Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Quentin Anciaux wrote: If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Regards, Quentin I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? Brent Hi Brent and Quentin, Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from memory itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to continuity of P.I.? Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stephen Paul King wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Quentin Anciaux wrote: If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Regards, Quentin I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, Does this body have (some) appropriate memories? Brent Hi Brent and Quentin, Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from memory itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to continuity of P.I.? Stephen Sure. But what provides that possibility - the causal (physical) continuity of the brain and body. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Personal Identity and Memory
Hi Brent, - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 12:46 PM Subject: Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Stephen Paul King wrote: snip Hi Brent and Quentin, Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from memory itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to continuity of P.I.? Stephen Sure. But what provides that possibility - the causal (physical) continuity of the brain and body. Brent This is why I am very timid about accepting Platonic idealist theories, for they seemed to inevitably relegate consciousness to some sort of epiphenomena ridding on top of another epiphenomenon: the material universe. Frankly, I find that some dualist theories do not have this problem whereas monist theories have the problem of epiphenomena. OTOH, I do find Bruno's theory to be very interesting. ;) If the material universe is just as real as the universe of number or thought or whatever form the idealist theories propose, we only need to show how the duals are related and how dynamics can follow. See: http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
