Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Bruno: I understand a little better. is there a citition for a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN? Ronald On Jun 4, 10:49 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Ronald, On 02 Jun 2009, at 16:45, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. I was alluding to old, and less old, disputes again programmers, about which programming language to prefer. It is a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN. But this does not mean that it is relevant to define an algorithm by a fortran program. I thought this was obvious, and I was using that known confusion to point on a similar confusion in Set Theory, like Langan can be said to perform. In Set Theorist, we still find often the error consisting in defining a mathematical object by a set. I have done that error in my youth. What you can do, indeed, is to *represent* (almost all) mathematical objects by sets. Langan seems to make that mistake. The point is just that we have to distinguish a mathematical object and the representation of that object in some mathematical theory. I will have the opportunity to give a precise example in the 7th thread later. In usual mathematical practice, this mistake is really not important, yet, in logic it is more important to take into account that distinction, and then in cognitive science it is *very* important. Crucial, I would say. The error consisting in identifying consciousness and brain state belongs to that family, for example. To confuse a person and its body belongs to that family of error too. All such error are of the form of the confusion between the Moon and the finger which point to the moon, or the confusion between a map and the territory. I have nothing against the use of FORTRAN. On the contrary I have a big respect for that old venerable high level programming language :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Well as FORTRAN is a turing complete language, then you can. As long as the programming language is universal/turing complete you can. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_completeness Regards, Quentin 2009/6/5 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com: Bruno: I understand a little better. is there a citition for a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN? Ronald On Jun 4, 10:49 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Ronald, On 02 Jun 2009, at 16:45, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. I was alluding to old, and less old, disputes again programmers, about which programming language to prefer. It is a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN. But this does not mean that it is relevant to define an algorithm by a fortran program. I thought this was obvious, and I was using that known confusion to point on a similar confusion in Set Theory, like Langan can be said to perform. In Set Theorist, we still find often the error consisting in defining a mathematical object by a set. I have done that error in my youth. What you can do, indeed, is to *represent* (almost all) mathematical objects by sets. Langan seems to make that mistake. The point is just that we have to distinguish a mathematical object and the representation of that object in some mathematical theory. I will have the opportunity to give a precise example in the 7th thread later. In usual mathematical practice, this mistake is really not important, yet, in logic it is more important to take into account that distinction, and then in cognitive science it is *very* important. Crucial, I would say. The error consisting in identifying consciousness and brain state belongs to that family, for example. To confuse a person and its body belongs to that family of error too. All such error are of the form of the confusion between the Moon and the finger which point to the moon, or the confusion between a map and the territory. I have nothing against the use of FORTRAN. On the contrary I have a big respect for that old venerable high level programming language :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
On 04 Jun 2009, at 21:23, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Bruno Marchal wrote: The whole point of logic is to consider the Peano's axioms as a mathematical object itself, which is studied mathematically in the usual informal (yet rigorous and typically mathematica) way. PA, and PA+GOLDBACH are different mathematical objects. They are different theories, or different machines. Now if GOLDBACH is provable by PA, then PA and PA+GOLDBACH shed the same light on the same arithmetical truth. In that case I will identify PA and PA+GOLDBACH, in many contexts, because most of the time I identify a theory with its set of theorems. Like I identify a person with its set of (possible) beliefs. If GOLDBACH is *true, but not provable* by PA, then PA and PA +GOLDBACH still talk on the same reality, but PA+GOLDBACH will shed more light on it, by proving more theorems on the numbers and numbers relations than PA. I do no more identify them, and they have different set of theorems. If GOLDBACH is false. Well GOLBACH is PI_1, that is, its negation is SIGMA_1, that is, it has the shape it exist a number such that it verify this decidable property. Indeed the negation of Goldbach conjecture is it exists a number bigger than 2 which is not the sum of two primes. This, if true, is verifiable already by the much weaker RA (Robinson arithmetic). So, if GOLDBACH is false PA + GOLDBACH is inconsistent. That is a mathematical object quite different from PA! So what then is the status of the natural numbers? Are there many different objects in Platonia which we loosely refer to as the natural numbers or is there only one