Barbour's mistake: An alternative to a timless Platonia
Those who have read my past threads and seen the summary of my metaphysics analysis (Mathematico-Cognition Reality Theory-MCRT) know that I think that time is an irreducible property of reality and my analysis suggests that even Barbour's configuration space (Platonia, the Multiverse whatever you want to call it) isn't truly timeless. The trouble with a timeless multiverse lies in the notion of 'the space of all mathematical possibilities'. Unfortunately the notion of 'all mathematical possibilities co-existing' is highly suspect, precisely because it's so ill-defined. There are some things in math for which the quantifier 'existence' is suspect infinite sets in particular. If 'the space of all possibilities' is itself still evolving as I suggested, then Platonia would not be timeless as Barbour (and many here on this list) thinks. Another reason for suspecting that Platonia isn't truly timeless lies in the fact that Barbour's Platonia is an attempt to totally remove 'boundary conditions' from science. Note that no attempts to remove boundary conditions from science have ever succeeded. Why should Barbour's theory suddenly be the exception? There's a very good reason for defining boundary conditions... because without an 'inside and 'outside' to an entity, one simply cannot analyze it as a dynamical system. That's why no attempt to remove boundary conditions from science has ever succeeded. Now when the 'system' under disussion is 'all of reality' it may seem tautological that 'there exists nothing outside reality because reality is everything that exists' but... well... this so called tautology is not neccesserily true! The trouble lies in the definition of a 'thing'. If there are incomprehensible things, then it may actually make sense to talk about them existing 'outside reality'. Standard philosophy only recognizes one quantifier for 'existence' but perhaps thre are several different notions. Again, Barbour's attempt to 'remove an outside to reality' also prevents us from analyzing reality as a dynamical system, because any system analysis requires us to define system boundaries and external actors. Again, no attempts to remove boundary conditions from science have ever succeeded. Why? Because Barbour's entire notion of a timeless Platonia is misguided. It's an attempt to 'objectify everything, to imagine that 'all of reality' can somehow be comprehensible to a rational mind. But why should this be true? Why shouldn't there exist incomprehensible things? Again, we have examples from mathematics...such as uncomputable numbers...which appear to suggest that there do exist incomphensible things. And I propose that the existence of incomphrensible things enables us to establish boundary conditions for all of reality and refutes Barbour's notion of timlessness. So here's my alternative to a timeless Platonia: What I suggest is that we should take the comprehensible/incomprehensible division as the boundary condition for 'reality'. We then define TWO different 'existence' quantifiers. Let: 'eXistenZ' = everything which exists which is in principle comphrensible and let 'existence' = everything which exists, including INCOMPREHENSIBLE things. Then: 'eXistenZ' is a sub-set of 'existence', but all minds can take 'eXistenZ' to be reality, because only this part of existence is actually comprehensible to them. The advantage of this is that it enables us to apply ordinary system analysis to eXistenZ. eXistenZ does have a boundary and therefore 'an inside and outside'. And unlike Barbour's scheme, eXistenZ is not timeless. Now one might try to argue that it's pointless to imagine 'incomprehensible things' because they can have no comprehsible effect on reality. But the argument isn't true. Reason could still tell us which things were incomprensible (for an analogy to this, note that we DO have comptable proofs that there exist incomputable numbers) and further more, incomprehensible things could still have *comprehensible* effects on eXistenZ and therefore they could be referenced indirectly, through these comprehensible effects. Now to summarize my analysis again: Start by defining the boundary between incomprehensible and comprehensible things as the boundary condition for 'reality'. Comprehensible (in principle) things are inside reality... call this eXistenZ. And the incomprehensible things are outside reality. Existence in it's totality. Next I pointed out that we *could* actually reference the incomprehensibles indirectly - because incomprehensible things *can* have comprehensible effects on eXistenZ. Then we have the basis for a new reality theory! *Identify the incomprehensibles *Reference them indirectly through their comprehensible effects on eXistenZ *Apply standard system analysis: let: The effects of the incomprehensibles on eXistenZ be the 'inputs' The 'system' which is reality is of course eXistenZ And the system 'outputs' are how the
Re: The Fourth Hypostase, String Theory, Diophantus and the Monster
