On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
> they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body
> or consciousness/reality problem.

Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst
continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to
enquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum
Mechanics either".  I think I've asked before about the distinction
between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".  It's
only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e.
if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is
in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).  But if
- as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is
"primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated, I'm
no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".  Is it related to
what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind from the
starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind - 1-
p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a primitively-
physical 3-p pov?

David


> Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain  
> here (uda, auda)  can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or  
> Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and  
> relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".
>
> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity  
> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the  
> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett  
> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that  
> they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body  
> or consciousness/reality problem.
>
> This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a (physical)  
> universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the  
> physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the  
> computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomes  
> prevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent with the  
> question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of  
> passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a  
> notion of entanglement of computation.
>
> If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to  
> all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique  
> coherent structure accounting for all observations?  What is its  
> internal and external logic?
>
> Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherent  
> structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external logic, and  
> some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major interest  
> of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third  
> person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum  
> observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique  
> coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories).
>
> But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of  
> realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just an  
> open problem to really count the number of complete boolean structures  
> capable of attributing values to anything observable.
>
> This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I mean those  
> few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware of some  
> subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical)  
> computation.
>
>   The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that we share  
> the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some computation:  
> this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by the  
> indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happenings makes  
> difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that  
> "really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I prefer to use  
> the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many worlds  
> or many-universes.   "Universe" becomes defined by the complete  
> boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations as seen  
> from a first person perspective).
>
> All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the  
> seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument.
>
> Bruno
>
> On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> > Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark  
> > here...
> >http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1
>
> > Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical  
> > structures.
>
> > On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Hello,
>
> > I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
> > do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
> > somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
>
> > Inyuki
> >http://www.universians.org
>
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