Peter Jones writes:

> SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
> picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
> sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
> candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'

What Bruno calls comp isn't standard computaitonalism, it has
an element of Platonism.

Standard computationalism involves the idea that consciousness can be captured by a computer program running on a computer. Bruno keeps the first part but challenges the second, suggesting that the idea of the physical process in the computer actually causing the conscious experience is flawed, as per Maudlin's paper. Thus he does not begin with the idea that conscious computations exist as Platonic objects (although I think he did suspect this all along) but ends with it as a conclusion from examining the claims of standard computationalism. Always risky to summarise someone else's ideas when they're watching, but perhaps Bruno could comment if I have it wrong.

Stathis Papaioannou
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to