of what those strings does formally, but I am not asking to formalize your reasoning in your string-language, unless for illustrative purpose in case you want to illustrate how a string interprets something. Like we can explain how a brain or more simply how a turing machine can interpret some data.
Re: The Mathematico-Cognition Reality Theory (MCRT) Ver 6.0
Yup it seems we do agree. I agree with most of what you said. And with Bruno's comments we have some consensus in this thread. So to borrow a phrase from you: 'Yes indeedy' :D --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
