Re: Vacuum energy

[Alan Grayson]

On Thursday, May 7, 2020 at 7:09:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/7/2020 4:28 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 12:19:52 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/2/2020 10:50 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> You mean to experimentally estimate it from the scatter of results?  That 
>>> depends on how accurately you want to estimate.  The error scales as 
>>> 1/sqrt(N).  In most experiments with photons or electrons, it's easy to 
>>> make N big.  But it's also hard to eliminate other sources of scatter that 
>>> have nothing to do with the UP.  So only experiments deliberately designed 
>>> for maximum precision are going to push the UP bounds for simultaneous 
>>> measurements. 
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> If the experiment is designed for max precision, how large does N have to 
>> be to satisfy the UP? TIA, AG 
>>
>>
>> That doesn't quite make sense.  It takes two to get an estimate of the 
>> variance and the first two you measure may satisfy the UP or they may 
>> violate the NP.  The variance, and the std deviation estimators are random 
>> variables, obey a certain distribution.  The bigger N the tighter the 
>> estimate.  In almost all experiments there will be other sources of 
>> randomness and the estimate will converge around some uncertainty bigger 
>> than h, which is satisfying the UP.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Why doesn't my question make sense? You say that with an ensemble of 2, 
> the product of the standard deviations might violate the UP. So how large 
> must the ensemble be to guarantee satisfying the UP? AG 
>
>
> There's no such guarantee.  You're not measuring the standard deviations 
> directly, you're measuring estimators of them.  The estimators are random 
> variables.   Suppose I said the average height of a human being is greater 
> than 175cm.  How many people would you have to measure to guarantee that 
> was true?
>
> Brent
>

Suppose I wanted to measure the length of a rod. Couldn't I use high 
frequency photons to measure its endpoints with as much precision as 
desired (short of inducing a black hole), and its length calculated from 
the length differences of its endpoints? Would this procedure violate the 
UP? AG 

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> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: Vacuum energy

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/7/2020 4:28 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 12:19:52 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 5/2/2020 10:50 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:


You mean to experimentally estimate it from the scatter of
results?  That depends on how accurately you want to
estimate.  The error scales as 1/sqrt(N). In most experiments
with photons or electrons, it's easy to make N big.  But it's
also hard to eliminate other sources of scatter that have
nothing to do with the UP.  So only experiments deliberately
designed for maximum precision are going to push the UP
bounds for simultaneous measurements.

Brent


If the experiment is designed for max precision, how large does N
have to be to satisfy the UP? TIA, AG


That doesn't quite make sense.  It takes two to get an estimate of
the variance and the first two you measure may satisfy the UP or
they may violate the NP.  The variance, and the std deviation
estimators are random variables, obey a certain distribution.  The
bigger N the tighter the estimate.  In almost all experiments
there will be other sources of randomness and the estimate will
converge around some uncertainty bigger than h, which is
satisfying the UP.

Brent


Why doesn't my question make sense? You say that with an ensemble of 
2, the product of the standard deviations might violate the UP. So how 
large must the ensemble be to guarantee satisfying the UP? AG


There's no such guarantee.  You're not measuring the standard deviations 
directly, you're measuring estimators of them.  The estimators are 
random variables.   Suppose I said the average height of a human being 
is greater than 175cm.  How many people would you have to measure to 
guarantee that was true?


Brent


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Re: Vacuum energy

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 12:19:52 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2020 10:50 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> You mean to experimentally estimate it from the scatter of results?  That 
>> depends on how accurately you want to estimate.  The error scales as 
>> 1/sqrt(N).  In most experiments with photons or electrons, it's easy to 
>> make N big.  But it's also hard to eliminate other sources of scatter that 
>> have nothing to do with the UP.  So only experiments deliberately designed 
>> for maximum precision are going to push the UP bounds for simultaneous 
>> measurements. 
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> If the experiment is designed for max precision, how large does N have to 
> be to satisfy the UP? TIA, AG 
>
>
> That doesn't quite make sense.  It takes two to get an estimate of the 
> variance and the first two you measure may satisfy the UP or they may 
> violate the NP.  The variance, and the std deviation estimators are random 
> variables, obey a certain distribution.  The bigger N the tighter the 
> estimate.  In almost all experiments there will be other sources of 
> randomness and the estimate will converge around some uncertainty bigger 
> than h, which is satisfying the UP.
>
> Brent
>

Why doesn't my question make sense? You say that with an ensemble of 2, the 
product of the standard deviations might violate the UP. So how large must 
the ensemble be to guarantee satisfying the UP? AG 

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Re: Universe as a simulated strange loop

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/7/2020 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Existing is when the proposition “ExP(x)” is true in some reality. For example 
Ex(prime(x)) is true in the structure/model (N, 0, s, +, x).