I've thought of bringing up the Monster group here before, but I didn't think anyone here would be that weird, since I even get weird reactions to my ideas about the Riemann zeta function. I've noticed the connection with the number 26 also. (By the way, for some unknown reason in my childhood 26 was my favorite number ;) In the past I've been drawn to the Monster group and the classification of finite simple groups, perhaps for reasons similar to other mathematically inclined people. There's just something mysterious about the fact that there are only a finite number of classes of this type of mathematical object. And yet it is a rather non-trivial number, larger than the number of spatial dimensions, and even larger than the number of platonic solids, or the number of faces on the largest platonic solid. And when you look at the order (size) of the largest of the finite simple groups (the Monster group), it is huge. And yet it is the largest. This seems to be a signpost that something fundamental is going on here. On the other hand, if I recall correctly without checking, rings and fields don't have such a classification such that there are a finite number of some basic type of them. I'm just shooting off at the hip, but I wonder if this has to do with the fact that groups have only one operator (addition or multiplication, say), whereas rings and fields have at least 2. This rings a bell with the sufficient complexity needed for Godel's Incompleteness Theorems (and a nontrivial G/G*?). A similar point is that there are an infinite number of primes, whereas the number of classes of finite simple groups is finite. Another caution is to note the failure this approach in the past, notably with Plato's theory of everything. We don't want to go down the path of numerology, which is a lot of what comes up when I google monster group and multiverse. But on the other hand, this is part of the nature of exploring. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
--- Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (among a lot other things, quoted and replied to): I disagree and can show empirical proof that we scientists only THINK we are not being solipsistic. I wrote in this sense lately (for the past say 40 years) but now I tend to change my solipsistic mind in view of your position - maybe the other way around, but for a mathematician (whay I amnot) a multiplication with -1 is no big deal. As I formulate my new ideas (did not elevate them to 'position') everybody with an active mind (e.g. with a mentality that generates ideas) is living in a solipsistic air of his own ideas. This is relevant to peasants, to religious fanatics, also to scientists etc. (I don't know which applies to me, I never proclaimed myself a 'scientist', am not religious and have no farm). We may pretend to see 3rd person errors (sic) but really we live in our 1st person enclave. This is OK in my own little nuthouse. I pretended to be more open and 'think' about a reality I can never attain, but behind such pretension was my hypocrisy. Thanks for adding something (even if considerable as negative) to my thinking (solipstic as it is - pardon me the pun, it is a typo). With best regards (also from me to me, but never mind: you can accept it) John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Fourth Hypostase, String Theory, Diophantus and the Monster
Tom Caylor wrote: I've thought of bringing up the Monster group here before, but I didn't think anyone here would be that weird, since I even get weird reactions to my ideas about the Riemann zeta function. I've noticed the connection with the number 26 also. (By the way, for some unknown reason in my childhood 26 was my favorite number ;) In the past I've been drawn to the Monster group and the classification of finite simple groups, perhaps for reasons similar to other mathematically inclined people. There's just something mysterious about the fact that there are only a finite number of classes of this type of mathematical object. And yet it is a rather non-trivial number, larger than the number of spatial dimensions, and even larger than the number of platonic solids, or the number of faces on the largest platonic solid. And when you look at the order (size) of the largest of the finite simple groups (the Monster group), it is huge. And yet it is the largest. This seems to be a signpost that something fundamental is going on here. On the other hand, if I recall correctly without checking, rings and fields don't have such a classification such that there are a finite number of some basic type of them. I'm just shooting off at the hip, but I wonder if this has to do with the fact that groups have only one operator (addition or multiplication, say), whereas rings and fields have at least 2. This rings a bell with the sufficient complexity needed for Godel's Incompleteness Theorems (and a nontrivial G/G*?). A similar point is that there are an infinite number of primes, whereas the number of classes of finite simple groups is finite. Another caution is to note the failure this approach in the past, notably with Plato's theory of everything. We don't want to go down the path of numerology, which is a lot of what comes up when I google monster group and multiverse. But on the other hand, this is part of the nature of exploring. Tom i.e. some amount of weirdness (where have I heart that phrase before? Ah, yes, Bruno's UDA paper) is to be expected as part of the nature of exploring. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Colin Hales wrote: 1Z snip Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 3:19 AM Brent Meeker It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would behave exactly as they do behave, most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any consideration at all, the rest deciding that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical purpose served by worrying about it. Their explanation, if they have any, as to why they behave as they do would be peppered with as ifs. Solipisism is for people who prefer certainty to understanding. COLIN HALES: Yay! someone 'got' my little dialogue! The point is that scientists are actually ALL tacit solipsists. My point was that scientists *do* prefer understanding to certainty, and therefore are *not* solipsists. I can't think of anything I have said, or that you have said, that leads to the conclusion that scientists ingenreal are solpsitsts. (I'm still wiating for an example of an instrumetalist ornithologist...) I disagree and can show empirical proof that we scientists only THINK we are not being solipsistic. We ARE actually -methodologically- solipsistic