Re: Consciousness is information?
On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a > universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B. > This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of > view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the > probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account > *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into > account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A > into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ > below "your" substitution level. So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a copy of a person from Brussels to Moscow. What is it that is transmitted? Information, right? So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully described by some set of data. It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must be recoverable from that set of data. The only question is, what conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is completely described by the data set? I don't see any obvious reason why anything additional is needed. What does computation really add to this? You say that computation is crucial for this "experience" to take place. But why would this be so? Why couldn't we just say that your various types of mathematical logic can describe various types of correlations, categories, patterns, and relationships between informational states, but don't actually contribute anything to conscious experience? Conscious experience is with the information. Not with the computations that describe the relations between various informational states. > But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate > the probability of personal access to B, you have to take > into account *all* computations going from A to B I don't see how probability enters into it. A and B are both fully contained conscious states. Both will be realized, because both platonically exist as possible sets of information. State B may have a "memory" of State A. State A may have an "expectation" (or premonition) of State B. But that is the only link between the two. Otherwise the exist independenty. So Brian Greene had a good passage somewhat addressing this in his last book. He's actually talking about the block universe idea, but still applicable I think: "In this way of thinking, events, regardless of when they happen from any particular perspective, just are. They all exist. They eternally occupy their particular point in spacetime. This is no flow. If you were having a great time at the stroke of midnight on New Year's Eve, 1999, you still are, since that is just one immutable location in spacetime. The flowing sensation from one moment to the next arises from our conscious recognition of change in our thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. Each moment in spacetime - each time slice - is like one of the still frames in a film. It exists whether or not some projector light illuminates it. To the you who is in any such moment, it is the now, it is the moment you experience at that moment. And it always will be. Moreover, within each individual slice, your thoughts and memories are sufficiently rich to yield a sense that time has continuously flowed to that moment. This feeling, this sensation that time is flowing, doesn't require previous moments - previous frames - to be sequentially illuminated." On your earlier post: > The physical has to emerge from the statistical > probability interference among all computations, going through my > (current) states that are indiscernible from my point of view. > Why such interference takes the form of wave interference is still a > (technical) open problem. In my view, I just happen to be inhabit a perceptual universe that is fairly orderly and follows laws of cause and effect. However, there are other conscious observers (including other versions of me) who inhabit perceptual universes that are much more chaotic and nonsensical. But everything that can be consciously experienced is experienced, because there exists information (platonically) that describes a mind (human, animal, or other) having that experience. I say that because it seems to me that this information could (theoretically) be produced by a computer simulation of such a mind, which would presumably be conscious. So add platonism to that, and there you go! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--
Re: Consciousness is information?
Bruno, you made my day when you wrote: *"SOMEHOW" - *in: "...The machine has to be "runned" or "executed" relatively to a universal machine. You need the Peano or Robinson axiom to define such states and sequences of states. You can shuffled them if you want, and somehow the UD does shuffle them by its dovetailing procedure, but this will not change the arithmetical facts that those states belong or not too such or such computational histories" * First: my vocablary sais about 'axiom' the reverse of how it is used, it is our artifact invented in order to facilitate the application of our theories IOW: explanations for the phenomena so poorly understood (if anyway). So it is MADE up for exactly the purpose what we evidence by it. Second: UD *"shuffles 'them'* by the ominous *'somehow'*, (no idea: how?) but it has to be done for the result we invented as a 'must be'. Third: the *'computational history' snapshots* have to come together (I am not referring to the sequence, rather to the combination between 'earlier' and 'later' snapshots into a continuum from a discontinuum. That marvel bugs science for at least 250 years since chemical "thinking" started. A sequence of pictures is no history. * Then again: you wrote: "...The world you are observing is a sort of mean of all those computations, from your point of view. But the "running of the UD" is just a picturesque way to describe an infinite set of arithmetical relations..." I am not sure about the "mean" since we are not capable of even noticing 'all of them', not to evaluate the totality for a 'mean' - in my not arithmetic vocabulary: a median *"meaning"* of them all (nonsense). Your words may be a flowery (math that is) expression of 'viewing the totality in its entirety' which is just as impossible (for us, today) as to realize your 'infinite set of arithmetical relations'. If I