"In some reality" completely drains "reality" of all meaning.  It simply 
means some set of assertions that is not self-contradictory.


Brent

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Re: Universe as a simulated strange loop

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/7/2020 9:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I can imagine a materialist psychologist claiming that the natural numbers are 
not primitive but explainable by a cultural anthropo-evolutionary genetic, say. 
But 1) he is confusing the human natural number theories with arithmetic, and 
2) he is cheating, as his explanation will make only sense by an implicit 
acceptance of some universal machinery equivalent to the belief in RA, so, he 
is just confusing level of explanation.


It's not confusion when you explain something in terms of what you 
understand.  Confusion is to say things must be explained in terms of 
something infinite and incomprhensible...and then claim it's 
incomprehensibility proves it's primitive because is can't have an 
explanation.


Brent


Yes, the human number theory is a fascinating subject, and it sustains the idea 
that 2+2=4 is “really absolutely” true, as all humans agree on this, and even 
many other mammals, actually. But that is a different subject matter than the 
one number theory is build for.  This one avoid the philosophy of numbers by 
using the axiomatic method. It should be obvious that with mechanism, the 
discovery of the numbers by the numbers is part of the meta-arithmetic that 
Gödel’s showed embeddable in arithmetic. The real bomb is still Gödel’s 1931, 
even if it is the two theorems of Solovay which sums it all in G, and G*.



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Re: Universe as a simulated strange loop

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2020, at 14:15, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 10:14:10 PM UTC-5, smitra wrote:
> On 03-05-2020 23:09, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > The SSH 
> > 
> >   https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247 
> >  
> > 
> > still lies in the "information turn" that plays in physics today.(IT 
> > FROM QUBIT, etc.) - a rejection pf materialism in favor of idealism. 
> > 
> > It is more interesting to me to stick to the vocabulary of 
> > materialist* physics - particles, fields, interactions, forces - but 
> > to approach CONSCIOUSNESS AS PURELY MATERIAL - adding a new 
> > force/interaction/particle/field as needed (like a sixth force/field). 
> > 
> > http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Field_theories_of_consciousness 
> >  
> > 
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness 
> >  
> > 
> > etc. 
> > 
> > * or physicalist 
> > 
> > @philipthrift 
> 
> Physicalism is a dead end. The hard problem of consciousness and other 
> philosophical problems can be considered to be no-go theorems against 
> physicalism. Abandoning physicalism solves all these problems in one 
> fell swoop. But that also opens the door to wrong theories as people 
> engaging with non-physicalist theories can too easily advertise their 
> pet theories because they don't suffer from all the diseases physicalist 
> theories suffer from. The bar has to be set higher, I would like to see 
> a derivation of the laws of physics, not some vague argument that it is 
> consistent with QM and unitary evolution but a lot more detail than just 
> that. 
> 
> Saibal 
> 
> I think more likely this mean the hard problem or qualia are illusions.

Esher hands points on the usual third person self-reference is which computer 
science excels, as the theorem of Kleene completely explains constructively, 
and  the basic idea is already in the combinator Mx = xx, as MM will give MM, 
etc. For biology there is one more nuance to add, but I don’t want to be long. 
All that works in the realm of the third person beliefs.

But this self-reference does not make the link with the first person that you 
need for explaining consciousness and qualia.
As Gödel saw, the logic of that 3p self-reference obeys G, not a logic of 
knowledge S4.

In particular G does not prove []p ->p.

But that is why the Theatetus definition makes sense here. To define knowledge 
by true belief ([∏p & p), and arithmetic makes it possible to arithmeticize 
this without defining a predicate (which can be shown to NOT exist), so the 
logic of ([]p & p) which implies p trivially, provides a logic of a non 
nameable/3p-describable first person, obey a logic of knowledge, already with a 
temporal subjectivity (close to Brouwer and Bersgson).

That solves the consciousness part of the consciousness/matter problem.