because consciousness (phenomenal consciousness itself) = [seeing itself] is not accepted as evidence of anything. We only accept the 'contents' of phenomenal consciousness' = [that which is seen] as scientific evidence. What's the difference? We think that predicting 'seeing' What do you mean by seeing ? will come from the act of analysing that which is seen... this is logically fallacious. Like observing the behaviour of monalisa within the painting and then using that behaviour to divine canvas, paint and an artist: silly/illogical. This behaviour is 'as-if' we are solipsists - that we do not believe mind (other minds) exist. We are being inconsistent in an extremely fundamental way. This is a complex and subtle point - a cultural blind of enormous implication. As for an example of an instrumentalist ornithologists? Hmmm... perhaps ask the utilitarianist nominalist paleontologists. They may know! :-) I have to say, I found your porrf to be pretty incomprehensible. The only way a solipsist can exist is to outwardly agree with the massive confabulation they appear to inhabit whilst inwardly maintaining the only 'real truth'. It isn't a real truth. if it were, it wouldn't matter how they behave. There's no external reality...It's not real!...so being duplicitous is OK. But to go on being a tacit solipsist affirmed by inaction: not admitting consciouness itself of actually caused by something...is equivalent to an inward belief of Bishop Berkeley-esque magical intervention on a massive scale without actually realising it. The whole delusion is maintained by a belief in an 'objective-view' that makes it seem like we're directly accessing an external world when we are not - it's all mediated by MIND, What are we, if we are neither mind nor world ? Your words assume that mind is not part of/distinct from/intrinsically apart from the world. This is a linguistic trap. So It *is* part of (etc) the world ? WE are inside a universe of stuff, WE are made of stuff with perceptions(appearances) of stuff constructed by stuff behaviour. When WE look as atoms WE are seeing stuff behave atomly. Other stuff in our heads paints atoms to look like that. Does that make sense? Not really. There is no objective view in this. Only appearances. We are NOT directly accessing the external world. We never have and we never will. How do you know ? Why should it have a phsyics ? Is there a physics of stock markets ? Surely consicousness is a high-level phenomenon. [A glass of water] is a high level phenomenon of [water atoms] [consciousness] is a high level phenomenon of [what?] Neurons, presumably. You can't have a high level phenomenon of a collection of something without a something. This belief is called 'magical emergentism'. In consciousness studies you can claim [what?] to be something seen with consciousness. The point is that the [what?] above will not be viewable with consciousness. That does not mean we can't be scientific about it. What it means is that the permission to examine potential [what?] is a behaviour currently prohibited by science because of the virtual solipsism I speak of. To speak of the [what?] is to speak of something that creates SEEING but is not SEEN directly. The correctly chosen [What?] will enable seeing that makes the seen look like it does, so 'seeing' is actually viable indirect evidence. If scientists are being virtual-solipsists by failing to accept seeing as evidence of something then seeing will never be explained. Do you 'see' how this blind works? Think of it like this: a) study New York traffic from Alpha-Centauri b) devise a very predictive 'LAW OF
Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Colin Hales wrote: So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND EXISTED. So far the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS. Brent Meeker FIRSTLY Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as this: Why not investigate consciousness at the neuronal level rather than the fundamental-particle level? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
1Z Colin Hales wrote: So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND EXISTED. So far the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS. Brent Meeker FIRSTLY Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as this: Why not investigate consciousness at the neuronal level rather than the fundamental-particle level? The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being observed with our phenomenal consciousness. That process, for the reasons that I have been outlining, can never supply a reason why it shall be necessarily 'like something' to be a cell of a collection of them. That reason is buried deep in the fabric of things. If you understand the underlying structure giving rise to phenomenality then the underlying structure will literally predict the existence, shape, size, behaviour and interconnectivity of neurons and astrocytes _in order_ that you be conscious. Our logic is all backwards: We need to have a theory predicting brain material. A theory based on brain material cannot predict brain material, especially one that has used the property we are trying to find to observe the brain material. The whole exploratory loop is screwed up. Cheers Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Barbour's mistake: An alternative to a timless Platonia
New Scientist Article: Do the laws of nature last forever? Top physics theorist Lee Smolin has also come out against timelessness. He points out in the article that intuitionalist logics allow for shifting math truths and a non-static configuration space for the universe. Nice to have my analysis confirmed by the best ;) Link: http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/mg19125701.100-do-the-laws-of-nature-last-forever.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
