1Z wrote:
> > I'll try to nail this here. I take 'ontology' to refer to issues of
> > existence or being, where 'epistemology' refers to knowledge, or 'what
> > and how we know'. When I say that our 'ontology' is manifest, I'm
> > claiming (perhaps a little more cautiously than Descartes): 'I a
George Levy wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >George Levy wrote:
> >>A conscious entity is also information.
> I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially "software."
You can assume it of you like. It isn't computationalism, which
is the claim that congition is running a programme, not the
David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > All right. (I hope you realize that you are very ambitious, but then
> > that is how we learn).
>
> Yes, learning is my aim here.
>
> > My terminological problem here is that "experience" and "knowledge"
> > are usually put in the "epistemology" in
1Z wrote:
George Levy wrote:
A conscious entity is also information.
I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially "software."
George
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
> All right. (I hope you realize that you are very ambitious, but then
> that is how we learn).
Yes, learning is my aim here.
> My terminological problem here is that "experience" and "knowledge"
> are usually put in the "epistemology" instead of ontology. Of course I
> kn
George Levy wrote:
> A conscious entity is also information.
Really ? Why is that ?
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
> All right. (I hope you realize that you are very ambitious, but then
> that is how we learn).
Yes, learning is my aim here.
> My terminological problem here is that "experience" and "knowledge"
> are usually put in the "epistemology" instead of ontology. Of course I
> kn
Le 05-août-06, à 17:03, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> Hi Bruno
>
> I think you're right about the complexity. It's because at this stage
> I'm just trying to discover whether this is a distinction that any of
> us think is true or useful, so I'm deliberately (but perhaps not always
> helpfully alas
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines
replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." ...
See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define "exist" by
" "exist" is true".
Then we have:
1 If p thinks then p exists;
Bruno/ George
I thought I might offer the following analogy to help to clarify the
application and relevance of the distinctions I'm trying to make
vis-a-vis the different types of 'first person'. I wouldn't want to
push it too far, but I think it has a certain formal similarity to the
points I'
Hi Bruno
I think you're right about the complexity. It's because at this stage
I'm just trying to discover whether this is a distinction that any of
us think is true or useful, so I'm deliberately (but perhaps not always
helpfully alas) using a variety of terms in the attempt to get my
meaning a
From:
George Levy
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 8:07
PM
Subject: Re: Are First Person
prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think that if you want to
make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can
really define it, you wi
Hi David,
I think I see, albeit vaguely, what you mean by your distinction, but
it seems to me more and more complex and based on many non trivial
notion "objective", "context", "boudaries" . It would be interesting if
George and you were able to converge to a "sharable" notion of first
pers
Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to
make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can
really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way.
Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a kno
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
differentiatin
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think that if you want to
make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can
really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way.
Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and
in that case, are you willing
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
differentiatin
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the lines of:
1) FP1 = context = 'subjectivity'
2) TP = content = 'objectivity'
3) FP2 = FP1 + TP
Then:
4) If p is knowable then p is TP in context of FP1
5) If k is
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