Then, the matter problem is solved constructively by the restriction on the 
sigma_1 sentences (the leaves of the universal dpevtalg in arithmetic), and 
that can be tested, and indeed the test are already done for many part of it, 
and thanks to quantum logic, it fits rather well, and here too, we get a clear 
separation of quanta and qualia.





> I have far more confidence in physics


Me to. Only physics can test if physicalism is true or false, and the physical 
facts get until now favour mechanism and immaterialism, I would say. 

Mechanism looks mystical, and is in a great part, as he says that the “truth” 
is in your head, and nowhere else. But Mechanism is also empirical, as it says 
that the “physical truth” is in the head of all universal machine/number, so 
extract it and compare with what we observe. If it is different and 
incompatible,  mechanism is false (or we are in a normal second order 
simulation, but that is the conspiracy move, which can be made with any theory).



> than I do in hopeful ideas about qualia, which are psychological form of elan 
> vital thought in previous centuries to underlie biology.


Qualia are facts, even if hard to share. You cannot discard them as illusion. 
It is like a doctor saying to his patient that his pain is an illusion. That 
makes no sense.

Elan Vitale is a typical “religion from ignorance”: it is a theory saying that 
another theory cannot solve a problem. It is perhaps right, in the sense that 
we can call elementary arithmetic an élan vitale perhaps. But this reverse the 
charge, and primary matter is what looks like a “religion from ignorance”.

Elan vitale without more precision is like God without a precise (testable) 
theology. Molecular biology has eliminated it, rightly. 

And the same will happen with materialism and physicalism, because it does not 
work, eliminate consciousness and persons, and contradicts Mechanism for which 
tuns of evidences exist.

To sum up: élan vital is 

Re: Universe as a simulated strange loop

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2020, at 19:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/6/2020 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 5 May 2020, at 21:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/5/2020 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Physics works very well, to make prediction but as metaphysics, as the 
 Platonist greeks understood, it simply does not work at all. It uses an 
 identity thesis between mind and brain which is easy in one direction, but 
 non-sensical in the other direction. It is not a matter of choice: if 
 mechanism is true, the many physical histories must emerges from the many 
 computations in all models of arithmetic, or in the standard model (as you 
 prefer).
>>> And you use the identity theory of all possible computation and 
>>> reality...which has no evidence in support of it and I see no reason to 
>>> believe.
>> The existence of all computations is a theorem of arithmetic. If you 
>> understand 2+2=4 and similar, you can understand that all computations are 
>> emulated in (all) model(s) of arithmetic. That arithmetic is assumed in all 
>> theories made by physicists. But when you add an ontological physical 
>> universe, we have no mean to restrict the statistics on all computations on 
>> the “physical” computations without adding some magic in the theory.
> 
> Understanding is belief and being true is not the same as existing.


Existing is when the proposition “ExP(x)” is true in some reality. For example 
Ex(prime(x)) is true in the structure/model (N, 0, s, +, x).

And yes, understanding is belief. Nice point. 

In the machine theory you have that “God” does not exist, and is not even 
“mentionable”. (Like Plotinus).

What exist primitively are the natural numbers, 0, 1, 2, 3, … or with the usual 
notations: 0, s0, ss0, sss0, ….

Nothing else exist “ontologically” or “primitively”. I could chosen the 
combinators, or the game of life pattern, but most people are more familiar 
with the natural numbers, and that is a good simple universal machinery, as I 
assume 0, s0, … but also the RA axioms, and from this I can prove the existence 
of universal machines and computations, and also of universal machine believing 
in the induction axioms, which are the one I study.

Then for each self-rerential mode you have a notion of existence. Describable 
in the corresponding modal logic, like with []Ex[]P(x), or withe quantisation 
([]<>Ex([]<>P(x)), etc.


> 
>> 
>> So, it seems you are the one adding an ontological commitment, to make 
>> magically disappear the consciousness of the relative number in arithmetic.
>> 
>> The reason to believe this is just Mechanism. I have not find a reason to 
>> believe in a physical universe having an ontological primitive status, which 
>> would be a reason to believe in non-mechanism (and to reject Darwinism, 
>> molecular biology, even most physical equations, whose solutions when 
>> exploitable in nature are up to now always computable.
>> 
>> We just can’t invoke an ontological commitment when we do science, 
>> especially in theology or metaphysics, unless some evidences are given for 
>> it. But there are no evidence at all. People confuse the real strong 
>> evidences for physical laws with evidence for laws who would be primary.
> 
> A funny thing to say for someone who always invokes and ontological 
> committment to arithmetic.


