Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
wow.. 2) A Nothing has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any meaningful question about itself. Assuming there is a relevant meaningful question a Nothing would be incomplete. An inescapable meaningful question is its own stability. This is not only meaningful it is impossible to avoid answering. 3) To attempt to answer this question a Nothing randomly and spontaneously decays towards an Everything to resolve its incompleteness. But this is not sustainable since an Everything is not independent of a Nothing. Therefore a Nothing rebounds from the decay. 4) Thus the definition or boundary between the Nothing and Everything pair is randomly dynamic equivalent to a random sequence of normal reals. 5) A universal computer is a good way to model a selector of a random sequence of normal reals. Hal
Re: Peculiarities of our universe
- Original Message - From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 3:24 PM Subject: Peculiarities of our universe There are a couple of peculiarities of our universe which it would be nice if the All-Universe Hypothesis (AUH) could explain, or at least shed light on them. One is the apparent paucity of life and intelligence in our universe. This was first expressed as the Fermi Paradox, i.e., where are the aliens? According to the anthropic principle, all conditions are such that our existence is possible. Also, all events up until now have been such that they favored our existence. This doesn't necessarily mean that those events were probable. In fact, they could have been wildly improbable. (that asteroid killing the dinosaurs at just the right moment might have helped us) Let us say you're repeatedly throwing a thousand dice on the floor, and that you are waiting for a pattern of fifty sixes to group close together on the floor. When they finally show up, it's doubtful that another distinct group of fifty sixes will show up in the same throw. In this analogy, the floor and dice represents (roughly) *this* universe and its galaxies and stars, and the groups of fifty sixes represent planets harboring intelligent life. After all, we seem to be very, very complex creatures. Most of the matter in the universe looks quite disorganized in comparison. Wouldn't this intuitive analogy explain why life is so rare ?
Re: Is the universe computable?
Indeed, I've always thought there was a dubious assumption there. There isn't a universal time to pace the clock tics of a simulation. Relativity forbids it. Anyway, time is a subjective illusion. Back to the question: So what happens when the simulation diverges from regularity? Some possibilities: a) The universe ends b) Pink elephants pop up everywhere c) It's already happening I like (c) - Original Message - From: Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2004 8:32 AM Subject: Is the universe computable? I start from a part of this post from David Barrett-Lennard (Mon, 3 Nov 2003 19:48:49) but I could probably hev selected several similar other ones: Given the source code for the simulation of our universe, it would seem to be possible to add some extra instructions that test for a certain condition to be met in order to tamper with the simulation. It would seem likely that there will exist simulations that match our own up to a certain point in time, but then diverge. Eg it is possible for a simulation to have a rule that an object will suddenly manifestitself at a particular time and place. The simulated conscious beings in such a universe would be surprised to find that induction fails at the moment the simulation diverges. It seems to me that there is a very strong assupmtion here which is that there should be some synchronicity between the time in the postulated computer into which the universe would be simulated and the time inside that simulated universe (as this is typically the case when an electronic device is simulated). But such an assumption not only does not seem necessary in any way but it also does not seem possibly consistent (or it would be very arbitrary at least) with a universe like ours for what we know of the implications of general relativity (it does not seem possible to define any global time in any consistent way in our universe). Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible in an even more general way) representing a universe taken as a whole in its spatio-temporal aspect. The mesh would be refined at each iteration. The relation between the time in the computer and the time in the universe would not be a synchrony but a refinement of the resolution of the time (and space) in the simulated universe as the time in the computer increases. Alternatively (though both views are not necessarily exclusive), one could use a variational formulation instead of a partial derivative formulation in order to describe/build the universe leading again to a construction in which the time in the computer is not related at all to the time in the simulated universe. It seems to me finally that the simulations in which there is a synchrony between the time in this universe and the time in the computer simulating it are very specific (if even existing) among all other possible simulations of the same universe (at least for the kind of relativistic universe we live in). I would even conjecture that the measure of the set of synchronous simulations is null within the set of all possible simulations of a given (not so trivial) universe (if one can give a sound sense to this). I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants about that point and about the sense that could be given to the question of what happens (in the simulated universe) in any non- synchronous simulation when the simulation diverges ? Georges.
