I wrote (to Juergen Schmidhuber): >Before going into such technics it would help us if you told >us what is wrong with the comp 1-person indeterminism >in the simple self-duplication experiment. >We discuss that before, but I am still not sure to >be able to make sense of your critics.
Rereading some of your post I know you do the 1/3 distinction. But you don't believe in the comp-indeterminism. Actually, from your second papers it seems you don't believe in any form of indeterminism (neither physical nor psychological). I really don't understand. Let us try to be specific. With comp you agree you survive annihilation and reconstitution. (with probability one *relatively* to comp and a correct bet on the substitution level, and a unique reconstitution). So I cut you and paste you in *two* rooms, now, one with a ZERO painted on the wall, the other with a ONE painted on the wall. I ask you to predict what will you be feeling immediately after the pasting. You cannot communicate you will see ONE on the wall. Because you know the one of "you" who will see ZERO will accept the prediction has been wrong (and I ask that communication with determinism should convince ANY one). You cannot communicate you will see ZERO on the wall. Same reason. You cannot communicate you will see ZERO and you will see ONE. Because neither of the two YOUs will see both the zero and one, if the duplication has been done at the right level. You cannot communicate you will see neither ZERO nor ONE, because in that case you can no more accept comp, which says that you survive self-cut and self pasting (independently in case of self-multiplication). You cannot say the question is meaningless. With comp, you say yes to the doctor, and it is meaningful to worried about possible copy. So, how is it that you talk like if you do have an algorithm capable of telling you in advance what will be your personal experience in a self-duplication experience. I apologise insisting making precise the point where we disagree, but we are both making the comp hypothesis, and you are using it to defend determinism, and I try hard to explain comp leads to an amazingly strong form of indeterminism. My hypothesis is that although you do the 1/3 distinction, you don't take into account that distinction in your TOE, and then you are using implicitely a magical "psycho-physico-parallelism" for attaching first person experience to a single third person unique computation. Where am I wrong? Bruno