Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. Concerning objective values, as we have discussed in the past, I don't see any rational argument in support of their existence. For example if one has chosen to consider the elimination of the human species as a priority value (like some fundamentalist deep ecologists have written), there is just no way you or I can rationally persuade them of the contrary. Of course we _can_ try to persuade them not to act, but this does not have much to do with values. A value is something subjective. I have chosen my values and you have chosen yours, or probably our society has programmed us with these values and we find them good enough not to change them. A value is a mental and social construct, not something written in the laws of the universe. I find this position perfectly satisfying. Question: why do you _want_ to think that there are objective values? G. On 8/18/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by* the laws of physics, but the laws of physics themselves are not the descriptions. You don't need to specify future states of matter to understand the laws of physics. By analogy, the objective laws of morality are NOT specifications of optimization targets. These specifications are *implied by the laws* of morality, but you can understand the laws of morality well without any knowledge of optimization targets. Thus it simply isn't true that you need to precisely specify an optimization target ( a 'goal') for an effective agent (for instance an AI). Again, consider the analogy with the laws of physics. Imperfect knowledge of the laws of physics, doesn't prevent scientists from building scientific tools to better understand the laws of physics. This is because the laws of physics are explanatory principles, NOT direct specifications of future states of matter. Similarly, an agent (for instance an AI) does not require a precisely specified goal , since imperfect knowledge of objective laws of morality is sufficient to produce behaviour which leads to more accurate knowledge. Again, the objective laws of morality are NOT optimization targets, but explanatory principles. The other claim of the objective value sceptics was that proposed objective values can't be empirically tested. Wrong. Again, the misunderstanding stems from the mistaken idea that objective values would be optimization targets. They are not. They are, as explained, explanatory principles. And these principles CAN be tested. The test is the extent to which these principles can be used to understand agent motivations - in the sense of emotional reactions to social events. If an agent experiences a negative emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as bad'. If an agent experience a positive emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as good'. Different agents have different emotional reactions to the same event, but that doesn't mean there isn't a commonality averaged across many events and agents . A successful 'theory of objective values' would abstract out this commonality to explain why agents experienced generic negative or positive emotions to generic events. And this would be *indirectly* testable by empirical means. Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. A complete physical description of an agent is NOT an explanation of the agent's teleological properties (ie the agent motivations). The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Physical properties have objective explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. What forms would objective values take? As explained, these would NOT be 'optimization targets' (goals or rules of the form 'you should do X'). They couldn't be, because ethical rules differ according to culture and are made by humans. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F
Re: Help With Attribution
Yes I wrote it. How do you guys like it? G. On 5/23/05, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It appears to have been written by someone called Giulio Prisco, who signs his name Giu1i0 Pri5c0, and is active in the Society for Universal Immortalism. His home page is http://prisco.info/giulio/. All found within about 2 minutes using Google! Cheers On Sun, May 22, 2005 at 10:50:51AM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: First, let me say that I appreciate the comments of Bruno and Stathis in regard to questions about Chalmerite mysteries; Unfortunately, I have not quite had time to examine them closely but they look exceedingly promising. Meanwhile, I need help. Who wrote the following? How does one tell? It's a pretty good essay I found in a pile of my printer output, and I want to know who wrote it. Thanks very much. ---Lee Corbin http://www.futuretag.net/hitbang/2004/11/engineering-transcendence.php -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Movie: WHAT THE BLEEP DO WE KNOW!?
Has anyone seen this movie? Looks interesting - santatcruztoday.com: This sure-to-be cult favorite is a hybrid of documentary and melodrama, combining a story about an unhappy, divorced photographer (Marlee Matlin) wandering the streets of Portland, Ore., with highly abstract theoretical constructs about the nature of God and the wacky, weird world of quantum physics. The movie has a website (http://www.whatthebleep.com/): WHAT THE BLEEP DO WE KNOW?! is a new type of film. It is part documentary, part story, and part elaborate and inspiring visual effects and animations. The protagonist, Amanda, played by Marlee Matlin, finds herself in a fantastic Alice in Wonderland experience when her daily, uninspired life literally begins to unravel, revealing the uncertain world of the quantum field hidden behind what we consider to be our normal, waking reality... The fourteen top scientists and mystics interviewed in documentary style serve as a modern day Greek Chorus. In an artful filmic dance, their ideas are woven together as a tapestry of truth. The thoughts and words of one member of the chorus blend into those of the next, adding further emphasis to the film's underlying concept of the interconnectedness of all things. http://www.whatthebleep.com/
Top scientist asks: is life all just a dream?
