RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Lee Corbin writes: [quoting Stathis] As I have said above, it is possible to rigorously define death as occurring when there is no successor observer moment, anywhere or ever. This is the case with physical death where there is no surviving copy or where the surviving copy has diverged from the original, and it is also the case with memory loss. Then you are claiming that a lot of death occurs in Aussie bars? Some really, really plastered guy is told the most *amazing* things by a gal who knows he won't remember a word the next day. So there are no successor observer moments to his experience of hearing these amazing things... The point you are making is the most convincing, and also most troubling, argument in support of your thesis that we should consider copies as selves. If I die today and then a backup copy of me that was made yesterday is run, this is equivalent to me losing a day of memories. If I believe that I will survive if I experience the memory loss, then I must also believe that I will survive my death if the backup is run. I think there is good reason to equate memory loss with death. The sense of personal identity is dynamic, redefined every moment by the sum of all mental processes which, iceberg-like, surface and manifest as conscious experience. When I think about the immediate future, I think about what it will be like for me as I am *now*; how I was yesterday or last year is of course important in making me as I am now, but if those former selves came along in a time machine or as backup copies, I would not share their first person experiences, nor they mine. If I think about imminent death, I think about me-now having no more experiences of any sort, ever again. This could come about with the physical death of my body, or it could come about with the destruction of this me-now construct, which is what would happen if my memory were wiped. I know that Stathis will still have experiences if part of my memory is wiped, but in an important first person sense it will be a different Stathis, because it won't be me-now experiencing a next moment. If I die or my memory is wiped, the first person experience of the present moment, and all of what would have been its linear descendants, will vanish from the universe forever. Now, people lose parts of their memory all the time, and the person who survives the memory loss generally doesn't worry about the fate of the person who lost their memory. We have seen this in the reports of those who have undergone medical procedures under sedation with midazolam: even if they did experience pain, they can't remember it so it doesn't matter now. This is in keeping with what I have said above about the person who is about to lose their memory being effectively a separate individual who is about to die. Sometimes their are legal consequences for a person's bad behaviour when intoxicated, and often they are quite indignant that they are being charged: if I can't remember it, it wasn't really I who did it. (In a sense, this leads *away* from the conclusion that copies are selves if the analogy with memory loss is to be pursued: the person who loses their memory and the person who survives may actually know nothing about each other, care nothing about each other, and even work directly against each other's interests. They share the same identity and some or most of their past, but they are separate entities.) Having said all that, why have I stated in previous posts that I would agree to some memory loss for a sum of money? Because I will convince myself that I will survive it, I have seen other people apparently survive it, and I have apparently survived it myself in the past. So why would I not agree to effectively the same amount of memory loss by killing myself given that a backup of my mind has been made? Perhaps for the same reason that I would not jump out of a plane with a parachute, even if I knew that the parachute would work properly. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee® Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963
Re: Duplicates Are Selves
On Jul 4, 2005, at 8:11 AM, Lee Corbin wrote:You think that person A ought (in the ethical sense) to have a strong desire for the future existence of person B - no less, in fact, than for the future existence of person A. You imply this when you say the subject is selfish. I see your point, that normally we have a strong desire for the future existence of -- the person who will wake up in our bed tomorrow. Hmm? You are still seeing that I'm making an *ethical* statementhere somehow? Well, I suppose that in some sense highly selfishbehavior could conceivably be described as ethical in some sense,but it's sure confusing.The statement of what a person should or shouldn't do falls under the domain of ethics. When you say"definitely in the case of very close copies, to beconsistent one should to the greatest degree he canextend the boundary to include close duplicates."You're making a normative statement. I was arguing that one's intuitions will likely pull the other way. You may say that "your duplicate is you", but it is undeniable that there are two organisms present, and an organism normally acts in such a way to prevent damage to its body, and as you say, these instincts are forged by evolution. These instincts form the basis of our ethical intuitions. Your wish for "consistency" would seem to be in opposition to how most people's instincts would lead them to behave. What would the Lee who stands to receive $5 in my experiment say to the Lee who is observing in a remote room, pondering which choice to make? "Please kill yourself so that I might live; after all, I'll have $5 more than you and so will be slightly better off. But, if you do decide to kill me instead, I won't mind so much, since $5 isn't really that much money." ? Can we really imagine people saying these things without previously carrying out some intense philosophical gymnastics?I don't know; I think Stathis has a good point that this duplication isn't really possible so all the conclusions we're drawing from it might be suspect - and entities that are duplicatable might have vastly different intuitions about what is moral and what is not.