such object and the Goldbach conjecture is either true of false of this object? Nobody can answer this question in your place. But if you believe that the principle of excluded middle can be applied to closed arithmetical sentences, like 99,999% of the mathematician, then you have to believe that the Goldbach conjecture is either true or false. Even intuitionist will admit that Goldabch conjecture is true or false, given its Sigma_1 character. This means that, about the (true- or-false) nature of GOLDBACH is doubtable only for an ultrafinitist. BTW, Goldbach conjecture asserts that all female (even) numbers can be written as a sum of two primes, except the number two. (I forget the word even in my enunciation above!). Here, you would have taken the twin primes conjecture, and things would have been different, and more complex. Because, even if it is false, it cannot be proven false by exhibiting an example? Yes. And this entails that both PA+TPC and PA + (~TPC) could be consistent, yet one of those theory has to be unsound, or if you prefer has to enunciate false arithmetical statements (yet consistent with PA). Sound is relative to the usual understanding of the natural numbers which is presupposed in any work in mathematical logic or computer science, like it is presupposed in any part of any physical theory. That usual meaning is taught in primary school without any trouble. In model theory, this notion of soundness can be made more precise, through the notion of standard model of PA for example, but this presupposes, in the meta-theory, an understanding of that usual notion of numbers. Nobody doubts the consistency and soundness of the theories like RA and PA. (Even Torgny, who fakes that he doubts them for a philosophical purpose unrelated to our discussion, like he fakes to be a faking zombie, etc. This is clear from older post by Torgny). Note that a theory of set like ZF shed even much more large light on arithmetical truth, (and is still incomplete on arithmetic, by Gödel ...). Incidentally it can be shown that ZF and ZFC, although they shed different light on the mathematical truth in general, does shed exactly the same light on arithmetical truth. They prove the same arithmetical theorems. On the numbers, the axiom of choice add nothing. This is quite unlike the ladder of infinity axioms. I would say it is and will be particularly important to distinguish chatting beings like RA, PA, ZF, ZFC, etc... and what those beings are talking about. Bruno Do you mean PA talks about the natural numbers but PA+theorems is a different mathematical object than N? I am not sure I understand what you mean. PA is an (immaterial) machine, or a program if you want. I guess that, by PA+theorems, you mean the set of theorems of PA. In some context we can identify PA and PA+theorems, because the context makes things unambiguous. But strictly speaking those are different mathematical object: PA is finite (well, as I defined it usually), But PA+theorems is infinite. Both talk about N, and both are different of N. Indeed PA is a finite (or infinite in the usual first order presentation) set of axioms and rules, PA+theorems is an infinite set of formula, and N is an infinite
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
On 05 Jun 2009, at 14:23, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: I understand a little better. is there a citition for a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN? The original Church Thesis, (also due to Post, Turing, Markov, Kleene, and others independently) is this: A function is computable if and only if it is programmable in LAMDA CALCULUS. Then it is an easy but tedious exercise of programing to show that you can simulate LAMDA CALCULUS with FORTRAN, and that you can simulate FORTRAN with LAMBDA CALCULUS. So they compute the same functions. And the same is true with LISP, or JAVA, or ALGOL, or C++, etc... in the place of FORTRAN. A thorough introduction to Church thesis, and I would say one far deeper than usual, is integrally part of the seventh step of UDA. So we will come back on this soon or later. Church thesis is really the key and the motor of both UDA and AUDA. I have discovered that it is rarely well understood, even by many experts. Like Gödel's theorem, Church's thesis is often deformed or misused. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Russell: Maybe you might be interested in gfortran(http://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/ GFortran)? Ronald On Jun 2, 6:38 pm, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Jun 02, 2009 at 07:45:22AM -0700, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. Ronald Maybe if he said Fortran IV or Fortran 66, it might have made the point clearer. I know guys who still program in Fortran 66. The rest of us have moved on ... Fortran 95 is not a bad language to program in for instance - and 2003 has some interesting features, although I don't know of any freely available compilers. Personally, I went C++ in the early 90s because g++ was available and the equivalent for Fortran 90 was not (gfortran or g95 arrived by about 2000 IIRC). -- ---- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Hi Ronald, On 02 Jun 2009, at 16:45, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. I was alluding to old, and less old, disputes again programmers, about which programming language to prefer. It is a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN. But this does not mean that it is relevant to define an algorithm by a fortran program. I thought this was obvious, and I was using that known confusion to point on a similar confusion in Set Theory, like Langan can be said to perform. In Set Theorist, we still find often the error consisting in defining