How could you say yes to the digitalist doctor without hoping he will get the 
number right? 

You don’t need to believe that 0 exist in a metaphysical sense, you need just 
to introspect yourself and see if you agree with the usual axioms, i.e. 
classical logic and

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

If you throw away any of those axioms, you lose Turing universality.

So if you believe that your computer exist, as a computer, you implicitly do 
that “ontological commitment” you seem to worry about.

The word “digital” as no meaning without the natural numbers.

Physicists nowadays assumes much more, like ZFC, to get a base in all Hilbert 
space, for example.

Then physicalist assumes much much much much more, like a primitive matter, or 
some universal numbers declared more important at the start, and that is 
refuted with mechanism.

Some people add metaphysics on the numbers, where, with mechanism, the number 
are introduced to be sure we understand the metaphysics which follows, from the 
number (G and G*) and eventually from the number + mechanism (G1 and G1*).

Physicist does not do metaphysics. Except in some paper of cosmology, or on 
foundation of QM, most physicist are metaphysically neutral. And when done with 
the scientific method, metaphysics itself must be done in a neutral way.

Bruno










> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> You seem to have understood this better sometimes ago. I Hope you are not 
>> having any doubt that the arithmetical reality (not the 

Re: Universe as a simulated strange loop

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2020, at 12:58, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Am Mi, 6. Mai 2020, um 10:41, schrieb Bruno Marchal:
>> 
>>> On 5 May 2020, at 21:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/5/2020 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Physics works very well, to make prediction but as metaphysics, as the 
 Platonist greeks understood, it simply does not work at all. It uses an 
 identity thesis between mind and brain which is easy in one direction, but 
 non-sensical in the other direction. It is not a matter of choice: if 
 mechanism is true, the many physical histories must emerges from the many 
 computations in all models of arithmetic, or in the standard model (as you 
 prefer).
>>> And you use the identity theory of all possible computation and 
>>> reality...which has no evidence in support of it and I see no reason to 
>>> believe.
>> 
>> The existence of all computations is a theorem of arithmetic. If you 
>> understand 2+2=4 and similar, you can understand that all computations 
>> are emulated in (all) model(s) of arithmetic. That arithmetic is 
>> assumed in all theories made by physicists. But when you add an 
>> ontological physical universe, we have no mean to restrict the 
>> statistics on all computations on the “physical” computations without 
>> adding some magic in the theory.
>> 
>> So, it seems you are the one adding an ontological commitment, to make 
>> magically disappear the consciousness of the relative number in 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> The reason to believe this is just Mechanism. I have not find a reason 
>> to believe in a physical universe having an ontological primitive 
>> status, which would be a reason to believe in non-mechanism (and to 
>> reject Darwinism, molecular biology, even most physical equations, 
>> whose solutions when exploitable in nature are up to now always 
>> computable.
>> 
>> We just can’t invoke an ontological commitment when we do science, 
>> especially in theology or metaphysics, unless some evidences are given 
>> for it. But there are no evidence at all. People confuse the real 
>> strong evidences for physical laws with evidence for laws who would be 
>> primary. 
>> 
>> You seem to have understood this better sometimes ago. I Hope you are 
>> not having any doubt that the arithmetical reality (not the theories!) 
>> emulate all computations, and that a universal machine (with oracles) 
>> cannot feel the difference between being emulated by this or that 
>> universal machinery.
> 
> Yes, I have no problem with any of what you say above.

OK.


> 
> What I have been wondering about is something else: what exactly is meant by 
> "primitive"? 


It depends on what you are interested in. To solve the mind-body problem, the 
first difficulty is to formulate it, and for this the notion of “primitiveness” 
is required, for what we will take for granted to proceed.

Basically X is considered as primitive if we have some reason to consider X as 
non explainable from something else, and judged as being more simple 
(technically/conceptually, … there is some matter of debate here of course).

Most materialist agrees that biology is explained, or explainable in principle 
by chemistry, itself explainable by particles/force physics. (And I agree with 
them on this). 
Then if they are metaphysical materialist, they will have to explain psychology 
from biology, say, and usually they do believe that such an explanation is 
possible (and of course, we know or should know that this is impossible: but 
before judging this, it means that for a materialist (who believes that matter 
cannot be explained entirely from a simpler ontological assumption), if 
interested in the Mind-Body problem, he has to develop a phenomenology of mind 
coherent with its taking matter as primitive.

