Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?
Hal, I do not understand why the Nothings are fundamentally incomplete. I interpreted this as inconsistency, partly due to the following line: "5) At least one divisor type - the Nothings or N(k)- encompass no distinction but must encompass this one. This is a type of incompleteness." If they encompass no distinctions yet encompass one, they are apparently inconsistent. So what do you mean when you instead assert them to be incomplete? --Abram On Sun, Dec 28, 2008 at 7:19 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote: > > Hi Abram: > > I have interlaced responses with - symbols. > > Original Message- > From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com > [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Abram Demski > Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 3:10 PM > To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD? > > > Hal, > > Is there a pattern to how the system responds to its own > incompleteness? You say that there is not a pattern to the traces, but > what do you mean by that? > > --- > > That is not what I actually said. I indicated that there were no > restrictions on the copy process. There would be a pattern to some of the > traces. The incompleteness of the Nothings causes them individually to > eventually become a more distinction encompassing Something. This is a > little like cold booting a computer that has a large [infinite] hard drive > containing the All. [a Nothing -> a Something] -> The BIOS chip loads the > startup program and some data into the dynamic memory and the computer > boots. The program/data would be the first Something in a trace. From this > point on there is no fixed nature to traces. The program could at one > extreme generate the entire remaining trace [a series of Somethings] from > just the data already present in the computer - without reading in more from > the All - outputting each resulting computer state to the All on the hard > drive. The All already contains these states many times over so this is > just a copy process. At the other extreme the program could just generate > random output which states are also in the All - another copy process. There > would be all nature of traces between these two extremes. > > The incompleteness I cite is just the instability question. There may be > others. [A trace would end if the output went into a continuous repeat of a > particular state.] > > Other incompleteness issues of a particular Something seem like they should > also prevent a trace from stopping. > > - > > It sounds to me like what you are describing is some version of an > inconsistent set theory that is somehow trying to repair itself. > > - > > In other postings I have said that the All, being absolutely complete, is > therefore inconsistent since it contains all answers to all questions [all > possible distinctions and therefore no distinction]. > > > > (Except rather then sets, which are 2-fold distinctions because a > thing can either be a member or not, you are admitting arbitrary > N-fold distinctions, including 1-fold distinctions that fail to > distinguish anything... conceptually interesting, I must admit.) > > > > I am not well versed in set theory or logic but I believe I understand what > you are saying. I see this as the All contains an N-fold distinction - > itself. > > --- > > So the question is, what is the process by which the system attempts > to repair itself? > > --- > > The individual traces so far are attempts by a Nothing to repair its > incompleteness. The terminus of some traces would be the All - an > absolutely complete, and thus inconsistent divisor. > > You seem to be adding traces based on inconsistency which seems reasonable - > see my responses below. > > --- > > Here is one option: > > The system starts with all its axioms (a possibly infinite set). It > starts making inferences (possibly with infinitistic methods), > splitting when it runs into an inconsistency; the (possibly infinite) > split rejects facts that could have led to the inconsistency. > > So, the process makes increasingly consistent versions of the set > theory. Some will end up consistent eventually, and so will stop > splitting. These may be boring (having rejected most of the axioms) or > interesting. Some of the interesting ones will be UDs. > > > > So far I have not tried to identify a second source of the dynamic. I see > the Nothings as consistent because they can produce no answers but therefore > incomplete since they need to answer at least one. Some traces starting > here evolve towards completeness. The All contains at least one inconsistent > divisor - itself. It is interesting to consider if traces could originate > at inconsistent divisors and evolve towards consistency. > > > > The entire process may or may not amount to more than a UD, depending > on whether we use infinities i
RE: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?
