Hi David,

I think I see, albeit vaguely,  what you mean by your distinction, but 
it seems to me more and more complex and based on many non trivial 
notion "objective", "context", "boudaries" . It would be interesting if 
George and you were able to converge to a "sharable" notion of first 
person. I am interested because the first person notion plays a key 
role, both in the UDA reasoning (the first part of my thesis which 
shows that comp forces a reversal between physics and the 
"bio/psych/theology of numbers") and in the beginning of the partial 
but "explicit" part of (propositional) physics we can already extract 
(and compare with quantum logic) when we translate the UDA in purely 
number-theoretical tools (the second part of my thesis).
To be sure, David, there are too many implicit assumptions, in your 
person distinction in your last posts, which, even in the case you 
would make them clear, would still be too precise so that I cannot 
currently make the comparison. I will say more in the roadmap asap.


Le 05-août-06, à 02:21, David Nyman a écrit :

> Hi Bruno
> I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
> place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
> ('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
> 'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
> differentiating the 'directly uttered' FP1 subjective context.  The
> intention is to present an 'outsideless' approach to reality that
> nevertheless allows for the definition of boundaries that delimit
> information flow and representation, and consequently 'knowing',
> 'knowability' and 'knowledge', in the ways characteristic of
> 'individual first persons'.)
>   1) Global FP1 (FP1g) = 'subjective context'
>   2) TP  = 'objective content'
>   3) Individual FP1 (FP1i) : perceiver/ model = FP1g + TP
>   4) FP2 : shareable model of FP1i = FP1g + TP
> Then:
>   5) If p is knowable then p is TP in context of FP1g
>   6) If k1 is a knower then k1 is FP1i in context of FP1g
>   7) If p is known then p is TP in context of FP1i
>   8) If k2 is knowable then k2 is FP2 in context of FP1g
>   9) If k2 is known then k2 is FP2 in context of FP1i
>  10) If k2 is shared then k2 is FP2 in context of more than one FP1i
> This further implies that:
> 11) FP1g is not knowable
> 12) FP1i is knowable but not shareable
> 13) FP2 is knowable and shareable
> 14) FP2 may in fact be known and in fact be shared
> In consequence of the foregoing, third person discourse relating to
> 'first person' necessarily takes place in terms of FP2, but in the
> context of a community of FP1i 'knowers'. The content of FP1i is
> indescribable but 'shareable' - on the analogy of a shareable
> distribution - 'downloadable'.  As directly uttered or manifested,
> it's sui generis, not 'like anything'.  As FP1i, 'I' can narrate my
> 'experience' - including my own 'self-reporting' - only in
> ostensive TP terms that map to the 'shareable distribution'.  Hence,
> for example, 'red' is indicated by 'pointing' to 'that' - both
> for 'me' and in my report to 'you' via the shareable
> distribution.  In this way we can jointly develop common mappings and
> organising schemas within 'shared reality'.  This symmetry of
> limitation puts us on an equal footing within a community of shareable
> discourse.
> David
> >

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