The Times: Professor Sir Martin Rees is to suggest that life, the universe and everything may be no more than a giant computer simulation with humans reduced to bits of software. Rees, Royal Society professor of astronomy at Cambridge University, will say that it is now possible to conceive of computers so powerful that they could build an entire virtual universe. The possibility that what we see around us may not actually exist has been raised by philosophers many times dating back to the ancient Greeks and appears repeatedly in science fiction. In a television documentary, What We Still Don't Know, to be screened on Channel 4 next month, he will say: Over a few decades, computers have evolved from being able to simulate only very simple patterns to being able to create virtual worlds with a lot of detail. If that trend were to continue, then we can imagine computers which will be able to simulate worlds perhaps even as complicated as the one we think we're living in. This raises the philosophical question: could we ourselves be in such a simulation and could what we think is the universe be some sort of vault of heaven rather than the real thing. In a sense we could be ourselves the creations within this simulation. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1358588,00.html
Quantum astronomy experiment proposed
Space.com: Quantum astronomy experiment proposed, possibly using the Allen Array Telescope and the narrow-band radio-wave detectors being build by the SETI Institute and the University of California, Berkeley.There are many ways we could go now in examining quantum results. If conscious observation is needed for the creation of an electron (this is one aspect of the Copenhagen Interpretation, the most popular version of quantum physics interpretations), then ideas about the origin of consciousness must be revised. If electrons in the brain create consciousness, but electrons require consciousness to exist, one is apparently caught in circular reasoning at best. But for this essay, we shall not discuss quantum biology. Another path we might go down would be the application of quantum physics to cosmology -- either the Inflationary origin of the universe, or the Hawking evaporation of black holes, as examples. But our essay is not about this vast field either. Today we will discuss the scaling of the simple double-slit laboratory experiment to cosmic distances, what can truly be called, quantum astronomy. http://www.space.com/searchforlife/quantum_astronomy_04.html
Shadows and smeared selves
In this note I try to outline my current thoughts on quantum physics, for your comments. I am sending this to a few mailing lists with overlapping memberships, so you may have received this twice or more. I apologise if this is the case and also for the very imprecise language and gross simplifications and analogies that I am using to make my point. While this is really a sketch of a sketch, I wish to discuss the core idea with people who understands these things better than I do, so please let me have your comments (even go back to your first year textbook and stop wasting my time). I think that, while Everett's Relative State formulation of quantum mechanics makes a lot of sense, its popular interpretation as Many Worlds(MWI) should be taken only as a simple pictorial device useful for a first understanding of the theory. As a more accurate interpretation, I propose thinking of perceived realities as shadows of a more complex reality. I suspect this is what some authors, perhaps including Everett himself, were trying to say, and that others may have said it explicitly (perhaps Lockwood), so I would appreciate any pointer to relevant works. I will use poor Schroedinger's cat as an example. Following Everett, the cat is in a superposition of [cat dead] and [cat alive] states before an observer opens the box and looks inside, and stays so after (there is no collapse). After opening the box and looking inside, the observer is in a superposition of [observer who remembers having seen the cat dead] and [observer who remembers having seen the cat alive]. The MWI says that after the act of observation (measurement) the universe is split in two branches where the first has [cat dead] and [observer who remembers having seen the cat dead], and the second has [cat alive] and [observer who remembers having seen the cat alive]. The difficulty that I have is: on the one hand we are saying that fundamental reality contains no such things as cats dead or alive, but on the other hand we are describing the world(s) with cats dead and cats alive. To clarify the first part of the statement: as we can choose any two directions to form a basis to use for the description of a particle's spin, all choices generating equally valid descriptions, besides [cat dead] and [cat alive] we should be free to use another basis to describe the cat. While any pair of independent linear superpositions of [cat dead] and [cat alive] will do, of course I have no idea of what such a superposition would look like. Since I cannot remember having ever seen one, I do not know what a superposition of [cat dead] and [cat alive] would look like, so probably I would not recognise one if I saw it. Perhaps this is the reason why I cannot remember having ever seen one. In other words, perhaps since reality is One Big World too complex for our minds to process efficiently, we use a simplified representation as Many (small) Worlds for our processing. This is not so surprising when we remember that our best computer programs use data compression and segmentation techniques, throwing most of the information away, to perform complex tasks such as face recognition efficiently. Perhaps reducing a complex reality to parallel worlds is a successful trick that sentient