Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
That doesn't affect my argument. The copied intelligence will also have the same properties as the evolved intelligence. Cheers On Mon, Jan 22, 2007 at 02:20:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Le 11-janv.-07, à 15:15, Russell Standish a écrit : > > > I would further hypothesise that all intelligences must > > arise evolutionarily. > > > I do believe this too, but once an intelligence is there it can be > copied in short time. Dishonest people do that with ideas, publishers > do that with writtings, Nature does this with DNA, and fanatics can do > this with nuclear bombs. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds (correction)
Jason wrote: > Jason wrote: > > Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times. > > If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the > > one tortured. If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999 > > lifetimes would only add to the negative observer moments created > > through the torture, and again the coin flip is best. > > > > I meant to say the "coin flip" is only optimal for neutral life times > and that in cases with positive or negative lifetimes, "replication" is > best. My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded my conclusion: Positive spared lives = Take replication Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip Negative spared lives = Take coin flip Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds (correction)
Jason wrote: > Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times. > If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the > one tortured. If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999 > lifetimes would only add to the negative observer moments created > through the torture, and again the coin flip is best. > I meant to say the "coin flip" is only optimal for neutral life times and that in cases with positive or negative lifetimes, "replication" is best. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Jason Resch writes: > Let's say being spared is "neutral" while being tortured is obviously bad, > even > if you are tortured for only a few minutes. Also, assume the intensity of the > torture and the quality of life on being spared is the same in duplication/ > coin toss > situations. > > What if I change the example and say you will be duplicated a million times, > and > only one of the copies will be tortured? From a selfish point of view, you can > almost certainly expect to find yourself one of the copies that will be > spared, > and I think you would be crazy to choose the coin flip. The equivalence of the > coin flip/ duplication example (when the probabilities are equal) is why we > cannot > distinguish between MWI and CI of QM. It makes no difference to me whether > the world splits into two and one copy of me is tortured if I toss the coin > or whether > there is only one version of me with a 50% chance of being tortured. > In the case you laid out you give two choices: A) The replicator B) The coin flip Case A results in 999,999 neutral lifetimes worth of observer moments and 1 lifetime of excruciating torture filled observer moments. Net outcome among all branched universes: -1 Case B results if half of one's future observer moments remebering torture and half remembering being spared. Net outcome among all branched universes: -0.5 Therefore it's still best to take case B, the coin flip. What makes the result seem so unintuitive is the concept of a lifetime of observer moments that has a net result being neutral. That means that trough all the ups and downs in that life, if one could see it all laid out before them, they would realize that person had so many negative events in their life that they might as well never have been born. With this consideration, it becomes more apparent that the 999,999 extra "neutral" lives offer no real advantage in living out, nor does the spared life in the coin flip need to be figured in. All that should be considered in this case is that with replication all universes will have someone who is tortured, while in the coin flip only half will. Most people consider their life to be a positive thing, and few would say they wouldn't mind if they had never been born. For most people, if it came down to a million life times for one person's torture, it would be a better choice over than the coin flip. Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times. If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the one tortured. If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999 lifetimes would only add to the negative observer moments created through the torture, and again the coin flip is best. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
Or of comp, or of multiple universes, or of. (the list is almost unlimitable). "Proving" is tricky. In many cases SOME accept the backwards argument from phenomena "assigned" to an originating assumption that is now deemed "proven" by it. Some don't. It depends on evidence in one's personal belief system qualia (characteristics) if someone is not closed minded in his own belief system's 'monotheistic' prejudices (like e.g. of natural sciences, or of math). Has anybody proven the existence? (I mean beyond the Zenian question: "who's arthritis is it?") John - Original Message - From: 1Z To: Everything List Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 9:59 AM Subject: Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life Bruno Marchal wrote: > Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a Platonia --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a Platonia --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
Le 23-janv.-07, à 04:36, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> >> When you ask your computer to print a document, the computer typically >> does not search the meaning of the words "print" or "document" in a >> dictionary. Other more subtile self-reference are handled by the >> diagonalization technic which makes it possible to cut the infinite >> regresses. IF and when I come back on the Fi and Wi, I will give you >> Kleene second recursion theorem which solves all those infinite >> regress >> appearing in computer self-reference. > > An association has been made between "print" and "document" with > objects > in the real world. You can work out what the print command is on an > unknown > computer by experimenting with different inputs and observing outputs. > But > if the real world is internalised, even if you could work out > regularities in the > syntax of an unknown computer (and I don't know if this is necessarily > possible: > it might be a military computer with syntax deliberately scrambled > with a one-time > pad) you would be unable to work out what it originally meant - what > the computer > is thinking. It is like finding an unknown language without a Rosetta > stone or any > cultural background which might help you with a translation. This > reminds me of the > impossibility of sharing 1st person experience: you can only do so if > you share some > 3rd person quality allowing at least some interaction. First, I do agree we cannot extract semantics from syntax, or behavior of a program from their codes. There is a well know theorem (Rice theorem) explaining why, and I could come back on this when I come back on the Fi and Wi. But so we agree. This does not depend on "cultural background" unless you define "cultural background" by "most probable universal neighborhood history". Now I am not sure this is directly related to the 1-3 distinction. Also, I have no clue of what you mean by "real world". >> >> From Pythagoras to Proclus, "intellectuals" were proud not making >> that >> error. Aristotle is in part responsible for having made "appearance" >> reality, coming back to the (provably wrong assuming comp) common >> sense >> in those matters. >> (of course as you know we have to rely on common sense to go beyond >> common sense). > > OK, but we have to start with some basic observation. It looks like > objects > are pulled to the Earth by a force - that is a basic observation, with > a minimal > implicit theory. I agree. I call that sometimes "grandmother physics". Even physicists use it in everyday life. > General Relativity explains this differently, but it takes a rather > complex series of arguments to arrive at GR. Already Galilee makes grandmother's physics globally wrong. Now Galilee, Newton and GR works because they does not contradict grandmother physics, and recast it in frame compatible with larger set of data. > You can't call Newton stupid because > of this. Not at all. Especially not Newton, who wrote some text showing that he was aware on the lack of serious metaphysical foundations for his physics. > Similarly, your conclusion that there is no separate physical reality > follows > from a number of carefully argued steps, and at the start of the chain > is the fact > that there does appear to be a physical world... if there did not, we > would not be > having this or any other discussion. I think we agree. I have never doubted the appearances of a physical reality, even assuming comp. What I do pretend, is that IF we assume the comp hyp, then the appearance of a physical reality does not reflect the existence of a *primary* physical reality. It is simpler to describe the epistemological consequences (albeit probably looking more provocative), which is that physics cannot be the fundamental science. It really means that the laws of physics, not only can be derived from computer science/number theory, but has to be derived from computer science number theory if we are asssuming comp. All stable appearances must emerge through a notion of first person plural observation. Now such "first person plural observation" can be described in the language of a Universal Machine, and this gives a way to test the comp hypothesis. I am before all an empiricist. True, I'm saying that if comp is true then the "laws of physics" are in your head (actually in any universal machine's "head"). So let us test comp by 1) deriving the "comp-physics" (the physics in the head), 2) let us compare it with the usual observations. If the empirical data contradict comp: comp is refuted. If the data are coherent with comp, comp is not refuted. If comp is correct, the data will never be contradicted, and we will never know if comp is correct, but may be we will bet on it according to possible circumstances. Note that in the UDA I do start, not only from the appearances of a physical world, but from its primary existence. But this assumption is