Similarly, a monist immaterialist (who assumes only immaterial relations, of 
the type mind or of the type number, or whatever) has to develop (extract, 
isolate, justify in a way or in another) a phenomenology of matter, or of 
matter conscious appearances in its theory of mind.

A dualist has a even harder task, as he will take both mind and matter as 
primitive, and will have to derive a phenomenology of interactions between 
both. Today, few (serious) people believe that this could be meaningful. 

 “materialism” is just naive physicalism: the idea that physics is the 
fundamental science. This makes matter into a primitive thing, and the theories 
will have to assume some primary physical elements, like atomes, or now, 
particles, or strings, etc.

Mechanism leads to a neutral monism, where neither matter, nor mind, is taken 
as primitive, as they are explained (wrongly or correctly, we might not it is 
wrong through new expriements)  from simpler (elementary arithmetic without 
induction).

The beauty here (grin) is that fr the natural numbers, or more generally, for 
the universal machinery/machines, we can prove in all inductive 

Re: The Wolfram Model

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2020, at 22:11, ronaldheld  wrote:
> 
> Bruno:
> Am I correct that you see the Wolfram model as a Physicalist theory and not 
> Mechanism(AR)?

Wolfram assumes mechanism, at least in his big “new science” book. But he fails 
to appreciate its consequences (Shmidhuber, Tegmark, even Bostrom are more 
sense full on this, although they still miss some key part of the mind-body 
problem).

So Wolfram is Mechanism, but accompanied with the very common dismissing of the 
mind-body problem. There is no phenomenologies, and it is still an attempt to 
make everything 3p, which is the main thing that the antic theologian 
understood as being just impossible (and provably so when you add 
Church-thesis).

I am not sure why you put Arithmetical (AR) alongside with mechanism. AR is 
used by everybody all the time. I have added as an assumption just to avoid 
problem with ultrafinitists, but eventually, I have solved that problem, as I 
military AR to RA (I limit the arithmetical realism to Robinson arithmetic, 
which is implicit in the classical Church-turing thesis. My “new” definition of 
an arithmetical realist is anyone who agree with the teacher, against their 
kids, when the teacher asserts that x + 0 = x, and things like that. AR is used 
when we make our taxes, or buy an insurance. AR is consistent with the 
ultarfinitost statement that there is a biggest natural number. To be sure, to 
prove this consistency requires some use of the infinite, but an utlrafinists 
has no obligation, nor any means, to prove its consistency, as no one can do 
that, neither the finalists, nor the arithmetical “gods”, nor the One itself.

In my sane04 paper, I defined mechanism to be “yes doctor + Church’s Thesis + 
Arithmetical Realism” (YD + CT + AR), but as AR is implicit in CT, I prefer now 
to avoid this redundancy, especially that many philosopher put far to much in 
AR. 
AR is the belief that 888 is even, independently of you wishes, or of the 
physical laws (which all assumes AR to be just formulated).

You can also replace “yes doctor” with Theaetetus’d definition of knowledge, to 
go from []p to ([]p & p), but it seems to me that the thought experiment 
motivates better this, including the weak variants []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p. 
The three variants gives different quantum logics (with p’s arithmetical 
interpretation restricted to the sigma_1 proposition, or better (a recent 
improvement!) the sigma_1(a) proposition, where the “a” denotes an arbitrary 
oracle (in the sense of Turing).

I appreciate a lot Wolfram’s book on the Cellular Automata though.  His recent 
paper might be quite interesting in physics, but as metaphysics, it is still 
too much physicalist for being consistent with Descartes or Darwin +Turing 
(Mechanism).

Bruno





>   Ronald
> 
> On Wednesday, April 29, 2020 at 4:40:56 AM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> The "hypergraph" stuff from Stephen Wolfram in recent news on his "new 
> foundation" of physics has a name: The Wolfram Model.
> 
> 
> 
> Some Relativistic and Gravitational Properties of the Wolfram
> Model
> Jonathan Gorard
> https://www.wolframcloud.com/obj/wolframphysics/Documents/some-quantum-mechanical-properties-of-the-wolfram-model.pdf
>  
> 
> 
> Some Quantum Mechanical Properties of the Wolfram Model
> Jonathan Gorard
> https://www.wolframcloud.com/obj/wolframphysics/Documents/some-relativistic-and-gravitational-properties-of-the-wolfram-model.pdf
>  
> 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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