beings have developed to process reality more efficiently. I believe thinking of shadows may be a better mental device than thinking of parallel worlds. Using this model the realities that I, and my doubles in other branches of the MWI model, perceive can be thought of as shadows of a more complex reality. Observing a shadow permits saying certain things about its source, like size and overall shape, but not other things like colour and smell. The shadow does not contain such information. Also, much of what we can say about shadows has more to do with illumination and the surface where the shadow is cast than with the actual source. Thinking of multiple worlds as shadows brings us back to Plato's cave, but there are two important differences: First, each of us observes shadows of the *real* world in a very large number of caves in parallel. Second, we are shadows ourselves, our mental computational processes being shadows of other, possibly much more complex, computational processes. In my view of the world, saying my mental computational processes is just another way to say I. So what am I a shadow of? I don't know, but perhaps by observing the shadow I can develop some plausible assumptions on the source. I know that I am a conscious being: though I am not able to put my finger precisely on what consciousness *is*, I know that it is a property that I posses. I also think that consciousness must have something to do with complexity: if a computational process is complex enough, it may become a conscious process. So, since it seems reasonable to think that a source must have a degree of complexity not lower than its shadow, we should consider the possibility that we are shadows cast by conscious
Re: Papers of Lockwood, Albert-Loewer
Thanks to Wei Dai for the two papers (I have not found the paper of Albert-Loewer yet, but I am working on it). For those familiar with Lockwood's version of the MMI, after reading the paper I think it (or at least the general flavor) makes a lot of sense. Any thoughts? On 19 Jan 2004, at 15:17, Wei Dai wrote: The latter two papers can be found on JSTOR. I've placed copies at http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/Many_Minds.pdf http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/Many_Minds_Replies.pdf The first paper doesn't seem to be online anywhere. There's an online archive for Synthese at http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0039-7857/contents, but it only goes back to 1997. You'll have to find the physical journal in an academic library. Or try writing to the authors and asking for a copy to be mailed to you. On Mon, Jan 19, 2004 at 10:52:09AM +, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 wrote: I wish to read these 3 papers, which I have not found on the net in full text. Would anyone have them or know where they can be found? Thanks Albert, D and Loewer, B.: 1988, `Interpreting the Many Worlds Interpretation', Synthese, 77, 195-213 Lockwood, M. [1996a]: Many Minds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, pp.159-88 Lockwood, M. [1996b]: Many Minds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: Replies to Replies , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, pp.445-61
RE: Extended Response on Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Interesting, and I agree with the last paragraph: making good choice increases the measure of the region of the multiverse where good choices have been made and everyone is better off. An alternative view of which I am thinking a lot is that our conscious thought processes actually take place in the multiverse, our perceived conscious thought processes (Lockwood's mind) being a shadow of our true more complex thought processes (Lockwood's Mind). Also in this case we can think that a Mind is happier when more and more minds are happy. But in general, I have difficulties seeing the point of mixing deep philosophical thinking with the ethics of everyday's life: I choose to try making my loved ones happier, and I wish to do my best to make everyone happier, I don'r really need QM to justify and defend this choice. When it comes to ethics I choose to see myself as a simple being with free will in a simple universe. -Original Message- From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: jueves, 22 de enero de 2004 6:04 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Extended Response on Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Here is an excerpt from a message I sent to the list last week, which argues that nihilism is not an appropriate response to multiverse physics. As far as the issue of human action and free will, here is how I look at it. There are really two issues. The first is that in some sense the multiverse makes our actions deterministic. That is, there is no longer any true unpredictability in what we do, because we do everything in one universe or another. So how can we have free will if there are no choices? Well, this problem has been considered many times in the philosophical literature going back hundreds of years (where it was asked how free will was compatible with God's omniscience). Recent works by Daniel Dennett, his books Elbow Room and his new book (which I haven't read) Freedom Evolves, discuss how free will can be said to coexist with determinism. The basic idea is that the acting out of deterministic processes and the considerations involved in making a free choice are two equally valid ways of explaining the same phenomenon, at different levels of description. These books could be good sources to explore these concepts further. The second part of the problem is specific to the multiverse model, which is, even assuming that in some sense you have free will, what is the practical point of acting, since your decisions