Because a) you have experiences but not experiences of yourself and
In what way dont I have experience of myself? Who am I experiencing now?
Someone else?
b) experiences are not more certain that every scientific truth.
Experiences are often misleading or outright illusions.
That I
Greetings,
In what way dont I have experience of myself? Who am I experiencing now?
Someone else?
You have no guarantee of whom you are experiencing. it is your
belief that you are experiencing something that is yourself.
That I exist is more certain than any scientific truth. This is what
Hi Godfrey,
Le 10-août-05, à 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Hi Everythingers,
Though I am new to the list I have been reading your fascinating posts
on this troubling issue of reality and subjectivity
so please pardon if I skip the protocol and delve into the discussion
right away. I
Hi Eric,
Le 11-août-05, à 01:34, Eric Cavalcanti a écrit :
Hi Bruno,
On 8/11/05, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I am having a problem understanding this axiom:
(...) Lob formula (B(Bp-p)-Bp), the main axiom of the modal logic
of self-reference (G)
can be interpreted as showing
Hi George,
Still trying to understand you but having trouble holding my
disbelieve...
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
Hi Godfrey
The I that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and
coincides with the physical system that the I inhabits. Thus the
world (the slice of
Le 11-août-05, à 00:55, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Okay, but two questions:
1. by comp do you mean the computationalist hypothesis as
apparently
used by philosophers? Is comp just an abbreviation for that?
Strictly speaking: yes. It happens now that many people implicitly
conceive comp in
Le 12-août-05, à 02:29, George Levy a écrit :
Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such
Le 07-août-05, à 22:20, Hal Finney a écrit :
Rutgers philosopher Tim Maudlin has a paper intended to challenge certain
views about consciousness and computation, which we have discussed
occasionally on this list.
Indeed. Maudlin's paper is without doubt one of the most important paper in
Chris writes
The point is that given the certainty of 'I exist' subjective experience can
not just be dismissed by the realist. Given its certainty, it demands some
kind of explanation,
Of course it does. But I imagine that you are looking at the phenonmenon
from inside the system. I warn
Thoughts on the Memory-prediction framework in explaining
intelligence anyone?
Book: Jeff Hawkins On Intelligence
I
wrote a sort-of-review of this book some time ago...
http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/OnBiologicalAndDigitalIntelligence.htm
-- Ben
Goertzel
-Original Message-From: Lennart Nilsson
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 2:00
PMTo:
Bruno,
You speak of God. Could you define what you, as a logician, mean?
Thanks,
Norman
~~
An informal, but (hopefully) rigorous and complete, argument showing that
physics is derivable from comp. That argument is not constructive. Its e
asyness comes from
Godfrey Kurtz wrote
More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any non-quantum
mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things, Bruno.
Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
to be.
There aren't many
Hi Godfrey, Bruno
The "I" that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and
coincides with the physical system that the "I" inhabits. Thus the
world (the slice of the plenitude that we can observe) is anthropically
constrained by the "I."
[GK]
So the "I" is (1) a logical system
Hi George,
Thanks for the clarifications. Let me see if I understand you better.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-Original Message-
From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[GL]
I am sorry I was sloppy in my explanation. Let me try to be clearer.
I is the kernel of consciousness. It
Hi Godfrey,
't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists working on
''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such
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