Hi Abram: I have interlaced responses with - symbols. Original Message- From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Abram Demski Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 3:10 PM To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD? Hal, Is there a pattern to how the system responds to its own incompleteness? You say that there is not a pattern to the traces, but what do you mean by that? --- That is not what I actually said. I indicated that there were no restrictions on the copy process. There would be a pattern to some of the traces. The incompleteness of the Nothings causes them individually to eventually become a more distinction encompassing Something. This is a little like cold booting a computer that has a large [infinite] hard drive containing the All. [a Nothing -> a Something] -> The BIOS chip loads the startup program and some data into the dynamic memory and the computer boots. The program/data would be the first Something in a trace. From this point on there is no fixed nature to traces. The program could at one extreme generate the entire remaining trace [a series of Somethings] from just the data already present in the computer - without reading in more from the All - outputting each resulting computer state to the All on the hard drive. The All already contains these states many times over so this is just a copy process. At the other extreme the program could just generate random output which states are also in the All - another copy process. There would be all nature of traces between these two extremes. The incompleteness I cite is just the instability question. There may be others. [A trace would end if the output went into a continuous repeat of a particular state.] Other incompleteness issues of a particular Something seem like they should also prevent a trace from stopping. - It sounds to me like what you are describing is some version of an inconsistent set theory that is somehow trying to repair itself. - In other postings I have said that the All, being absolutely complete, is therefore inconsistent since it contains all answers to all questions [all possible distinctions and therefore no distinction]. (Except rather then sets, which are 2-fold distinctions because a thing can either be a member or not, you are admitting arbitrary N-fold distinctions, including 1-fold distinctions that fail to distinguish anything... conceptually interesting, I must admit.) I am not well versed in set theory or logic but I believe I understand what you are saying. I see this as the All contains an N-fold distinction - itself. --- So the question is, what is the process by which the system attempts to repair itself? --- The individual traces so far are attempts by a Nothing to repair its incompleteness. The terminus of some traces would be the All - an absolutely complete, and thus inconsistent divisor. You seem to be adding traces based on inconsistency which seems reasonable - see my responses below. --- Here is one option: The system starts with all its axioms (a possibly infinite set). It starts making inferences (possibly with infinitistic methods), splitting when it runs into an inconsistency; the (possibly infinite) split rejects facts that could have led to the inconsistency. So, the process makes increasingly consistent versions of the set theory. Some will end up consistent eventually, and so will stop splitting. These may be boring (having rejected most of the axioms) or interesting. Some of the interesting ones will be UDs. So far I have not tried to identify a second source of the dynamic. I see the Nothings as consistent because they can produce no answers but therefore incomplete since they need to answer at least one. Some traces starting here evolve towards completeness. The All contains at least one inconsistent divisor - itself. It is interesting to consider if traces could originate at inconsistent divisors and evolve towards consistency. The entire process may or may not amount to more than a UD, depending on whether we use infinities in the basic setup. You did in your post, and it seems likely, since set theory is not finitely axiomizable and your system is an extension of set theory. On the other hand, there would be some fairly satisfying axiomizations, in particular those based on naive set theory. This does have an infinite number of axioms, but in the form of an axiom schema, which can be characterized easily by finite deduction rules. So, your system could easily be crafted to be either a UD or more-than-UD, depending on personal preference. (That is, if my interpretation has not strayed too far from your intention.) --Abram - So far I think the inconsistency driven traces yo
Re: Reality
Bruno, you have strong (and likable) arguments from *your* point of view. I would like to say *"NO"* to the doctor, because a digital brain is but a reduction, from all that what I seek as whatever 'nature' (the world?) can provide. I don't know what, I call it 'analogue' - beyond those tools available to our limited mind as humans. I HOPE for more. Numbers represent one plane in this dream (for me). This is what you feel as a "critical tone" in my texts. I try to cope, because it is better than the total vagueness what I am in. Let me interject into your text below, starting the paragraphs with 'MJ': Tnanks for the reply John On Sat, Dec 27, 2008 at 1:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > John, > > On 25 Dec 2008, at 14:46, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno et al.: > > I don't feel comfortable with the view "reality *OF* something". Reality > IMO is the > unfathomable existence (whatever that may be) and *WE - machines, mind,*you > name it are having access to portions that we interpret (realize?) in ways > *we can.* > This portion (part, view, ensemble, whatever) is our *perceived reality *which > may > be 'physical', 'numbers', 'faith', what *WE deem (our) REALITY.