a mathematical object by a set. I have done that error in my youth. What you can do, indeed, is to *represent* (almost all) mathematical objects by sets. Langan seems to make that mistake. The point is just that we have to distinguish a mathematical object and the representation of that object in some mathematical theory. I will have the opportunity to give a precise example in the 7th thread later. In usual mathematical practice, this mistake is really not important, yet, in logic it is more important to take into account that distinction, and then in cognitive science it is *very* important. Crucial, I would say. The error consisting in identifying consciousness and brain state belongs to that family, for example. To confuse a person and its body belongs to that family of error too. All such error are of the form of the confusion between the Moon and the finger which point to the moon, or the confusion between a map and the territory. I have nothing against the use of FORTRAN. On the contrary I have a big respect for that old venerable high level programming language :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
From my understanding of logic, there is made the distinction between objects and descriptions of objects. For example, the relation is less than is considered different from the relation symbol So what you said makes sense. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Ronald, On 02 Jun 2009, at 16:45, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. I was alluding to old, and less old, disputes again programmers, about which programming language to prefer. It is a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN. But this does not mean that it is relevant to define an algorithm by a fortran program. I thought this was obvious, and I was using that known confusion to point on a similar confusion in Set Theory, like Langan can be said to perform. In Set Theorist, we still find often the error consisting in defining a mathematical object by a set. I have done that error in my youth. What you can do, indeed, is to *represent* (almost all) mathematical objects by sets. Langan seems to make that mistake. The point is just that we have to distinguish a mathematical object and the representation of that object in some mathematical theory. I will have the opportunity to give a precise example in the 7th thread later. In usual mathematical practice, this mistake is really not important, yet, in logic it is more important to take into account that distinction, and then in cognitive science it is *very* important. Crucial, I would say. The error consisting in identifying consciousness and brain state belongs to that family, for example. To confuse a person and its body belongs to that family of error too. All such error are of the form of the confusion between the Moon and the finger which point to the moon, or the confusion between a map and the territory. I have nothing against the use of FORTRAN. On the contrary I have a big respect for that old venerable high level programming language :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Ronald, On 02 Jun 2009, at 16:45, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. I was alluding to old, and less old, disputes again programmers, about which programming language to prefer. It is a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN. But this does not mean that it is relevant to define an algorithm by a fortran program. I thought this was obvious, and I was using that known confusion to point on a similar confusion in Set Theory, like Langan can be said to perform. In Set Theorist, we still find often the error consisting in defining a mathematical object by a set. I have done that error in my youth. What you can do, indeed, is to *represent* (almost all) mathematical objects by sets. Langan seems to make that mistake. The point is just that we have to distinguish a mathematical object and the representation of that object in some mathematical theory. Just so I'm sure I understand you; do you mean that, for example, the natural numbers exist in a way that is independent of Peano's axioms and the theorems that can be proven from them. In other words you could add to Peano's axioms something like Goldbach's conjecture and you would still have the same mathematical object? Brent I will have the opportunity to give a precise example in the 7th thread later. In usual mathematical practice, this mistake is really not important, yet, in logic it is more important to take into account that distinction, and then in cognitive science it is *very* important. Crucial, I would say. The error consisting in identifying consciousness and brain state belongs to that family, for example. To confuse a person and its body belongs to that family of error too. All such error are of the form of the confusion between the Moon and the finger which point to the moon, or the confusion between a map and the territory. I have nothing against the use of FORTRAN. On the contrary I have a big respect for that old venerable high level programming language :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