Re: Duplicates Are Selves
I have been on vacation so I have a large backlog of messages to read! But they are very interesting and full of challenging ideas. I find this list to be one of the best I have ever been on in terms both of fearlessly exploring difficult areas and also remaining cordial and polite. I am trying to understand Lee Corbin's idea about duplicates as selves better. I can understand seeing exact, synchronized duplicates as selves (such as two computers running the same simulated individual in lock-step). But when they begin to diverge I understand that Lee still sees them as (in some sense) himself and one copy would in fact sacrifice to benefit a diverged copy just as much(?) as to benefit its own body. Is this right? What I would ask is, is there a limit to this? Is this common-self-ness a matter of degree, or is it all-or-none? Is there some degree of divergence after which a copy might be somewhat reluctant to continue to view its brother copy as being exactly equivalent to itself? For example, what if someone were an identical twin? In some sense they are duplicates at the moment of conception who then begin to diverge. This seems to be different from the copies we discuss merely in degree of divergence, not in kind. Would it be reasonable to argue that an identical twin should view his brother as himself? And what about the possibility of creating non-identical copies? Perhaps our copying machine is imperfect and the products are not quite the same as the original. They are very close, perhaps so close that only extremely detailed inspection can detect the differences. Or perhaps they are not really so close at all and the copies in fact bear little resemblance to their originals. How does the potential existence of such imperfect copying machines affect the notion that one should view copies as selves? If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? Hal Finney
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Hal Finey wrote: If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? The former. Remember: There's no arguing about taste. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Hal wrote: If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? The way I see it, Me or my self is a poorly defined concept. It can refer to a number of different things. It could refer to my physical body (now or in the past or future); the mind that is part of *this* physical body (now or in the past or future); any mind or body indentical to this mind or body; any mind or bosy similar to this mind or body; etc. What you attach the descriptor me to is really a matter only of taste or context. One could try to tighten the definition of me to make it non-ambiguous, but then inevitably this will run afoul of one of the various thought experiments this list enjoys entertaining. Jonathan Colvin
Re: Duplicates Are Selves
On Jul 3, 2005, at 12:56 PM, Jonathan Colvin wrote:Hal Finey wrote: If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same "self", or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? The former. Remember: "There's no arguing about taste".I agree. And also remember (from David Hume), "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of identity to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation you're in, those facts alone can't tell you how you should act.As to whether duplicates are the same "self", I think this is, again, a place where "I" leads us astray. Take this situation: I will create an exact duplicate of you. For one 24-hour period you will, from a remote location, experience the duplicate living your life (via some closed-circuit camera and virtual reality goggles, or something). I will then give you the option of either (1) killing yourself (painlessly, instantly) and giving the duplicate 5 dollars, or (2) pushing a button that makes the duplicate vanish, and you go back to your old life as if nothing happened. Lee would choose option (1), I take it, because he sees this situation as "I get 5 dollars". I think this interpretation, using "I", has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really saying (in third person terms) is, "Person A ought to terminate person A's life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars) more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A)." Now we can see that by calling them both "I" or "Lee" or "self", Lee is merely providing an ethical justification to his choice, not making a metaphysical statement about personal identities. In other words, it is because he extends the "normal" desire of self-preservation to the duplicate, that he would accept certain choices. Whether this is in fact correct is not a scientific question but one for philosophical ethics (and a very interesting one).Pete Carlton