* > > > > Scientists know that a theory is always intrinsically hypothetical, and > probably wrong. Making it precise makes it possible to be *shown* wrong, and > so we can abandon it, partially or completely, but so we learn. > > > > > Within such we may accept certain items as *"real"*, what does not make > them > *THE REALITY* only accepted aspects in our perception. > > > > > > *THE REALITY* is what we search. Nobody here pretend to know it in any > public way. THE REALITY is what we postulate theories about. > Then I propose an argument that IF we say yes to the doctor, that is, IF > there is a level of self-description such that a digital substitution > preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness THEN numbers (or > combinators, ...) have to be enough at the ontological level. The rest can > be described as internal gluing epistomologies, the lawful "many dreams". > This is going in *your* direction, it seems to me. > > MEC is not reductionist because it attribute consciousness to relative > sequences of numbers. It attributes personhood to sufficiently > introspective self-transforming machine. It points to the fact that we can > already listen to their opinions in some (precise) sense. > 'JM': Accordingly: a 'digital' substitution is part of the totality, can serve my feeling, (I add to it the rest) and consciousness, this elusive and mant ways identified noumenon came up in my trend to generalize its potential appearances to the simplest and widest-spread meaning came down to "acknowledgement of and response to information" (info - not the 'bit', which still has to be assigned as representing some meaning, - but to a discernible difference (to what?) in the relationships within the reality. The reality is IMO not something we 'seek to search', because we have access to only a part of it and the total is unknowable. Consequently: ontology makes sense only about something we MAY know in its entirety, NOT the unknowable . So I scrap ontology for now. We have a clash of opinion here: In my vocabulary MEC *IS indeed *reductionistic, reduced to the 'one plain' of numbers in *"reality"* which I imagine richer than imaginable within our human mind. Numbers are humanly thinkable. I question that the 'numbers' plane is 'sufficiently introspective' if 'we can already listen to their opinions. >The TOE may be pertinent to the 'reality', from the view of that > particular 'theory' > - in the case of this list: physical-mathematical aspects. > > > ? Are we not conversing on consciousness, persons and the mind body > problem? Is there no an attempt emphasize computer science and logic? > 'JM': I am still in limbo with 'mind', consciousness I touched in the preceding par., 'person' is open if I read the (partially) teleported nightmares, and "body" is definitely a term of the physical world. I still wonder if a 'person' is the body, the mind(set) a combination of them, or a separate item? > > > John, when you say that we must take into account the fact that our > theories are biased by the fact that they are our own theories, you are > right. But then, this is a theorem in the theory MEC, where we can > mathematically begin to study the degree of bias of possible self-observing > machines. > > I, and the universal machine, agrees often with what you are saying, John, > but I rarely understand the critical tone, like if the existence of a bias > should discourage the search for theories. (It should discourage only > the velleity of certainties there. If that is your point, I agree). > 'JM': I don't believe in ascertaining the "degree of bias" in something we know only partially. Not even ANY bias in something not yet learned. What I accept is the 'conditional': "if...", which eliminates the bias (as I started with a 'no' to the doctor)
Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?
Hal, Is there a pattern to how the system responds to its own incompleteness? You say that there is not a pattern to the traces, but what do you mean by that? It sounds to me like what you are describing is some version of an inconsistent set theory that is somehow trying to repair itself. (Except rather then sets, which are 2-fold distinctions because a thing can either be a member or not, you are admitting arbitrary N-fold distinctions, including 1-fold distinctions that fail to distinguish anything... conceptually interesting, I must admit.) So the question is, what is the process by which the system attempts to repair itself? Here is one option: The system starts with all its axioms (a possibly infinite set). It starts making inferences (possibly with infinitistic methods), splitting when it runs into an inconsistency; the (possibly infinite) split rejects facts that could have led to the inconsistency. So, the process makes increasingly consistent versions of the set theory. Some will end up consistent eventually, and so will stop splitting. These may be boring (having rejected most of the axioms) or interesting. Some of the interesting ones will be UDs. The entire process may or may not amount to more than a UD, depending on whether we use infinities in the basic setup. You did in your post, and it seems likely, since set theory is not finitely axiomizable and your system is an extension of set theory. On the other hand, there would be some fairly satisfying axiomizations, in particular those based on naive set theory. This does have an infinite number of axioms, but in the form of an axiom schema, which can be characterized easily by finite deduction rules. So, your system could easily be crafted to be either a UD or more-than-UD, depending on personal preference. (That is, if my interpretation has not strayed too far from your intention.) --Abram On Sat, Dec 27, 2008 at 11:38 AM, Hal Ruhl wrote: > > Hi Bruno: > > Since I have not programmed computers beyond the use of simple spread sheet > data organizing displays for many years, about the best I can offer these > days is a kind of flow chart: > > Start with an input space that contains all possible collections of > distinctions. I call these collections Divisors. [I wish to avoid the use > of the word "information".] > > It is then noted that this collection contains itself. > > Next it is noted that at least one of these Divisors is incomplete in a way > that must be resolved. This boot straps a dynamic within the input space. > > > To avoid adding additional types of components to the input space such as > labels on divisors it is simplest to describe the dynamic as creating a > succession of additional copies of divisors and adding them to the input > space. Since any divisor is already present an infinite number of times, > this dynamic is not changing the nature of the content of the input space. > > So far the simulating program is self booting and makes copies of portions > of its input space and outputs the copies to that space. Each of the > identified incomplete divisors is a seed for an additional such program > including any new copies of that divisor. > > A particular succession of copies is a trace of a simulation particular > program. > > The copy process has no restrictions. Some traces would be computationally > correct while others would be random and others