Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
> supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
> no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
> that in both cases matte
For my benefit, could you flesh that out in plain English please?
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
1Z wrote:
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, co
Peter Jones writes:
> SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
> picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
> sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
> candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousn
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'You don't actually have to emulate the entire universe, just enough
to fool its inhabitants. For example, you don't need to emulate the
appearance of a snowflake in the Andromeda galaxy except in the unlikely
event that someone went to have a look at it.'
MP: I think
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes "infinite" he
really means infinite - not "really, really big" as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
that in both cases matter is irrelevant to consciousn
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
What
SP: 'Recall that ordinary life does not involve anything like perfect
copying of your brain from moment to moment. Thousands of neurons are
dying all the time and you don't even notice, and it is possible to
infarct a substantial proportion of your brain and finish up with just a
bit of a limp.
Bruno Marchal writes:
> 1. The implementation problem: everything can implement a computation
> if you look at it the right way.
> Normally this is of no consequence - mapping the vibration of atoms in
> a rock to a word processing program would be at least as difficult as
> building a conve
Hi Jason,
Welcome,
Le 03-janv.-07, à 11:07, Jason a écrit :
http://home.gcn.cx/users/jason/ideas.html
I will take a look once I get enough time. It seems you belong to the
ASSA group, that is you accept some form of bayesianism for fundamental
probability question. Hope you will wake the
Le 03-janv.-07, à 06:39, Mark Peaty a écrit :
BM: ' (= Bruno Marchal, not Brent Meeker)
OK, except I don't see what you mean by on a "number" basis. We know
that number have a lot of quantitative interesting relationships, but
after Godel, Solovay etc.. we do know that numbers have astonishi
Bruno Marchal writes:
> which invokes an argument discovered by Bruno and Tim Maudlin
> demonstrating that there is a problem with the theory that the mental
> supervenes on the physical. It seems that to be consistent you have to
> allow either that any computation, including the supposedly
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes "infinite" he
really means infinite - not "really, really big" as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that appears in physics (and
Le 03-janv.-07, à 04:00, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as
something picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism
seems quite sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most
promising candidate for producing artificial
int
Le 03-janv.-07, à 03:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
> It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with "given the appearance
of > a physical world". As I have said before, I am not entirely
convinced > that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from
Le 02-janv.-07, à 13:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is "right" is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer tha
Hello Everyone,
I am a 22 year old male who majored in computer science. I have some
level of familiarity with Ultimate Ensemble, Digital physics, the
many-worlds interpretation, as well as philosophy. Some people that
have influenced my ideas include: Max Tegmark, David Deutsch, Wei Dai,
Konr
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