leave out the 'arithmetical' (or substitute it by my meaningfulness) then we came together in 'viewing the totality' in our indiviual wording-ways. "*Relations"* is the punctum salience, it is a loose enough term to cover whatever is beyond our present comprehension. When relations look differently (maybe by just our observation from a different aspect?) we translate it into physical terms like change, movement, reaction, process or else, not realizing that WE look at it from different connotations. Use to that our *coordinates* (space and time) in the limited view we can muster (I call it: *"model*") and we arrived at causality of the conventional sciences (and common sense thinking as well). Indeed it is our personal (mini)-solipsistic perceived reality of *OUR*world washed into some common pattern (partially!) by comp or math or else. By the maze of such covering umbrella we believe in adjusted thinking. * Please do not conclude any denial from my part against the 'somehow' topics, the process-function-change manipulations (unknown, as I said), it is only reference to my ignorance directed in my agnosticism towards made-up explanations of any cultural era (and changing fast). John M On Tue, Apr 21, 2009 at 2:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Apr 2009, at 18:59, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > The question was whether information was enough, or whether something > > else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed, > > which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak of > > computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the > > sequence? > > Not really. Subjective time, be it first person or first person plural > (and thus "physical") relies on all computations made by the UD, and > the taking into account it is "self-referential". > > > > > > In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily > > computed in the same order > > Your first person next instant depends on an infinity of computations > made by the UD. The time step of the UD is relevant, because it > determines the whole UD structure, but it is not related in any direct > way with "time". We can conjecture than the more our substitution is > low, the more *time* looks like a computation being independent of us: > so relation of order can be made through indiscernible computation > equivalence class. I mean there are relation between states of > consciousness and computational history, but our consciousness > evolution is not related directly to one computational sequence. > > > > as they are experienced or is the order > > something intrinsic to the information in the states (i.e. like > > Stathis'es observer moments which can be shuffled into any order > > without > > changing the experience they instantiate). > > Consciousness is related to the sheaf of computations going through > that states. A computational state is a state of a computing > (mathematical) machine when doing a computation. The machine has to be > "runned" or "executed" relatively to a universal machine. You need the > Peano or Robinson axiom to define such states and seq
Re: Consciousness is information?
Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 21 Apr 2009, at 18:59, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> The question was whether information was enough, or whether something >> else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed, >> which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak of >> computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the >> sequence? >> > > Not really. Subjective time, be it first person or first person plural > (and thus "physical") relies on all computations made by the UD, and > the taking into account it is "self-referential". > > > > > >> In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily >> computed in the same order >> > > Your first person next instant depends on an infinity of computations > made by the UD. The time step of the UD is relevant, because it > determines the whole UD structure, but it is not related in any direct > way with "time". We can conjecture than the more our substitution is > low, the more *time* looks like a computation being independent of us: > so relation of order can be made through indiscernible computation > equivalence class. I mean there are relation between states of > consciousness and computational history, but our consciousness > evolution is not related directly to one computational sequence. > > > >> as they are experienced or is the order >> something intrinsic to the information in the states (i.e. like >> Stathis'es observer moments which can be shuffled into any order >> without >> changing the experience they instantiate). >> > > Consciousness is related to the sheaf of computations going through > that states. A computational state is a state of a computing > (mathematical) machine when doing a computation. The machine has to be > "runned" or "executed" relatively to a universal machine. You need the > Peano or Robinson axiom to define such states and sequences of states. > You can shuffled them if you want, and somehow the UD does shuffle > them by its dovetailing procedure, but this will not change the > arithmetical facts that those states belong or not too such or such > computational histories. I understand that the UD computes all different histories so they are interleaved. But each particular computation consists of an ordered set of states. These states can belong to more than one sequence of conscious experience. But the question is whether the order of the states in the computation is always the same as their order in any sequence of conscious experience in which they appear? For example, if there is a computation of states A, B, and C then is that a possible sequence in consciousness? In general there will be another, different computation that computes the states in the order A, C, B, so is that too a possible sequence in consciousness? Or is the experienced sequence in consciousness the same - determined by some intrinsic to the states? > And consciousness relies on those > computational facts (and information play important role there, but > not up to identify consciousness and information. (I think > consciousness is more a filtering of information, somehow). > > > > >> A