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Hal writes I have been on vacation so I have a large backlog of messages to read! But they are very interesting and full of challenging ideas. I find this list to be one of the best I have ever been on in terms both of fearlessly exploring difficult areas and also remaining cordial and polite. Welcome back! You are sorely missed. (Actually, I think that you are sorely missed on every email list I know of.) I am trying to understand Lee Corbin's idea about duplicates as selves better. I can understand seeing exact, synchronized duplicates as selves (such as two computers running the same simulated individual in lock-step). But when they begin to diverge I understand that Lee still sees them as (in some sense) himself and one copy would in fact sacrifice to benefit a diverged copy just as much(?) as to benefit its own body. Is this right? Yes, I'd sacrifice (for entirely selfish reasons) for my duplicate if it meant less suffering for me. For example, if I and my duplicate are quietly talking in a room, and the torturers come in and offer one instance of me ONE MINUTE TORTURE so that the other instance is spared TWO MINUTE TORTURE, then the one instance---perhaps a little nervously---signs up for it. (This is clearly a case where we are not in lock step, and let's say that it's a *close* duplicate, closer than the person I'll be tomorrow or was yesterday.) The trouble is my animal self. After a few seconds of the torture, the instance will cry out Do it to him!. And it might be difficult to get an instance of me to sign up again. What I would ask is, is there a limit to this? Is this common-self-ness a matter of degree, or is it all-or-none? Is there some degree of divergence after which a copy might be somewhat reluctant to continue to view its brother copy as being exactly equivalent to itself? Definitely it's a matter of degree. There is a smooth transition between me and, say, Hal Finney, a set of particular instances that lie between you and me. So at some point I say (selfishly ---we are only concerned with selfish behavior here) do it to the intermediate for an HOUR instead of me for a MINUTE. For example, what if someone were an identical twin? In some sense they are duplicates at the moment of conception who then begin to diverge. This seems to be different from the copies we discuss merely in degree of divergence, not in kind. Would it be reasonable to argue that an identical twin should view his brother as himself? The interesting case of identical twins turns out to be not so interesting, as I understand it. They're somewhat different at birth, already headed out on slightly different personality development paths, for example. I hear that people who know twins come to feel very quickly that they're different people. This would *not* happen with your duplicate. Your wife, for example, would *never* come to think of you as different people ---at least not until years had passed and differences had built up. And what about the possibility of creating non-identical copies? Perhaps our copying machine is imperfect and the products are not quite the same as the original. They are very close, perhaps so close that only extremely detailed inspection can detect the differences. Or perhaps they are not really so close at all and the copies in fact bear little resemblance to their originals. How does the potential existence of such imperfect copying machines affect the notion that one should view copies as selves? I would say that the known or perceived fidelity of the copying process *would* be a factor. After my duplicate and I talked for a while, we might come to see that we weren't so similar as we thought: we might find that we had slightly different memories, or (more likely with any strictly mechanical copying process) that one of us appeared damaged. If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? I *think* it's objective. Take two bit strings, for example. We sort of have a feeling about how similar they are after we study them awhile. But we can resort to various objective measures. Sure there is no *one* particular supreme measure, but nonetheless I believe that the degree to which two things resemble each other is objective, and not just a matter of taste. Still, even if you were my identical twin brother, we might come to disagree on how far back in time we identified with our younger selves. You might say that the twelve-year old was at the 50% point, and I might say that the eighteen-year old was at the 50% point. Even when an advanced AI gives us some objective instruments or measures for determining similarity, even my twin and I might disagree
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Pete writes David Hume Quote In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of identity to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation you're in, those facts alone can't tell you how you should act. Okay. I agree. I too believe in the is/ought barrier, if that's what you're saying. As to whether duplicates are the same self, I think this is, again, a place where I leads us astray. Oh yes. Trying to extend what I means given all the new possibilities is not easy! Take this situation: I will create an exact duplicate of you. For one 24-hour period you will, from a remote location, experience the duplicate living your life (via some closed-circuit camera and virtual reality goggles, or something). Well, you mean one instance of me (who you refer to as you) will *watch* the other duplicate. The *experience* you're referring to will be the copy's. I will then give you the option of either (1) killing yourself (painlessly, instantly) and giving the duplicate 5 dollars, or (2) pushing a button that makes the duplicate vanish, and you go back to your old life as if nothing happened. Lee would choose option (1), I take it, because he sees this situation as I get 5 