On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:20, Roger Clough wrote:
There is a quote by Sherlock Holmes that suggests a way to possibly
filter out
solid truth from a comp (?)
List all of the possibilities or possible solutions. Then remove
all from that list
that are impossible (now or ever, I would add). Whatever is left
over is the
(rational or necesssary) truth.
This is akin to proof of p = proof that (not p) leads to an
impossibility. Sherlock was good in logic :)
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 19:59:11
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer
On Thursday, September 6, 2012 7:37:38 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King
wrote:
On 9/5/2012 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 6:38:07 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
No, the stuff in our skulls is alive, has intelligence, and a 1p.
Computers don't and can't. Big sdifference.
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷 Please leave magic out of this, as any sufficiently advanced
technology is indistinguishable from magic. The trouble is that
the stuff in our skulls does not appear to be that much different
from a bunch of diodes and transistors.
锟斤拷 Our brains obey the very same physical laws! What makes the
brain special? I suspect that the brain uses quantum entanglement
effects to both synchronize and update sense content in ways that
cannot obtain from purely classical physical methods. Our
mechanical machines lack the ability to report on their 1p content
thus we are using their disability to argue against their possible
abilities. A computer that could both generate an internal self-
model and report on it would lead us to very different conclusions!
I think you are both right. Computers qua computers don't feel
anything because they aren't anything. The physical material that
you are using to execute computations on does however have
experiences - just not experiences that we associated with our own.
There is a concrete experience associated with the production of
these pixels on your screen - many experiences on many levels, of
molecules that make up the wires etc., but those experiences don't
seem to lead to anything we would consider significant. It's pretty
straightforward to me. A stuffed animal that looks like a bear is
not a bear. A picture of a person is not a person, even if it is a
fancy interactive picture.
Craig
--
Hi Craig,
I think that the difference that makes a difference here is the
identity that emerges between matching of the experience *of* object
and experience *by* object. Ranulph Glanville has, with others in
the Cybernetics community, written masterfully on this in his Same
is Different paper.
Hi Stephen,
How does the of/by distinction compare with map-territory and use-
mention distinctions?
Craig
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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