related question in my mind has to do with reversibility. >> Computations in general are not reversible: Turing machines erase >> symbols. You can't infer the factors from the product. But QM >> (without >> collapse) is unitary and reversible in principle (though not in >> practice >> because of statistical and light-speed reasons). So my question is, >> are >> the computations of the UD reversible? >> > > I have still a residual doubt that a quantum computer makes sense > mathematically, but if that exists, then there exist a reversible > universal dovetailing. > > I don't understand that remark. Universal dovetailing is a completely abstract mathematical construct. It exists in Platonia. So how can the existence of a reversible (i.e. information preserving) UD depend on quantum computers? Brent > > > >> >>> and thus you have to take into >>> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A >>> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ >>> below "your" substitution level. >>> >>> >> Does the UD have to complete the infinitely many computations from A >> to >> B, i.e. we must think of these computations as being complete in >> Plationia? >> > > Yes. Our first person expectations relies on the whole completion of > the UD, due to the non awareness of the dovetailing delay. But it is > easier to describe the working of the UD by a program executed in > time, than by an infinite set of arithmetical relations already true > in "Platonia". > > If you accept comp, you accept that your "brain state" is accessed an > infinity of times by the UD through an infinity of computations. The > world you are observing is a sort of mean of all those c
Re: Consciousness is information?
On 21 Apr 2009, at 18:59, Brent Meeker wrote: > > The question was whether information was enough, or whether something > else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed, > which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak of > computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the > sequence? Not really. Subjective time, be it first person or first person plural (and thus "physical") relies on all computations made by the UD, and the taking into account it is "self-referential". > In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily > computed in the same order Your first person next instant depends on an infinity of computations made by the UD. The time step of the UD is relevant, because it determines the whole UD structure, but it is not related in any direct way with "time". We can conjecture than the more our substitution is low, the more *time* looks like a computation being independent of us: so relation of order can be made through indiscernible computation equivalence class. I mean there are relation between states of consciousness and computational history, but our consciousness evolution is not related directly to one computational sequence. > as they are experienced or is the order > something intrinsic to the information in the states (i.e. like > Stathis'es observer moments which can be shuffled into any order > without > changing the experience they instantiate). Consciousness is related to the sheaf of computations going through that states. A computational state is a state of a computing (mathematical) machine when doing a computation. The machine has to be "runned" or "executed" relatively to a universal machine. You need the Peano or Robinson axiom to define such states and sequences of states. You can shuffled them if you want, and somehow the UD does shuffle them by its dovetailing procedure, but this will not change the arithmetical facts that those states belong or not too such or such computational histories. And consciousness relies on those computational facts (and information play important role there, but not up to identify consciousness and information. (I think consciousness is more a filtering of information, somehow). > > > A related question in my mind has to do with reversibility. > Computations in general are not reversible: Turing machines erase > symbols. You can't infer the factors from the product. But QM > (without > collapse) is unitary and reversible in principle (though not in > practice > because of statistical and light-speed reasons). So my question is, > are > the computations of the UD reversible? I have still a residual doubt that a quantum computer makes sense mathematically, but if that exists, then there exist a reversible universal dovetailing. > > >> and thus you have to take into >> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A >> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ >> below "your" substitution level. >> > > Does the UD have to complete the infinitely many computations from A > to > B, i.e. we must think of these computations as being complete in > Plationia? Yes. Our first person expectations relies on the whole completion of the UD, due to the non awareness of the dovetailing delay. But it is easier to describe the working of the UD by a program executed in time, than by an infinite set of arithmetical relations already true in "Platonia". If you accept comp, you accept that your "brain state" is accessed an infinity of times by the UD through an infinity of computations. The world you are observing is a sort of mean of all those computations, from your point of view. But the "running of the UD" is just a picturesque way to describe an infinite set of arithmetical relations. From inside it is just a logical consequence that it looks analytical and physical. Obvioulsy a lot of work has to be done to see if all this will lead to a refutation of comp, or to a "theory of everything". Bruno >> (*) >> - Richard Epstein and Walter Carnielli, Computability, computable >> Functions, Logic, and the Foundations of Mathematics, Wadsworth & >> Brooks/Cole Mathematics series, Pacific Grove, California, 1989. >> - Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, Cambridge >> University Press, Fourth edition, 2002. >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~-
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