Re: Quantum accident survivor
Hello, A few comments on your post. If I interpret correctly, you are basically distinguishing dualistic interpretations from a materialistic ones. When we talk of a materialistic viewpoint, what *are* we talking about? Is it our vague conception that everything is made of atoms what constitutes a materialistic view of the universe? As we all know, not even the deepest theoretical physicists know what the hell they are talking about, in a fundamental sense, when they talk about matter, energy, quarks, gravity, etc. They only describe the result of measurements and abstract mental models that somehow, accommodate or shadow the results of these measurements. Where does this leave dualism? If the material world is just a mental construct of man, created to accommodate our sensorial input, there is suddenly no more dual in dualism, only experience, or whatever we want to call our sensorial life. So, one can hypothesize that there is no need to define a mysterious material basis for what is just sensorial experience. If windows 98 where considered conscious AI, would a version of windows 98 running on two different computers be one entity or two? Why would the universe create two souls, when one will suffice? If we consider ourselves to be just a sequence of states in a mathematical universe (a fairly modest hypothesis), the only condition for us having a sense of identity from one state to the next is not necessarily to pertain to the same material substrate (which may not even exist), but that the two states be related by some continuity, or memory. After all, my personal viewpoint always prefers to stick with me instead of switching back and forth with my dog, since his states our not a continuation of mine, memory-wise. If this interpretation is correct, it can be argued that we'll never be in the null state of death, because death is not a state which will remember any previous me. So, it follows that if there exists a plausible state or configuration which is a valid continuation, memory-wise, of my current state, then my personal viewpoint, will prefer this path over the death state. ergo, immortality !. PD: definition of viewpoint: an artificial construct to help visualize the succession of states that constitute my identity, - Original Message - From: Eric Cavalcanti [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2003 9:47 AM Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor Hi, Sorry for the late reply to this: From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can assume anything you like! Seriously, we have had extensive and occasionally acrimonious debates on this topic in the past, without much success or resolution. I think that we have no good foundation for establishing the truth or falsehood of any theory of identity in absolute terms. Instead, these issues must be considered matters of taste. You can indeed choose to believe that as long as any version of yourself continues in any universe, then you will consider yourself to still be alive. You could also choose the contrary, that if the total measure (ie. probability) of your survival is extremely small, that you are dead. Hal Finney - Original Message - From: Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi there, Hal, one nitpick about your comments: In the case of Quantum Immortality, I don't think it's a matter of taste, or interpretation. It is a theory that every one of us can and ultimately will test. Granted, we will only be aware of a positive result, but, nevertheless... cheers, Frank I agree with you. The QTI is after all experimentally testable, and of direct importance for all of us. But I guess the problems in this discussion is the lack of precise definition of the terms and of the philosophical framework. First, in this discussion I am always assuming MWI. In a materialistic framework - with nothing external to the physical world - it is hard to define personal identity if we take the MWI in account. But in this case there is clearly no 'soul' or anything other than the configuration of atoms to describe what we call 'ourselves'. In any branching of the multiverse there are multiple copies of my body being produced. Nevertheless, I only experience one of those states. Therefore, I guess the best I could say is that ' I ' is one of the instances of this configuration. Let me stress this point: *I am, for all practical purposes, one and only one specific configuration of atoms in a specific universe. I could never say that ' I ' is ALL the copies, since I NEVER experience what the other copies experience. The other copies are just similar configurations of atoms in other universes, which shared the same history, prior to a given point in time.* In some of these branching universes, this configuration of atoms that I call 'me' will not show signs of what we call life anymore. Notice that death is no different
Re: Is the universe computable?
