At this stage you should try to be specific about the reasons why an
hardware independent isomorphism cannot exist, or perhaps you are
just saying that first person feeling would not be genuine if they
were not related to some 'physical reality' in which case I could
agree
I feel we're
Le 28-juil.-06, à 22:15, David Nyman a écrit :
snip (a bit unclear sorry)
In your comments above you refer to Platonism. It seems clear that if
we are to regard mathematics or comp as having the kind of 'efficacy'
(sorry, but what word would you prefer?), then we must indeed grant
them
Le 29-juil.-06, à 18:23, David Nyman a écrit :
No doctor! Or rather, it depends what you mean by 'what really
describes me'. What I have argued is that, at the 'physical' level of
description, running a hardware-independent computation could never
'really describe me' in one of the main
Le 27-juil.-06, à 03:21, David Nyman a écrit :
Mmmmhh This sounds a little bit too much idealist for me. Numbers
exist with some logic-mathematical priority, and then self-intimacy
should emerge from many complex relations among numbers. Also, the
many
universes (both with comp and/or
Le 24-juil.-06, à 04:23, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno: And this is perhaps the very root of a possible disagreement.
I would
not compare mathematical with tautological, nor with
conventional. This should be clear after the Godelian fall of
logicism. We know today that even just the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to
Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing
emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even local nature.
I don't see why.
The idea that computation can't lead to what you
Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to
Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing
emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even local nature.
Why not? I find this a bit speculative, and I am interested more in the
consequence of the
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