dollars. That's right. When all is said and done, tomorrow someone exceedingly similar to me will get up (but with an extra fiver). But that happens anyway. Tomorrow someone *just* like me will get up in my bed anyway, even without strange experiments. I think this interpretation, using I, has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really saying (in third person terms) is, Person A ought to terminate person A's life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars) more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A). NOT AT ALL. It is axiomatic in these discussions that the subject is as *selfish* as can be imagined. I don't believe that any ought has slipped in here (though thanks for the warning from Hume). Perhaps I *ought* to sacrifice myself to save 1000 Australians, but, if I am to act selfishly, then I *ought* not in order to maximize my own benefit. But my use of the word ought in this last sentence is not the moral ought. It means what one would expect, e.g., you ought to go outside if you want some sun. Lee
Re: Duplicates Are Selves
Pete: I think this interpretation, using I, has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really saying (in third person terms) is, Person A ought to terminate person A's life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars) more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A). Lee: NOT AT ALL. It is axiomatic in these discussions that the subject is as *selfish* as can be imagined. I don't believe that any ought has slipped in here (though thanks for the warning from Hume). Perhaps I *ought* to sacrifice myself to save 1000 Australians, but, if I am to act selfishly, then I *ought* not in order to maximize my own benefit. But my use of the word ought in this last sentence is not the moral ought. It means what one would expect, e.g., you ought to go outside if you want some sun. I was using ought in the same sense too (rationally consistent with a given desire). Given that person A has the desires that he does, he ought to accept choice (1). I'm not saying whether person A ought (in the ethical sense) to have those desires or not, but given that he prefers (person B + 5 dollars) to (person A), and believes that by accepting choice (1) his preference will be realized, it is rational for him to behave by accepting choice (1). You think that person A ought (in the ethical sense) to have a strong desire for the future existence of person B - no less, in fact, than for the future existence of person A. You imply this when you say the subject is selfish. I see your point, that normally we have a strong desire for the future existence of -- the person who will wake up in our bed tomorrow. But I don't think it's clear whether you can extend the common notion of acting selfishly into the situation with duplicates, and whether you should or not is something the Hume quote is relevant to. In other words, it is a fact that there are two identical people - or, to be even clearer, two identical organisms (A and B). Does this fact impinge on A's behavior with respect to B, and if so, why? If A hesitates to accept death or torture to the benefit of B, isn't that a good case for re-evaluating A's desires for B? (Interestingly, clones in the animal kingdom sacrifice themselves for each other all the time - some worker bees and fire ants, for instance. At the gene's-eye view, a gene is sacrificing some copies of itself in order that a greater number of copies may get made down the line. Even without clones, there is kin selection, in which organisms behave altruistically towards close relatives, and this has a similar gene's-eye view explanation. Genes certainly cause behavior consistent with Lee's approach to personal identity, and it is in a strong sense selfish behavior.) Pete
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Lee Corbin writes: Having my duplicate who has already diverged live on while I die is not just memory loss, but rather replacement of the lost memories with someone else's, which I feel is a greater threat to my identity and which I would be less likely to agree to. It's someone else just because that's the *feeling* you have about it! Since you have the feeling that you are the same person today that you will be tomorrow, perhaps some day you can achieve the feeling that your duplicate sitting across the room is really you too. Memory loss would be more like having myself backed up and the backup run after I have died. If the backups are frequent, I suppose it is better than no backup at all, but I would still feel afraid of dying. At its most basic, for me anyway, the fear of imminent death is the fear that the person I am *now* will be wiped from the universe and never have any more experiences. Actually, I am wrong about (at least) one thing: memory loss and memory replacement do amount to the same thing, once the copy with the lost memories has new experiences. Have faith in physics. If from *every* objective measure, a Stathis will be awaking tomorrow in your bed, and will do things and talk to everyone just like you, then he is you. There are no souls. You must have faith. The physics of the situation is all that there is. An interesting choice of words: there are no souls... you must have faith. There *is* one objective (and subjective) measure whereby the copy differs from the original: the