Re: Infinities

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 10:34:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now, this does not necessarily concern us. I think. Even ZF and ZF
> +Choice proves the same theorems in arithmetic. That is probably not
> the case for ZF and ZF + CH, but the comp ontology will not change.
> For the phenomenology, that might change something though, making
> the measure problem more easy or more difficult. We are not yet
> enough advanced on this to decide, i think. model theory and set
> theory are *quite* complex compared to arithmetic!
> 

If comp ontology does not depend on CH (seems plausible), but there is
an effect of phenomenology, then so much the worse for comp. Comp
predicts that phenomenology is purely derivable from comp.

However, I tend to agree with Saibal that things like the CH will
prove irrelevant to phenomenology. 
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Infinities

[smitra]

On 23-09-2017 10:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Sep 2017, at 13:47, David Nyman wrote:




https://www.quantamagazine.org/mathematicians-measure-infinities-find-theyre-equal-20170912/

[1]


A rare progress on the continuum hypothesis (CH). Shelah is amazingly
smart. There is that story that he arrived one week to early at a
congress of logic, and decided to follow a congress on group theory
instead, and depressed everybody by solving most open problems of that
congress! His first question was "what is a group?", and people taught
he was retarted!

Now, this does not necessarily concern us. I think. Even ZF and
ZF+Choice proves the same theorems in arithmetic. That is probably not
the case for ZF and ZF + CH, but the comp ontology will not change.
For the phenomenology, that might change something though, making the
measure problem more easy or more difficult. We are not yet enough
advanced on this to decide, i think. model theory and set theory are
*quite* complex compared to arithmetic!

Bruno

Everything in physics suggests that infinities don't actually exists, so 
perhaps more progress can be made if you use a finitistic logics system.


Saibal

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> ​>> ​
>> We agreed that "the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow, but
>> yesterday nobody saw  ​Moscow.
>
>
> ​> ​
> That contradicts the identity criteria on which we have agreed.
>

​
What
​ ​
agreed
​ ​
on
​ ​
identity criteria
​ ​
does that violate? The only
​ ​
identity criteria
​ ​
I remember agreeing to is
​ "​
the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow
​.​

​> ​
> The answer is simply: I expect
> ​ [...]
>

​Simple indeed if one refuses to consider just what "*I*" means and what
the consequences of
​ ​
stepping into a "*I*"

​duplicating machine would be, ​but not simple in a good way.


> ​> ​
> to find myself either in M or in W.
>

​And it is so much simpler not to think about just what "myself" means with
regards to the future. Not thinking is easier than thinking.

​>> ​
>> and which *THE* first person experience are you talking about?
>
>
> ​> ​
> All the unicity experience of all copies.
>

​If its all of them why do you express surprise and claim that all sorts of
deep philosophical consequences can be drawn from the fact that one and
only one answer is insufficient to describe the fate of several different
things.  ​
H
ow could it be otherwise?


> ​> ​
> I remind you the criteria: all copies must confirms the prediction rule in
> the finite duplication,
>

​All the copies were NOT asked the question yesterday back in Helsinki,
only Bruno Marchal was asked the question ​yesterday back in Helsinki; and
we know today that Bruno Marchal ended up seeing both cities. Yes yes I
know what you will say "you confuse the 1p and the 3p" but you are the one
who is confused, it is you who hasn't thought deeply about what a people
duplicating machine really means. If the body of Bruno Marchal is
duplicated there will still be only one conscious entity if the two of them
are in identical environments, it is only when the environments differs,
such as being in different cities, that the two start to form different
memories and become different conscious beings. But you ask "Which one will
become the Moscow man?" and the answer of course is "the one the sees
Moscow". Yes that's a trivial answer but then it was a trivial question,
and at least it's true just like all tautologies.

​> ​
> "THE" is used, because all those experience are incompatible from the
> first pov.
>

​Which *THE* ​first pov is "*THE*" incompatible with?

​>> ​
>> THE first person experience of the Helsinki man today? THE first person
>> experience of the Helsinki man tomorrow?
>
>
> ​> ​
> Yes, that one. That has been said since the start.
>

​That one? Which one?​ You quoted two.


> Which  first person experience
>> ​ Is Mr. You, which ONE is different from all the others and uniquely
>> ​deserves the noble title of "*THE*"?
>>
>
> ​> ​
> All of them deserves the title of "THE"
>

​And that is why your notation has the precision of a dogs breakfast. ​


> ​>> ​
>> We had agreed that "the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow, but
>> yesterday nobody saw Moscow so obviously yesterday the Moscow man DID NOT
>> EXIST.
>
>
> ​> ​
> That contradicts the identity criterion.
>

​The
 identity criterion
​, what a joke!  If  "The Moscow man"​ no longer means the man who saw
Moscow then what does it mean? I don't know why I bother to ask you, on
Monday Wednesday and Friday you say it means one thing, on Tuesday Thursday
and Saturday you say it means another thing, and on Sunday you're not quite
sure.

>
​>> ​
>> But now you say "the Moscow man" did exist yesterday, so I have no idea
>> what you now mean by  ​"the Moscow man" and you have no idea either.
>
>
> ​> ​
> That is ridiculous. As I said, the M-man is the H-man, when he is in M.
>

​If there is no difference between the Moscow man and the ​

​Helsinki man then why did you give them different names? If there is a
difference but that difference is NOT that the Moscow man has seen Moscow
and Helsinki but the Helsinki man has only seen Helsinki then what in the
world is that difference? You've got to get your notation straight and make
it precise!  ​


> ​> ​
> Please answer P(tea).
>

​I don't like pee tea.

​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​At that moment, you can consider them as fused. The H-man is both of
>>> them,
>>
>> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> Both? If there are two there must be a difference between the H-man and
>> the M-man,
>
>
> ​> ​
> Not when seen as fused.
>

​If they are identical then what would be the difference between saying ​

​"there are two of them that are fused but both are identical​" to just
saying "there is only one and nothing is fused"? I can't see how there
would be any difference, not from the 3p view *and not from the 1p view
either!* So I ask yet again, now that the Moscow man no longer means the
man who saw Moscow what does it mean? And is there a Tokyo man fused in
there too? How about a
Chicago
​ man?​


> ​>> ​
>> ​He expects ​Santa Claus's workshop
>> ​! ​
>>
>> I don't give a damn what the