Re: R/ASSA query
On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 5:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Could our universe *actually* produce such a being by applying our presumably deterministic laws to any set of initial conditions over any amount of time? Of course it could. People could have any belief whatsoever, and the day-person belief can't even be shown to be logically or empirically false. It's just a contingent fact about human psychology that it is a rare belief. Assuming Physicalism: People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical configurations that it is possible for a human brain to take. What determines the set of possible physical brain configurations? Well, first, the laws of physics that govern the interactions of the quarks and electrons that constitute such a brain. And second, whether such a configuration is reachable from the initial state of the universe. So physical laws plus initial conditions determine what beliefs are actually possible vs not possible for people. People cannot have any belief whatsoever. Evolution has no causal mechanism, and thus doesn't add any explanatory power to physicalism. It's just a convenient fiction - a kind of short hand, or a metaphor - for fundamental physical laws plus initial conditions. I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Definition of universe
On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem. Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to enquire why you say above and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either. I think I've asked before about the distinction between can be computed and is (in fact) being computed. It's only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e. if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis). But if - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is primitively-physical, as opposed to computationally-generated, I'm no longer sure of your reason for saying thus. Is it related to what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind from the starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind - 1- p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a primitively- physical 3-p pov? David Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain here (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and relies on philosophy of mind/computer science or machine's theology. The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem. This is relevant for the (very hard) question what is a (physical) universe?. This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomes prevalent, and the question of universe becomes equivalent with the question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a notion of entanglement of computation. If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique coherent structure accounting for all observations? What is its internal and external logic? Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherent structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external logic, and some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major interest of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories). But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just an open problem to really count the number of complete boolean structures capable of attributing values to anything observable. This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I mean those few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware of some subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical) computation. The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that we share the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some computation: this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by the indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happenings makes difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that really exists beyond its local appearances. This why I prefer to use the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many worlds or many-universes. Universe becomes defined by the complete boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations as seen from a first person perspective). All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument. Bruno On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote: Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of universe as posited by Tegmark here... http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1 Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical structures. On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey min...@gmail.com wrote: Hello, I was just wondering, we are talking
Re: R/ASSA query
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 5:27 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical configurations that it is possible for a human brain to take. What determines the set of possible physical brain configurations? Well, first, the laws of physics that govern the interactions of the quarks and electrons that constitute such a brain. And second, whether such a configuration is reachable from the initial state of the universe. So physical laws plus initial conditions determine what beliefs are actually possible vs not possible for people. People cannot have any belief whatsoever. Evolution has no causal mechanism, and thus doesn't add any explanatory power to physicalism. It's just a convenient fiction - a kind of short hand, or a metaphor - for fundamental physical laws plus initial conditions. I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. How do you know? Perhaps the physical brain state that this belief WOULD supervene on is not actually possible in our universe due to the fact that assuming that state would violate the Pauli exclusion principle? Or perhaps it wouldn't violate the violate any physical law, BUT all paths by which you could reach that state WOULD violate some physical law. So the only universe that could contain a person holding that belief would have to have this person appear as part of the initial conditions of that universe. Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a mental tool, a way of thinking by analogy. Lacking any sort of causal mechanism, it doesn't explain the way things are. It's just a story that helps us think about the way things are. Right? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds
On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 12:38 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 25, 2010, at 1:56 AM, Charles charlesrobertgood...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 23, 8:42 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I think it's an example of the radiation arrow of time making a time-reversed process impossible - or maybe just vanishingly improbable. Bruce Kellet has written a paper about these problems, see pp 35. http://members.optusnet.com.au/bhkellett/radasymmetry.pdf I am reading this, and have just come across this passage: One possibility that is sometimes raised is that the overall expansion of the universe provides the local arrow for the direction of time. While cosmology, particularly the cosmological initial conditions, might be relevant to any final understanding of the arrow of time, particularly the thermodynamic arrow, it is difficult to see the expansion of the universe as being sufficient to explain the local asymmetry of every single independent radiation event. The basic reason is that the expansion of the universe is a cosmological phenomenon; the usual understanding of the Friedmann-Roberston-Walker solution to Einstein’s equations of General Relativity that governs the overall evolution of the universe is that, although the fabric of spacetime expands on the large scale, individual galaxies do not expand, they merely move apart. The expansion actually takes place only on the scale at which the universe can be seen as homogeneous and isotropic. This is the scale of galaxies and galactic clusters—only there is the ‘Friedmann dust’ model applicable. The model that describes the expansion of the universe simply does not apply within galaxies, much less within the solar system or on the surface of the earth. So the universal expansion is simply unable to provide an effective arrow of time that is locally available for every independent radiation event. This seems to me to miss a fundamental point, namely that emission and absorption events are only local if you ignore what happens to the photon beforehand or afterwards. If you trace the trajectory of the photon, you will arrive at some other event, and this event in turn is linked to a previous / future one. Ultimately all chains of trajectories of photons, electrons, quarks and so on connect to either the