lost memory of the post-backup experiences. You might argue that it doesn't matter very much, but it is real, and it is what I have been using to define death: no successor observer moment, anywhere or ever. The same consideration ought to apply to memory loss, but people don't generally think of it that way, because they know that they'll be OK afterwards, on the basis of past experience. Just because they're not used to thinking of it in the right way, does not preclude our embracing the right way that we should be thinking of it. Yes, it's true: the very first thing you learned on this Earth was how to tell what was outside your body from what was inside, and slowly your concept of self was formed. But we can see now that it was wrong. We can see now that if you are to have a consistent view of what self is, then it must include all processes that (from the viewpoint of physics) are indistinguishable from you. Or rather, which are very, very similar (like the you yesterday, or the you across the room). Just embrace it: when you see your duplicate across the room, and you know all the facts of his and your existence, just repeat: There by the grace of God go I. As I have said above, it is possible to rigorously define death as occurring when there is no successor observer moment, anywhere or ever. This is the case with physical death where there is no surviving copy or where the surviving copy has diverged from the original, and it is also the case with memory loss. Losing a lifetime's memories is equivalent to physical death with no surviving copy, so it is certainly a very bad thing. Losing a shorter period of memories or dying and leaving behind a copy made a short time ago might not seem as bad, but I think this is only because the survivor is unable to remember any loss. The situation is not any different to suffering pain and then having the memory erased; the knowledge that they are about to die is for many people even more distressing than physical pain. You argue that the doomed person should not consider himself doomed if there is a backup available, and certainly you have more chance of convincing him of this than you have of convincing a victim undergoing torture that he isn't really in pain because his memory will be erased or he will be killed and a pre-torture copy will take over. Nevertheless, I would still be upset if I were about to die, unless I knew that my mind was being backed up continuously, so that no experiences are lost. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Duplicates Are Selves
Pete Carlton writes: [quoting Hal Finney] If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? The former. Remember: There's no arguing about taste. I agree. And also remember (from David Hume), In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarkd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprizd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, tis necessary that it shoud be observd and explaind; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. That's a great quote! All 20th century analytical philosophy can be seen as a footnote to David Hume. I often see people who are of a scientific bent trying to reduce ethics (less often, aesthetics) to a matter of reason. It can't be done; you might start with logic (is) but you will end up with axioms that ultimately are are a matter of taste (ought). In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of identity to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation you're in, those facts alone can't tell you how you should act. As to whether duplicates are the same self, I think this is, again, a place where I leads us astray. Take this situation: I will create an exact duplicate of you. For one 24-hour period you will, from a remote location, experience the duplicate living your life (via some closed-circuit camera and virtual reality goggles, or something). I will then give you the option of either (1) killing yourself (painlessly, instantly) and giving the duplicate 5 dollars, or (2) pushing a button that makes the duplicate vanish, and you go back to your old life as if nothing happened. Lee would choose option (1), I take it, because he sees this situation as I get 5 dollars. I think this interpretation, using I, has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really saying (in third person terms) is, Person A ought to terminate person A's life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars) more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A). Now we can see that by calling them both I or Lee or self, Lee is merely providing an ethical justification to his choice, not making a metaphysical statement about personal identities. In other words, it is because he extends the normal desire of self- preservation to the duplicate, that he would accept certain choices. Whether this is in fact correct is not a scientific question but one for philosophical ethics (and a very interesting one). There is only one way to unequivocally define what is a duplicate in the philosophy of personal identity, and that is a *perfect* duplicate of a person at a particular point in time. If you suddenly die and such a duplicate exists, no experiences are lost, and it is in fact equivalent to not dying at all. --Stathis Papaioannou _ REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