a blend. Traces can split. > > The output process generates observer moments based on the outputted > divisors. > > The output of new copies of the incomplete Divisor and splitting traces > dovetails the dynamic. > > I think this contains a UD but the unrestricted nature of the traces seems > to makes it more than that. > > Yours > > Hal > > > > > > > -Original Message- > From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com > [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal > Sent: Saturday, December 27, 2008 5:36 AM > To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD? > > > Hi Hal, > > To see if your system is a UD, the first thing to do should consist in > writing a program capable of simulating it on a computer, and then to > see for which value of some parameters (on which it is supposed to > dovetail) it simulates a universal Turing machine. > To simulate it on a computer would help you (and us) to interpret the > words that you are using in the description of your system. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > On 27 Dec 2008, at 03:27, Hal Ruhl wrote: > > > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr
Re: Reality
Hi Tom, On 27 Dec 2008, at 22:50, Tom Caylor wrote: > > Bruno, > > Just coming at this after not thinking about it much. Good method :) > Sometimes > that's an advantage, but sometimes it results in forgetting pertinent > points that were understood before. As a math teacher, I know perfectly well that a student can genuinely understand a point, and forget later. Understanding is not enough, you have to forget and come back, repeatedly, sometimes from different directions, until the familiarity develops. Some theorem are so deep that you get surprises each time you come back to them. A bit like with music and art. Even more so with a simple but not so simple counter-intuitive argument in a still a bit taboo domain. In public discussion, possible new people can benefit from clear question. No problem asking. > > > > Taking two of your statements and trying to synthesize them, first > this one: > > On Dec 27, 11:51 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> ... >> Then I propose an argument that IF we say yes to the doctor, that is, >> IF there is a level of self-description such that a digital >> substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness THEN >> numbers (or combinators, ...) have to be enough at the ontological >> level. The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies, >> the lawful "many dreams". This is going in *your* direction, it >> seems >> to me. >> > > From your first statement, my initial "off the cuff" (quick) reaction > was that there is a contradiction between two parts of the supposed > theory of everything: > > A) "(IF) there is a level of self-description such that a digital > substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness" > B) "The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies, the > lawful "many dreams"" > > The "rest" in B is truly huge, is it not? Yes, it is, indeed. It is the whole first person plenitude, the sharable and the non sharable. Even the perceptible and the non perceptible. The "dreams" were defined as computations "as seen from some first person points of view (cf the throught experiments). That is why I have put "lawful" before the many dreams: those things are real and big. They are as real as the total or partial computable functions, and their relative implementations. By a Skolem like phenomenon the little box of numbers, once seen from inside by numbers is *very* big, uncomputably big. > And it is part of reality > is it not? Yes, it is, if by reality you mean the truth which kicks back soon or later when we are wrong or lie about them. In this case it is really the computational truth, or the Sigma_1 truth, but again seen from an inside point of view (making it climbs far higher than Sigma_1). It does not just look more complex there: it *is* more complex there. > Out "internal gluing epistemolgies" are something that is > going on in our mind, and our mind is part of reality. OK. But then you have to make precise that by "our mind" you mean the mind of the universal machines /numbers (in the relative way). When you say mind is part of reality, some will take this in the naturalist way (like mind = functioning of the brain). But with the UDA reversal you have something like NUMBERS ==> UNIVERSAL MACHINE ==> UNIVERSAL MIND ==> primary hypostases ==> secondary hypostases (that is: sensible and intelligible matter). > And this > "rest" is larger than anything that can be simulated (digitally, > computably), right? Absolutely so. > And yet it is something in our consciousness, > that is, it is part of A. I refer you to my text, which you have gently quoted above. Your "A" is a bit truncated if I may say. > It seems that wanting to have non- > simulatable "internal gluing epistemologies" and also have a > simulatable consciousness is like wanting to have your cake and not > have your cake too. Who said that consciousness is simulable or simulatable? Saying yes to the digital doctor does not mean a brain simulate a consciousness or a first person. On the contrary, as exemplified by the reasoning and mainly by UDA.8 (the MGA), consciousness does not even supervene on the activity of the brain. The brain makes only higher the probability that some first person, incarnated locally through a hopefully self-referential correct machine with respect to its normal histories, remain able to manifest herself again relatively to those most probable histories/dreams. The "real person" in the machine is really connected to a continuum of histories, not obeying *only* computable laws. > > > But then perhaps this is not a contradiction in light of your last > statement: > >> >> After the discovery of the Universal Machine, the Mechanist >> hypothesis, or even just the "strong AI" thesis, is not a >> reductionism, it is an openness of our mind toward a peculiar Unknown >> which invites itself to our table. >> >> Bruno > >
Re: Machines was:Kim 2.1
On 27 Dec 2008, at 20:50, Günther Greindl wrote: > I agree with Bruno that all empirical evidence in this universe > suggest > that CT = PCT. But this need not be so, in a logical sense. Indeed. UDA shows that PCT is a mysterious, if not *the* mystery with CT. Logicaly, and a priori, CT implies NOT PCT, or possible(not PCT). It is still an open problem, given that physics is not yet completely extracted, to say the least, from the comp hypothesis. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