That's correct. It is not really irreversible. The point is that it doesn't matter as you end up in a state where the outcome of finding out what happened is not pre-determined. Saibal - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" To: Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2009 07:27 PM Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting > > Accepting QM without collapse, I am not sure you can dump your memory > in the environment in any truly irreversible way. > > Bruno > > > On 21 Apr 2009, at 15:22, Saibal Mitra wrote: > > > > > Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The > > verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially > > intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers. > > > > However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter > > if you > > undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment > > in an > > irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like: > > > > |you>[ |universe_1| + |universe_2> ] > > > > As far as |you> are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1> and > > |universe_2> differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23 > > particles: > > the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case. > > > > > > - Original Message - > > From: "Brent Meeker" > > To: > > Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM > > Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting > > > > > >> > >> Saibal Mitra wrote: > >>> If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also > >>> say that > > the > >>> two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible > >>> future > >>> versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with > > either > >>> of the two outcomes. > >>> > >>> But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and > >>> forgetting > >>> about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar > >>> position > > as > >>> that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If > >>> one > > could > >>> perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to > >>> experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can > >>> start with > > a > >>> spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component. > > There > >>> then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer > > forgetting > >>> about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be > >>> restored in > > the > >>> original state. The observer does remember having measured the > > z-component > >>> of the spin. > >>> > >>> Then, measuring the x-component again will yield "spin-up" with 100% > >>> probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer > > measured > >>> spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves > >>> that > > had > >>> the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a > >>> priori > >>> determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, > >>> both > >>> branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the > >>> quantum > >>> state is of the form: > >>> > >>> |You>[|spin up>|rest of the world knows the spin is up> + |spin > > down>|rest > >>> of the world knows spin is down>] > >> > >> You're contemplating reversing three different things: > >> > >> 1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result. Something > >> that's > > easy to do. > >> > >> 2) The spin state of a particle. > >> > >> 3) The state of what the rest of the world knows. > >> > >> Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, > >> reverse > > the spin > >> state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by > >> "the > > rest of > >> the world". > >> If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put > >> back > > in that > >> state. But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a > >> measurement > > would > >> require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole > >> universe > > (or at > >> least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring > > apparatus). > >> > >> Brent Meeker > >> > >>> > >>> although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you > > cannot > >>> rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches > >>> is real > >>> when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of > >>> both > >>> branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you > > don't > >>> know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, > >>> there > > is > >>> indeed more than one branch). > >>> > >>> > >>> - Original Message - > >>> From: "Jack Mallah" > >>> To: > >>> Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM > >>> Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> --- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra wrote: > http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 > > I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end > up in > > a > >>> different sector of the multiverse by sele
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
Accepting QM without collapse, I am not sure you can dump your memory in the environment in any truly irreversible way. Bruno On 21 Apr 2009, at 15:22, Saibal Mitra wrote: > > Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The > verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially > intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers. > > However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter > if you > undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment > in an > irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like: > > |you>[ |universe_1| + |universe_2> ] > > As far as |you> are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1> and > |universe_2> differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23 > particles: > the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case. > > > - Original Message - > From: "Brent Meeker" > To: > Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM > Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting > > >> >> Saibal Mitra wrote: >>> If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also >>> say that > the >>> two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible >>> future >>> versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with > either >>> of the two outcomes. >>> >>> But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and >>> forgetting >>> about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar >>> position > as >>> that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If >>> one > could >>> perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to >>> experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can >>> start with > a >>> spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component. > There >>> then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer > forgetting >>> about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be >>> restored in > the >>> original state. The observer does remember having measured the > z-component >>> of the spin. >>> >>> Then, measuring the x-component again will yield "spin-up" with 100% >>> probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer > measured >>> spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves >>> that > had >>> the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a >>> priori >>> determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, >>> both >>> branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the >>> quantum >>> state is of the form: >>> >>> |You>[|spin up>|rest of the world knows the spin is up> + |spin > down>|rest >>> of the world knows spin is down>] >> >> You're contemplating reversing three different things: >> >> 1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result. Something >> that's > easy to do. >> >> 2) The spin state of a particle. >> >> 3) The state of what the rest of the world knows. >> >> Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, >> reverse > the spin >> state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by >> "the > rest of >> the world". >> If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put >> back > in that >> state. But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a >> measurement > would >> require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole >> universe > (or at >> least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring > apparatus). >> >> Brent Meeker >> >>> >>> although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you > cannot >>> rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches >>> is real >>> when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of >>> both >>> branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you > don't >>> know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, >>> there > is >>> indeed more than one branch). >>> >>> >>> - Original Message - >>> From: "Jack Mallah" >>> To: >>> Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM >>> Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> --- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra wrote: http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in > a >>> different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I >>> had >>> written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now > I've >>> made the argument more rigorous. >>> >>> Saibal, I have to say that I disagree. As you acknowledge, erasing > memory >>> doesn't recohere the branches. There is no meaningful sense in >>> which > you >>> could end up in a different branch due to memory erasure. >>> >>> You admit the 'effect' has no observable consequences. But it has >>> no >>> unobservable meaning either. >>> >>> In fact, other than what I call 'causal differentiation', which
Re: Consciousness is information?
Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 20 Apr 2009, at 17:41, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > >>> A computation is a sequence of numbers (or of strings, or of >>> combinators, etc.) as resulting by an interpretation. For such an >>> interpretation, you don't need a "world", only an "interpreter" that >>> is a universal system, like elementary arithmetic for example. >>> >> You put scare quotes around "interpreter". >> > > > Just because it is not a human interpreter, but a programming language > interpreter. I use the term in the computer science sense. > > > > >> I don't see how arithmetic >> is an interpreter - isn't it an interpretation (of Peano's axioms)? >> > > > Usually I use "Arithmetic" for the (usual) standard interpretation (in > the human sense) of arithmetic. By arithmetic I was thinking of a > formal system such as the formal system Robinson Arithmetic (or Peano > Arithmetic depending on the context). > > It is not so easy to show that Robinson Arithmetic is a Turing > Universal interpreter, but it is standardly done in most good textbook > in mathematical logic(*). It is no more extraordinary that the Turing > universality of the SK combinators, or the universality of the > Conway's game of life, or the universality of any little universal > system. > > > > > >> And >> how does arithmetic avoid the problem of arbitrarily many mappings, as >> raised by Stathis? >> > > > Once you accept the computationalist hypothesis, not only that problem > is not avoided but the problems of the existence of both physical laws > and consciousness is entirely reduced to it, or to the digital version > (UD) version of that problem. The collection of all computations is a > well defined computational object, already existing or defined by a > tiny part of Arithmetical Truth, and not depending on the choice of > the initial basic formal system. > > The mapping are well defined though. The way Putnam, Mallah, Chalmers > and others put that problem just makes no sense with comp, given that > they postulated some primitively material or substantial universe > which does not makes any sense (as I have argued already). Then they > confuse a computation with a description of a computation. Sometimes > they use also the idea that real numbers occurs actually in nature > which just add confusion. Now I usually don't insist on that, because, > even if such mapping would make sense, it just add computational > histories in the universal dovetailing, or in Arithmetic, and this > does not change the measure problem. The only important fact here is > that with comp, the digitalness makes the measure problem well > defined: none mappings are arbitrary: either there is a computation or > there is no computation. > For example, with numbers and succession (but without addition and > multiplication) there is no universal computation, even if there is a > sense to say there is all description of computations there. A > counting algorithm does not constitute a universal dovetailing. Now, > numbers + addition + multiplication, gives universal computations and > thus all computations with its typical super-redundancy, and the > measure problem makes sense. Ontologically we need no more. > Epistemologically we need *much* more, we need something so big that > even with the whole "Cantor Paradise" or the whole "Plato Heaven" at > our disposition we will not even been able to name what we need (and > that is how comp prevents first person reductionism or eliminativism, > and how it makes theology needing a scientific endeavor). (with > science = hypothetical axiomatics). > > I agree with Kelly that we don't need a notion of causality, but we > need computations (Shannon information measures only a degree of > surprise, and consciousness is more general than being surprised, and > I agree with you that information is a statical notion). But the > notion of computations needs the logical relations existing among > numbers, although other basic finite entities can be used in the place > of numbers. In all case, the computations exists through the logical > relations among those finite entities. > > We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a > universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B. > This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of > view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the > probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account > *all* computations going from A to B, The question was whether information was enough, or whether something else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed, which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak of computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the sequence? In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily c
Re: Consciousness is information?
On 20 Apr 2009, at 17:41, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> A computation is a sequence of numbers (or of strings, or of >> combinators, etc.) as resulting by an interpretation. For such an >> interpretation, you don't need a "world", only an "interpreter" that >> is a universal system, like elementary arithmetic for example. > > You put scare quotes around "interpreter". Just because it is not a human interpreter, but a programming language interpreter. I use the term in the computer science sense. > I don't see how arithmetic > is an interpreter - isn't it an interpretation (of Peano's axioms)? Usually I use "Arithmetic" for the (usual) standard interpretation (in the human sense) of arithmetic. By arithmetic I was thinking of a formal system such as the formal system Robinson Arithmetic (or Peano Arithmetic depending on the context). It is not so easy to show that Robinson Arithmetic is a Turing Universal interpreter, but it is standardly done in most good textbook in mathematical logic(*). It is no more extraordinary that the Turing universality of the SK combinators, or the universality of the Conway's game of life, or the universality of any little universal system. > And > how does arithmetic avoid the problem of arbitrarily many mappings, as > raised by Stathis? Once you accept the computationalist hypothesis, not only that problem is not avoided but the problems of the existence of both physical laws and consciousness is entirely reduced to it, or to the digital version (UD) version of that problem. The collection of all computations is a well defined computational object, already existing or defined by a tiny part of Arithmetical Truth, and not depending on the choice of the initial basic formal system. The mapping are well defined though. The way Putnam, Mallah, Chalmers and others put that problem just makes no sense with comp, given that they postulated some primitively material or substantial universe which does not makes any sense (as I have argued already). Then they confuse a computation with a description of a computation. Sometimes they use also the idea that real numbers occurs actually in nature which just add confusion. Now I usually don't insist on that, because, even if such mapping would make sense, it just add computational histories in the universal dovetailing, or in Arithmetic, and this does not change the measure problem. The only important fact here is that with comp, the digitalness makes the measure problem well defined: none mappings are arbitrary: either there is a computation or there is no computation. For example, with numbers and succession (but without addition and multiplication) there is no universal computation, even if there is a sense to say there is all description of computations there. A counting algorithm does not constitute a universal dovetailing. Now, numbers + addition + multiplication, gives universal computations and thus all computations with its typical super-redundancy, and the measure problem makes sense. Ontologically we need no more. Epistemologically we need *much* more, we need something so big that even with the whole "Cantor Paradise" or the whole "Plato Heaven" at our disposition we will not even been able to name what we need (and that is how comp prevents first person reductionism or eliminativism, and how it makes theology needing a scientific endeavor). (with science = hypothetical axiomatics). I agree with Kelly that we don't need a notion of causality, but we need computations (Shannon information measures only a degree of surprise, and consciousness is more general than being surprised, and I agree with you that information is a statical notion). But the notion of computations needs the logical relations existing among numbers, although other basic finite entities can be used in the place of numbers. In all case, the computations exists through the logical relations among those finite entities. We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B. This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ below "your" substitution level. (*) - Richard Epstein and Walter Carnielli, Computability, computable Functions, Logic, and the Foundations of Mathematics, Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole Mathematics series, Pacific Grove, California, 1989. - Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, Cambridge University Press, Fourth edition, 2002. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Consciousness is information?