will be in effect cancelled out by being done differently in other universes? Larry Niven's science fiction short story All the Myriad Ways explores the problems which sweep society when a technology is invented to visit parallel universes, leading to a widespread surrender to nihilism and social ennui. However this perspective ignores the concept of measure, where some universes are more prominent than others. Although you may make different choices in different universes, the probabilities are not equal. Your decision making processes influence the measure of the universes in which your different choices occur. By giving matters careful thought and making wise decisions, you can maximize the measure of the universes in which your choices have good outcomes. This justifies the necessity of careful choice and eliminates the descent into nihilistic horror and despair. Hal Finney
Papers of Lockwood, Albert-Loewer
I wish to read these 3 papers, which I have not found on the net in full text. Would anyone have them or know where they can be found? Thanks Albert, D and Loewer, B.: 1988, `Interpreting the Many Worlds Interpretation', Synthese, 77, 195-213 Lockwood, M. [1996a]: Many Minds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, pp.159-88 Lockwood, M. [1996b]: Many Minds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: Replies to Replies , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, pp.445-61
Shadows of reality
Some thoughts on the MWI for your comments. I am sending this to a few mailing lists with overlapping memberships, so you may have received this twice or more. I apologise if this is the case and also for the very imprecise language and gross simplifications and analogies that I am using to make my point. This is really a sketch of a sketch. I think that, while Everett's Relative State formulation of quantum mechanics makes a lot of sense, its popular interpretation as Many Worlds (MWI) should be taken only as a pictorial device useful for a first understanding of the theory. I propose thinking of perceived realities as shadows of a more complex reality. I suspect this is what some authors, perhaps including Everett himself, are trying to say, and that others have said it explicitly, so I would appreciate any pointer to relevant works. I will use poor Schroedinger's cat as an example. Following Everett, the cat is in a superposition of [dead cat] and [alive cat] states before the box has been opened, and stays so after. Once opened the box an observer is in a superposition of [observer who remembers having seen a dead cat] and [observer who remembers having seen an alive cat]. The MWI says that the universe is now split in two branches where the first has [dead cat] and [observer who remembers having seen a dead cat], and the second has [alive cat] and [observer who remembers having seen an alive cat]. The difficulty that I have is: on the one hand we are saying that there is no such a thing as a dead cat or an alive cat, but on the other hand we are describing the world(s) with dead cats and alive cats. To clarify the first part of the statement: as we can choose any two directions to form a basis to use in describing a particle's spin, all choices generating equally valid descriptions, besides [dead cat] and [alive cat] we should be free to use another basis to describe the cat. Any pair of independent superpositions of [dead cat] and [alive cat] will do, of course I have no idea of what one would look like. Since I cannot remember having ever seen one, I do not know what a superposition of [dead cat] and [alive cat] would look like, so probably I would not recognise one if I saw it. Perhaps this is the reason why I cannot remember having ever seen one. In other words, perhaps since reality is One Big World too complex for our minds to process efficiently, we use a simplified representation as Many (small) Worlds for our processing. This is not so surprising since our best computer programs use data compression and segmentation techniques, throwing most of the information away, to perform complex tasks such as face recognition efficiently. I believe thinking of shadows may be a better mental device than thinking of parallel worlds. Using this model the realities that I, and my doubles in the MWI model, perceive can be thought of as shadows of a more complex reality. Observing a shadow permits saying certain things about is source, but not other things like what the source is saying. The shadow does not contain such information. Also, much of what we can say about shadows has more to do with illumination and the surface where the shadow is cast than with the actual source. Thinking of multiple worlds as shadows brings us back to Plato's cave, but there are two important differences: First, each of us observes shadows of the outside world in a very large number of caves in parallel. Second, we are shadows ourselves, our conscious computational processes being shadows of other possibly much more complex computational processes.
Re: Is the universe computable?
Please correct me if I am wrong: Bruno believes that information, for example mathematical concepts and theorems, exist independently of their encoding in some physicsl systems (arithmetic realism); in other words, that the number 4 esists independently of the presence in the physical world of sets of 4 separate objects, or that 2+2=4 is true independently of the possibility to physically verify this with 4 bottlecaps. Eugen believes that mathematics is the physics of bottlecaps, and that information cannot be said to exist if it is not carried by a physical system in the actual world. Are we sure that both mean the same thing by existence? By the way I am reading Bruno's thesis, the few pages that I have read are very interesting.
