Re: Immortality

2001-10-05 Thread Marchal
I wrote (to Juergen Schmidhuber): >Before going into such technics it would help us if you told >us what is wrong with the comp 1-person indeterminism >in the simple self-duplication experiment. >We discuss that before, but I am still not sure to >be able to make sense of your critics. Rereading

Re: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

2001-10-05 Thread Brent Meeker
On 05-Oct-01, Marchal wrote: ...> >> Seeing that there is no rigerous way to define what actually >> constitues a physical computer, and what does not, does it make any >> sense to say "my desktop computer" has become conscious? > > > Your desktop computer cannot be conscious, nor can my brain.

Re: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

2001-10-05 Thread Marchal
Neil Lion wrote: >This is true, but the current state of a computer can always be represented >within a finite string. Perhaps the computer cannot ever realize this, as >the description will be a part of the computer (ad-infinitum), but as long >as I see myself as seperate from the process of the