I submit this link to Shmidhuber's second paper, which discusses various probability distributions on the set of computable Universes. ftp://ftp.idsia.ch/pub/juergen/toesv2.pdf Sorry if this has been already covered. I'm not a mathematician, and I'm not entirely into hardcore computer science. This other site contains the links to Shmidhuber's other works. http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html Peace - Original Message - From: David Barrett-Lennard [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 'Hal Finney' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 11:52 PM Subject: RE: Is the universe computable? An interesting idea. Where can I read a more comprehensive justification of this distribution? If a number of programs are isomorphic the inhabitants naturally won't know the difference. As to whether we call this one program or lots of programs seems to be a question of taste and IMO shows that probability calculations are only relative to how one wants to define equivalence classes of programs. I would expect that the probability distribution will depend on the way in which we choose to express, and enumerate our programs. Eg with one instruction set, infinite loops or early exits may occur often - so that there is a tendency for simplistic programs. On the other hand, an alternative instruction set and enumeration strategy may lead to a distribution favoring much longer and more complex programs. Perhaps it tends to complicate programs with long sequences of conditional assignment instructions to manipulate the program state, without risking early exit. Importantly such tampering doesn't yield a program that is isomorphic to a simple one. We seem to have a vast number of complicated programs that aren't reducible to simpler versions. This seems to be at odds with the premise (of bits that are never executed) behind the Universal Distribution. - David -Original Message- From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, 4 November 2003 2:24 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Is the universe computable? IMO the best idea we have discussed for why the universe is and remains lawful is that the set of descriptions (equivalently, programs) for the universes are governed by the Universal Distribution. This is the description where a string whose shortest description has length n bits is given measure 1 / 2^n. An heuristic argument for this distribution is that if programs are self delimiting, then there are 2^x more programs of length n+x than of length n, created by appending the 2^x x-bit strings to each n-bit program. Since the appended x bits are never executed, all 2^(n+x) of these programs are the same as the basic 2^n programs. A program which says obey these simple laws is shorter than a program which says obey these simple laws for a zillion steps, then start obeying these other laws, or a program that says obey these simple laws everywhere except where this incredibly complicated configuration occurs, and then do this complicated other thing. Hal Finney
Fw: Is the universe computable?
I submit this link to Shmidhuber's second paper, which discusses various probability distributions on the set of computable Universes. ftp://ftp.idsia.ch/pub/juergen/toesv2.pdf Sorry if this has been already covered. I'm not a mathematician, and I'm not entirely into hardcore computer science. This other site contains the links to Shmidhuber's other works. http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html Peace - Original Message - From: David Barrett-Lennard [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 'Hal Finney' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 11:52 PM Subject: RE: Is the universe computable? An interesting idea. Where can I read a more comprehensive justification of this distribution? If a number of programs are isomorphic the inhabitants naturally won't know the difference. As to whether we call this one program or lots of programs seems to be a question of taste and IMO shows that probability calculations are only relative to how one wants to define equivalence classes of programs. I would expect that the probability distribution will depend on the way in which we choose to express, and enumerate our programs. Eg with one instruction set, infinite loops or early exits may occur often - so that there is a tendency for simplistic programs. On the other hand, an alternative instruction set and enumeration strategy may lead to a distribution favoring much longer and more complex programs. Perhaps it tends to complicate programs with long sequences of conditional assignment instructions to manipulate the program state, without risking early exit. Importantly such tampering doesn't yield a program that is isomorphic to a simple one. We seem to have a vast number of complicated programs that aren't reducible to simpler versions. This seems to be at odds with the premise (of bits that are never executed) behind the Universal Distribution. - David
Re: A random collection of questions about info-cosmology
he devil is watching you I put a curse on all of you that bad thing will happen to you and your love ones you may die to bad keep on sending me these email and the curse will get stronger so get fucked
Re: Quantum accident survivor
get fucked
Re: a possible paradox
get fucked
Re: Quantum accident survivor
Hi there, Hal, one nitpick about your comments: In the case of Quantum Immortality, I don't think it's a matter of taste, or interpretation. It is a theory that every one of us can and ultimately will test. Granted, we will only be aware of a positive result, but, nevertheless... cheers, Frank From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can assume anything you like! Seriously, we have had extensive and occasionally acrimonious debates on this topic in the past, without much success or resolution. I think that we have no good foundation for establishing the truth or falsehood of any theory of identity in absolute terms. Instead, these issues must be considered matters of taste. You can indeed choose to believe that as long as any version of yourself continues in any universe, then you will consider yourself to still be alive. You could also choose the contrary, that if the total measure (ie. probability) of your survival is extremely small, that you are dead. Hal Finney
