--- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> John writes
>
> > > "Computationalism" is yet another claim.
> > > It's the notion that all of our own
> > > thoughts as well could be implemented
> > > on a Turing Machine in a way that would
> > > deliver to us just as much
> > > experiential satisf
On 05 Sep 2005, at 23:54, Saibal Mitra wrote:I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify this. So, this like postulating
Hi Norman,
Only when you demand that the computations be done in real time there is a
problem. My point is that this problem is not relevant.
Any TM that you can build will have limitations because of the laws of
physics. Suppose that simulating the time evolution of 1 isolated cubic
meter of sp
Hi Saibal,
At last, I may be getting a glimmering of understanding of your point of
view (which doesn't mean that I agree with you). Thanks for your patience.
You seem to be saying that it is irrelevant if a Turing Machine, even one
that operates at the speed of light, takes a billion years to
-- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy---THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side,
The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky'http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
John writes
> Eliza was part of a model: responsive to effects
> within 'her' program. Within the rules of (possible in
> 1990 or whatever level)the model of 'physics' with
> phenomena, forces, events that far discovered.
> Whatever 'she' was receptive to. Beyond that 'she'
> can't act, as a limit
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