On 04 Jun 2009, at 19:28, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Ronald, On 02 Jun 2009, at 16:45, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Since I program in Fortran, I am uncertain how to interpret things. I was alluding to old, and less old, disputes again programmers, about which programming language to prefer. It is a version of Church Thesis that all algorithm can be written in FORTRAN. But this does not mean that it is relevant to define an algorithm by a fortran program. I thought this was obvious, and I was using that known confusion to point on a similar confusion in Set Theory, like Langan can be said to perform. In Set Theorist, we still find often the error consisting in defining a mathematical object by a set. I have done that error in my youth. What you can do, indeed, is to *represent* (almost all) mathematical objects by sets. Langan seems to make that mistake. The point is just that we have to distinguish a mathematical object and the representation of that object in some mathematical theory. Just so I'm sure I understand you; do you mean that, for example, the natural numbers exist in a way that is independent of Peano's axioms Not just the existence of the natural numbers, all the true relations are independent of the Peano Axioms, and of me, ZF, ZFC and you. and the theorems that can be proven from them. A formal theory is just a machine which put a tiny light on those truth. In other words you could add to Peano's axioms something like Goldbach's conjecture and you would still have the same mathematical object? The whole point of logic is to consider the Peano's axioms as a mathematical object itself, which is studied mathematically in the usual informal (yet rigorous and typically mathematica) way. PA, and PA+GOLDBACH are different mathematical objects. They are different theories, or different machines. Now if GOLDBACH is provable by PA, then PA and PA+GOLDBACH shed the same light on the same arithmetical truth. In that case I will identify PA and PA+GOLDBACH, in many contexts, because most of the time I identify a theory with its set of theorems. Like I identify a person with its set of (possible) beliefs. If GOLDBACH is true, but not provable by PA, then PA and PA+GOLDBACH still talk on the same reality, but PA+GOLDBACH will shed more light on it, by proving more theorems on the numbers and numbers relations than PA. I do no more identify them, and they have different set of theorems. If GOLDBACH is false. Well GOLBACH is PI_1, that is, its negation is SIGMA_1, that is, it has the shape it exist a number such that it verify this decidable property. Indeed the negation of Goldbach conjecture is it exists a number bigger than 2 which is not the sum of two primes. This, if true, is verifiable already by the much weaker RA (Robinson arithmetic). So, if GOLDBACH is false PA + GOLDBACH is inconsistent. That is a mathematical object quite different from PA! Here, you would have taken the twin primes conjecture, and things would have been different, and more complex. Note that a theory of set like ZF shed even much more large light on arithmetical truth, (and is still incomplete on arithmetic, by Gödel ...). Incidentally it can be shown that ZF and ZFC, although they shed different light on the mathematical truth in general, does shed exactly the same light on arithmetical truth. They prove the same arithmetical theorems. On the numbers, the axiom of choice add nothing. This is quite unlike the ladder of infinity axioms. I would say it is and will be particularly important to distinguish chatting beings like RA, PA, ZF, ZFC, etc... and what those beings are talking about. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Bruno Marchal wrote: The whole point of logic is to consider the Peano's axioms as a mathematical object itself, which is studied mathematically in the usual informal (yet rigorous and typically mathematica) way. PA, and PA+GOLDBACH are different mathematical objects. They are different theories, or different machines. Now if GOLDBACH is provable by PA, then PA and PA+GOLDBACH shed the same light on the same arithmetical truth. In that case I will identify PA and PA+GOLDBACH, in many contexts, because most of the time I identify a theory with its set of theorems. Like I identify a person with its set of (possible) beliefs. If GOLDBACH is *true, but not provable* by PA, then PA and PA+GOLDBACH still talk on the same reality, but PA+GOLDBACH will shed more light on it, by proving more theorems on the numbers and numbers relations than PA. I do no more identify them, and they have different set of theorems. If GOLDBACH is false. Well GOLBACH is PI_1, that is, its negation is SIGMA_1, that is, it has the shape it exist a number such that it verify this decidable property. Indeed the negation of Goldbach conjecture is it exists a number bigger than 2 which is not the sum of two primes. This, if true, is verifiable already by the much weaker RA (Robinson arithmetic). So, if GOLDBACH is false PA + GOLDBACH is inconsistent. That is a mathematical object quite different from PA! So what then is the status of the natural numbers? Are there many different objects in Platonia which we loosely refer to as the natural numbers or is there only one such object and the Goldbach conjecture is either true of false of this object? Here, you would have taken the twin primes conjecture, and things would have been different, and more complex. Because, even if it is false, it cannot be proven false by exhibiting an example? Note that a theory of set like ZF shed even much more large light on arithmetical truth, (and is still incomplete on arithmetic, by Gödel ...). Incidentally it can be shown that ZF and ZFC, although they shed different light on the mathematical truth in general, does shed exactly the same light on arithmetical truth. They prove the same arithmetical theorems. On the numbers, the axiom of choice add nothing. This is quite unlike the ladder of infinity axioms. I would say it is and will be particularly important to distinguish chatting beings like RA, PA, ZF, ZFC, etc... and what those beings are talking about. Bruno Do you mean PA talks about the natural numbers but PA+theorems is a different mathematical object than N? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Good information, thanks! On Sun, May 31, 2009 at 1:02 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 May 2009, at 23:08, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Has anyone on this list ever heard of this? A theory of reality formulated by Christopher Michael Langan? http://www.ctmu.org/Articles/IntroCTMU.htm It sounds a little sketchy at first, though not entirely different than some of what Bruno Marchal says. Obviously the main reason to pay much attention to it is that Langan has an IQ of between 190 and 210. Which kept me going past the first paragraph, which is when I would otherwise have stopped. But, after further reading it sounds somewhat more plausible. I'd be very interested in hearing Bruno's opinion. It is a physicalism in disguise. There is also a confusion between a mathematical object as a tool to represent other object, and the other object. And using set theory in that setting is a curious choice, given that set theory is known to flatten the concepts. It is the reason what mathematician prefer category theory, or specific theories ... I mean sets? Which sets? It is very unclear how the different notions are related. I can appreciate its apparent open mind on religion, but I don't see any effort to solve problems, nor any clarification of problems. Langan seems not to be afraid of being appreciated by those who want to be mystified instead of understanding. But then if you have a link on a real precise theory or results, you can let us know, but my opinion is that it is not really honest, or if it is, then it is presented in a very awkward. To give set a fundamental status is really like saying you should do everything in FORTRAN. Unless you have a good original reason to use sets, but then you should give it. Rereading some parts I am not sure at all he even try to say something, ... pervert the usual meaning of the terms. He makes complex simple ideas and hides somehow its naive view of Plato, making me a bit nervous even on points where I could imagine some sense there ... ... Hmm Pompous and Boring, if you ask my opinion. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Russell, I second (if it is of any worth). I 'tried' to read the diatribes on the html page and my perseverence ws not sufficient to stay in he lines. Some concepts seem to be mixed (I did not say up) e.g. to identify 'reality' one should get a hold of it and I found 'physical' sketchy (maybe I blurred-up where it was more sorrowly identified). . . It was funny to read about ONE universe in all, spacetime etc. as universal foundations, and so on, I think this list is past such level. About the Ph.D.: I agree, it is a harsh schooling to compose/order ideas an regulate one's thinking (if the tutor is any good). My 2nd one was a lot easier than the 1st one. I don't care too much for titles, but in terms as a mental training I appreciate your position. I don't care too much for high IQs either (was measured once for a job interview and they disclosed upon my threat only that it was 200) - but I assigned it to the metric system I grew into: saved lots of time in the math problems by converting the US units into metric, play with the decimal point and reformed the US units. Which is not much of an intelligence. Other topics in those tests are cultural background related, plus a snobbish preference for certain domains in the cognitive inventory by the organizers of the particular test. People with other background may fail. John M On Sat, May 30, 2009 at 7:16 PM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: I looked into him about a month or so ago, after he'd posted an unflattering remark about my work. He might have an IQ of 200, but to put it bluntly, what he writes is drivel. It may well have a kernel of truth, and there may well even be original thought in there, but it is so voluminous and so badly organised it is impossible to tell. Basically, my advice to him would be to get a PhD. It doesn't teach you creativity, but does teach you how to organise and express your ideas so that others can possibly understand it. But I suspect Chris Langan is too proud to do this. At least Bruno has done his PhD, and his work is so much the better off for him having gone through that process, painful though it was. Cheers On Sat, May 30, 2009 at 02:08:44PM -0700, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Has anyone on this list ever heard of this? A theory of reality formulated by Christopher Michael Langan? http://www.ctmu.org/Articles/IntroCTMU.htm It sounds a little sketchy at first, though not entirely different than some of what Bruno Marchal says. Obviously the main reason to pay much attention to it is that Langan has an IQ of between 190 and 210. Which kept me going past the first paragraph, which is when I would otherwise have stopped. But, after further reading it sounds somewhat more plausible. I'd be very interested in hearing Bruno's opinion. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