Jesse, I always appreciated your posts as considerate, logical and most professional. Now I a not so sure... Brent mixed up a bit the concepts, even stirring in interpretation into meaning, you speak about "our real world" - a joke. All because both of you are infected with a physicalistic-computerminded thinking, product of our XX.c. aberration by too much epistemic enrichment without the necessary base to use it properly. The old Greeks had it easy: with that minuscule 'knowledge-base' they had it was just dandy to use their pure logic - what is tarnished in today's thinking when a preschooler knows more about the universe than a Greek sage did. Not that I would vouch for the trueness of our knowledge, it is "interpreted" perceived reality, with lots of explanatory artifacts (figments) to match the 'equations'. Let me épater le bourgois: there is no such thing as *meaning* we put it out by our ways of thinking. Vocabularies are not God-given(!). Loaded words are real. Diverse meanings are context-dependent. Information is also not an 'existing thing', it is something we absorb from relations that reach our cognizance. Context dependent again. Now what is thei mysterious context? it is our setup in our perceived reality what we apply in a certain case. Again our doing. Not two minds(?) work identically in ALL respects (this caution is for Bruno, who may (I don't know) posit that anybody (with a mathematically inclined mind would work similarly with numbers, I amnot sure). So if you identify a dog as a cat, it is your meaning - not mine. I agreed with Brent that meaning is based on action - I was in the mindset of considering everything as 'action' until the question arose: what triggers such action, what provides the necessities to it (I don't know what to call energy) and the ways it proceeds? so what we see is what we supposed/assumed. Is that your "real world"? I THINK we are part of an existence all interconnected in ways about which we have no idea, but explain it to the ever actual level of our epistemic cognitive inventory. There are relations that may be viewed in diverse aspects and the change of our views is interpreted in our physics impeded thinking as movement, action, change, function, etc. It is hard to separate our figments from our own thinking: we think in them. KNOW we don't. Our perception is limited and we cannot include the totality *(I think thinking in numbers is also only an aspect to try so).* It is comfortable to stay within our capbilites - we are not ready to accept that all we know is a fraction that fits our assumptions. Sorry, I am far from expressing myself clearly, and that is not only a language problem. Human language - maybe. John M PS. My version of consciousness (universal): the course of responding to information (that is: in the above described sense). ANY. JM On Mon, Apr 20, 2009 at 10:01 AM, Jesse Mazer wrote: > Brent Meeker wrote: > > I think "meaning" ultimately must be grounded in action. That's why > > it's hard to see where the meaning lies in a computation, something that > > is just the manipulation of strings. People tend to say the meaning is > > in the interpretation, noting that the same string of 1s and 0s can have > > different interpretations. But what constitutes interpretation? I > > think it is interaction with the world. If you say, "What's a cat?" > > and I point and say, "That." then I've interpreted "cat" (perhaps > > wrongly if I point to a dog). > > > > Well, suppose you have an A.I. computer program that's running a robot > body--if you say "what's a cat" and the robot looks at a cat and points at > it, and more generally interacts with the world and uses language in a way > that suggests humanlike intelligence, do you grant that it probably has > consciousness and that its statements have meaning? If so, suppose take the > same program and let it run a simulated body in a simulated world, and when > some other simulated fellow asks it "what's a cat", it now points at a > simulated cat in this world. Has your opinion about the > consciousness/meaning-creation of this program changed because it's only > taking actions in a simulated world rather than our "real" world? > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Extra explanation
I just send a posting to the FOR list about my article. I did not have the time to reply to everyone on this list previously. Reading the old discussion again, I think that it was suggested that the exact quantum states matter, but they don't. It was only used to illustrate the thought experiment by Deutsch which would allow one to prove that the MWI is correct. This is what I sent to the FOR list: Some time ago I wrote a small article: http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 This was recently featured in New Scientist: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227044.200-avoid-a-future-cataclysm-forget-the-past.html The idea is that an observer can undo things that have already happened by resetting its memory, because when you reset your memory to a previous state, that previous state you are evolving into will be the same in a sector of the multiverse which evolved from that previous state and then was reset for any reason. So, if the reseting is triggered for reason A or reason B, it would lead to the observer ending up in the same state. The outcome of a new measuremnt to find out why the mempory was reset is then not pre-determined. Some details: The word "state" here refers to the classically describable state of an observer. In the article, I focus on machine observers. The subjective state of the observer is then exactly specified by specifying the ones and zeroes of the bits of the memory. So, I assume that whatever the observer can be aware of is encoded by the classical state of the bits of the computer and not the exact quantum state of the