Big Bang or the distant future (timelike infinity, say). If the trajectories (or, presumably, waves) are constrained by whatever is at either end of their trajectory, as time-symmetry implies, then this stops them being local. They are part of a universe-filling web, which is anchored to whatever boundary conditions obtain on the universe as a whole. Charles -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. One approach to the problem that I heard regarding the arrow of time relates to the fact that storing information (either by the brain or in a DNA molecule in the course of evolution) requires the expendature of energy. The expendature of energy results in an increase in entropy of the universe. Thus life evolves and we remember new things in the same direction of time. Jason Stephen Hawking discusses this idea briefly in A Brief History of Time, p. 146-147. I'll quote: It is rather difficult to talk about human memory because we don't know how the brain works in detail. We do, however, know all about how computer memories work. I shall therefore discuss the psychological arrow of time for computers. I think it is reasonable to assume that the arrow for computers is the same as that for humans. If it were not, one could make a killing on the stock exchange by having a computer that would remember tomorrow's prices! A computer memory is basically a device containing elements that can exist in either of two states. A simple example is an abacus. In its simplest form, this consists of a number of wires; on each wire is a bead that can be put in one of two positions. Before an item is recorded in a computer's memory, the memory is in a disordered state, with equal probabilities for the two possible states. (The abacus beads are scattered randomly on the wires of the abacus.) After the memory interacts with the system to be remembered, it will definitely be in one state or the other, according to the state of the system. (Each abacus bead will be at either the left or the right of the abacus wire.) So the memory has passed from a disordered state to an ordered one. However, in order to make sure that the memory is in the right state, it is necessary to use a certain amount of energy (to move the bead or to
Re: R/ASSA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 5:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Could our universe *actually* produce such a being by applying our presumably deterministic laws to any set of initial conditions over any amount of time? Of course it could. People could have any belief whatsoever, and the day-person belief can't even be shown to be logically or empirically false. It's just a contingent fact about human psychology that it is a rare belief. Assuming Physicalism: People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical configurations that it is possible for a human brain to take. What determines the set of possible physical brain configurations? Well, first, the laws of physics that govern the interactions of the quarks and electrons that constitute such a brain. And second, whether such a configuration is reachable from the initial state of the universe. So physical laws plus initial conditions determine what beliefs are actually possible vs not possible for people. People cannot have any belief whatsoever. Evolution has no causal mechanism, and thus doesn't add any explanatory power to physicalism. It's just a convenient fiction - a kind of short hand, or a metaphor - for fundamental physical laws plus initial conditions. I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. That seems likley, but it's hard to know it's true. It may happen that the laws of physics are such that persons (animals like us) believing (falsely) that they only live for a day cannot evolve. Or maybe you only mean that some individuals could have this belief as a kind of mental pathology - as some people believe they don't exist. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 5:27 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical configurations that it is possible for a human brain to take. What determines the set of possible physical brain configurations? Well, first, the laws of physics that govern the interactions of the quarks and electrons that constitute such a brain. And second, whether such a configuration is reachable from the initial state of the universe. So physical laws plus initial conditions determine what beliefs are actually possible vs not possible for people. People cannot have any belief whatsoever. Evolution has no causal mechanism, and thus doesn't add any explanatory power to physicalism. It's just a convenient fiction - a kind of short hand, or a metaphor - for fundamental physical laws plus initial conditions. I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. How do you know? Perhaps the physical brain state that this belief WOULD supervene on is not actually possible in our universe due to the fact that assuming that state would violate the Pauli exclusion principle? Or perhaps it wouldn't violate the violate any physical law, BUT all paths by which you could reach that state WOULD violate some physical law. So the only universe that could contain a person holding that belief would have to have this person appear as part of the initial conditions of that universe. Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a mental tool, a way of thinking by analogy. Lacking any sort of causal mechanism, it doesn't explain the way things are. It's just a story that helps us think about the way things are. Right? Why do you say evolution lacks a causal mechanism? Natural selection causes somethings not to occur - like animals that eat their children. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. How do you know? Perhaps the physical brain state that this belief WOULD supervene on is not actually possible in our universe due to the fact that assuming that state would violate the Pauli exclusion principle? Or perhaps it wouldn't violate the violate any physical law, BUT all paths by which you could reach that state WOULD violate some physical law. So the only universe that could contain a person holding that belief would have to have this person appear as part of the initial conditions of that universe. Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a mental tool, a way of thinking by analogy. Lacking any sort of causal mechanism, it doesn't explain the way things are. It's just a story that helps us think about the way things are. Right? People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know. The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour is there, but the very maladaptive behaviours are rare. It's not that it's difficult to make an animal that does not feel hungry, it's just that these animals don't pass on their genes. Is that not a causal mechanism for evolution? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 10:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. How do you know? Perhaps the physical brain state that this belief WOULD supervene on is not actually possible in our universe due to the fact that assuming that state would violate the Pauli exclusion principle? Or perhaps it wouldn't violate the violate any physical law, BUT all paths by which you could reach that state WOULD violate some physical law. So the only universe that could contain a person holding that belief would have to have this person appear as part of the initial conditions of that universe. Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a mental tool, a way of thinking by analogy. Lacking any sort of causal mechanism, it doesn't explain the way things are. It's just a story that helps us think about the way things are. Right? People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know. The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour is there, but the very maladaptive behaviours are rare. It's not that it's difficult to make an animal that does not feel hungry, it's just that these animals don't pass on their genes. Is that not a causal mechanism for evolution? Isn't there already a complete causal account at the level of quarks and electrons and the fundamental forces that govern their interactions, stretching back to the first instant of the universe, for the existence and demise of any specific animal that doesn't feel hunger? If this physics-based account is complete, then what does this extra causal mechanism of evolution that you are proposing actually do? Either evolution really does something - or it's just an imaginary device that we've made up...a descriptive metaphorical narrative that is broadly compatible with a Victorian conception of how the world is, but which in itself doesn't actually explain anything. Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