I think these interviews provide a nice summary of his views: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ak5Lr3qkW0 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mfbUhs2PVY I remember seeing an interview with him on TV about a decade ago and being very interested in his claim to be able to mathematically prove the existence of god, souls, and life after death, but I don't know if he's ever revealed those proofs. It seems with Bruno's testable comp hypothesis we can do the same, depending on your definitions of god, souls, and life after death. Jason On Mon, Jun 1, 2009 at 2:20 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Russell, I second (if it is of any worth). I 'tried' to read the diatribes on the html page and my perseverence ws not sufficient to stay in he lines. Some concepts seem to be mixed (I did not say up) e.g. to identify 'reality' one should get a hold of it and I found 'physical' sketchy (maybe I blurred-up where it was more sorrowly identified). . . It was funny to read about ONE universe in all, spacetime etc. as universal foundations, and so on, I think this list is past such level. About the Ph.D.: I agree, it is a harsh schooling to compose/order ideas an regulate one's thinking (if the tutor is any good). My 2nd one was a lot easier than the 1st one. I don't care too much for titles, but in terms as a mental training I appreciate your position. I don't care too much for high IQs either (was measured once for a job interview and they disclosed upon my threat only that it was 200) - but I assigned it to the metric system I grew into: saved lots of time in the math problems by converting the US units into metric, play with the decimal point and reformed the US units. Which is not much of an intelligence. Other topics in those tests are cultural background related, plus a snobbish preference for certain domains in the cognitive inventory by the organizers of the particular test. People with other background may fail. John M On Sat, May 30, 2009 at 7:16 PM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I looked into him about a month or so ago, after he'd posted an unflattering remark about my work. He might have an IQ of 200, but to put it bluntly, what he writes is drivel. It may well have a kernel of truth, and there may well even be original thought in there, but it is so voluminous and so badly organised it is impossible to tell. Basically, my advice to him would be to get a PhD. It doesn't teach you creativity, but does teach you how to organise and express your ideas so that others can possibly understand it. But I suspect Chris Langan is too proud to do this. At least Bruno has done his PhD, and his work is so much the better off for him having gone through that process, painful though it was. Cheers On Sat, May 30, 2009 at 02:08:44PM -0700, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Has anyone on this list ever heard of this? A theory of reality formulated by Christopher Michael Langan? http://www.ctmu.org/Articles/IntroCTMU.htm It sounds a little sketchy at first, though not entirely different than some of what Bruno Marchal says. Obviously the main reason to pay much attention to it is that Langan has an IQ of between 190 and 210. Which kept me going past the first paragraph, which is when I would otherwise have stopped. But, after further reading it sounds somewhat more plausible. I'd be very interested in hearing Bruno's opinion. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
On 30 May 2009, at 23:08, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Has anyone on this list ever heard of this? A theory of reality formulated by Christopher Michael Langan? http://www.ctmu.org/Articles/IntroCTMU.htm It sounds a little sketchy at first, though not entirely different than some of what Bruno Marchal says. Obviously the main reason to pay much attention to it is that Langan has an IQ of between 190 and 210. Which kept me going past the first paragraph, which is when I would otherwise have stopped. But, after further reading it sounds somewhat more plausible. I'd be very interested in hearing Bruno's opinion. It is a physicalism in disguise. There is also a confusion between a mathematical object as a tool to represent other object, and the other object. And using set theory in that setting is a curious choice, given that set theory is known to flatten the concepts. It is the reason what mathematician prefer category theory, or specific theories ... I mean sets? Which sets? It is very unclear how the different notions are related. I can appreciate its apparent open mind on religion, but I don't see any effort to solve problems, nor any clarification of problems. Langan seems not to be afraid of being appreciated by those who want to be mystified instead of understanding. But then if you have a link on a real precise theory or results, you can let us know, but my opinion is that it is not really honest, or if it is, then it is presented in a very awkward. To give set a fundamental status is really like saying you should do everything in FORTRAN. Unless you have a good original reason to use sets, but then you should give it. Rereading some parts I am not sure at all he even try to say something, ... pervert the usual meaning of the terms. He makes complex simple ideas and hides somehow its naive view of Plato, making me a bit nervous even on points where I could imagine some sense there ... ... Hmm Pompous and Boring, if you ask my opinion. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe
Why would someone's IQ rating be a recommendation of anything about them? People like Langan long ago fell into the Intelligence Trap. They have an exaggerated need to be right about everything all the time. They are usually unable to think about anything from a perspective other than the one they long ago decided was the right perspective. They don't know how to listen to others. They are usually unable to restructure the available information in such a way that they can draw new perspectives from it. Please do not extoll the virtues of anything as anachronistic and mythical as somebody's supposed high IQ. I could put a thinking test in front of him that would defeat him totally, yet be easily done by a 7 year old. Kim Jones On 31/05/2009, at 9:16 AM, russell standish wrote: Obviously the main reason to pay much attention to it is that Langan has an IQ of between 190 and 210. Which kept me going past the first paragraph, which is when I would otherwise have stopped. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