computer. The exact state of the computer has to be specified using a wavefunction of the computer (in fact, the state of the computer will be entangled with the rest of the universe). Then, one can write down any generic quantum state of the universe containing the observer by supplementing the (classical) information stored in the bits by the extra information you need to fully specify the wavefunction of the computer and everything else in the universe. One can then consider the unitary transformations that would represent a memory backup, memory resetting etc. After the memory resetting, you are notified why the memory was reset. Since the relevant things happen in the realm where classical physics applies, the probabilities are the same as what you would find using purely classical reasoning. The interpretation of these probablilites is, however, different from classical physics. When the memory is reset, you evolve to some state while the rest of the inverse will be in some superposition of states in which the memory was reset for various reasons. Then, before finding out why the memory was reset, the outcome of that observation is not pre-determined --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers. However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter if you undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment in an irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like: |you>[ |universe_1| + |universe_2> ] As far as |you> are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1> and |universe_2> differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23 particles: the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case. - Original Message - From: "Brent Meeker" To: Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting > > Saibal Mitra wrote: > > If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also say that the > > two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible future > > versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with either > > of the two outcomes. > > > > But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and forgetting > > about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar position as > > that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If one could > > perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to > > experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can start with a > > spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component. There > > then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer forgetting > > about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be restored in the > > original state. The observer does remember having measured the z-component > > of the spin. > > > > Then, measuring the x-component again will yield "spin-up" with 100% > > probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer measured > > spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves that had > > the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a priori > > determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, both > > branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the quantum > > state is of the form: > > > > |You>[|spin up>|rest of the world knows the spin is up> + |spin down>|rest > > of the world knows spin is down>] > > You're contemplating reversing three different things: > > 1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result. Something that's easy to do. > > 2) The spin state of a particle. > > 3) The state of what the rest of the world knows. > > Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse the spin > state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by "the rest of > the world". > If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put back in that > state. But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a measurement would > require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole universe (or at > least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring apparatus). > > Brent Meeker > > > > > although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you cannot > > rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches is real > > when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of both > > branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you don't > > know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, there is > > indeed more than one branch). > > > > > > - Original Message - > > From: "Jack Mallah" > > To: > > Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM > > Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting > > > > > > > > > > --- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra wrote: > >> http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 > >> > >> I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a > > different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had > > written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now I've > > made the argument more rigorous. > > > > Saibal, I have to say that I disagree. As you acknowledge, erasing memory > > doesn't recohere the branches. There is no meaningful sense in which you > > could end up in a different branch due to memory erasure. > > > > You admit the 'effect' has no observable consequences. But it has no > > unobservable meaning either. > > > > In fact, other than what I call 'causal differentiation', which clearly will > > track the already-decohered branches (so you don't get to reshuffle the > > deck), there is no meaningful sense in which "you" will end up in one > > particular future branch at all. Other than causal differentiation > > tracking, either 'you' are all of your future branches, or 'you' are just > > here for the moment and are none of them. > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this me
