Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 12:45:43PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > > > > OK, so by necessary primitive, you mean the syntactic or microscopic > > layer. But take this away, and you no longer have emergence. See > > endless discussions on emergence - my paper, or Jochen Fromm's book for > > instance. D

Re: Penrose and algorithms

2007-06-21 Thread Pete Carlton
You could look up "Murmurs in the Cathedral", Daniel Dennett's review of Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind", in the Times literary supplement (and maybe online somewhere?) Here's an excerpt from a review of the review: -- However, Penrose's main thesis, for which all this scientific expos

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our > everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from > virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? > (Other than sensing b

Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

2007-06-21 Thread Mark Peaty
DN: ' > I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR > field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My > fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is > 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of > a 'modulated conti

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: > On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our >> everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from >> virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactl

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread John Mikes
David wrote: < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> Jun 21, 2007 2:31 PM David, you are still too mild IMO. You wrote: "... "there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'". I would say: we call 'fields' what seems to be callable 'interaction' upon the outcome of certain

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:24 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, "Participatorily intuit the > magic of the de-formalized ding an sich." I'd be happy with that sign, if you substituted a phrase like 'way of being' for 'magic'. There is no analogy be

Re: Asifism

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that > relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but > relationships entail existence and difference. I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish whether the 'r

Re: Asifism

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that > relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but > relationships entail existence and difference. I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish whether the 'r

Re: Asifism

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that > relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but > relationships entail existence and difference. I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish whether the 'r

Re: Asifism

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that > relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but > relationships entail existence and difference. I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish whether the 'r

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:42 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > David, you are still too mild IMO. I try not to be churlish. > I like your quest for "de-formalized participants" (like e.g. energy?) Not sure - can you say more? > The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 08:44:54PM -, David Nyman wrote: > There is no analogy between the two cases, because > Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way > of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations. > This is magic with a vengeance. You ass

Re: Penrose and algorithms

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 09:29:11AM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote: > > it is disconcerting that he does not even address the issue, and > often writes as if an algorithm could have only the powers it could > be proven mathematically to have in the worst case. > > > I agree with Dennett here. J

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to > bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung > about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to > illustrate poi

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 12:22:31AM -, David Nyman wrote: > > On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to > > bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung > > about at