On 11/18/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On 18/11/2007, Gene Ledbetter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > In another thread Rolf mentioned a variant of the Doomsday Argument where
> > the universe is infinite:
> >
> > << ...This variant DA asks, "if there's currently a Galacti
On 18/11/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > How is this different to arguing that a person who wins the lottery
> > should not ask how come something so improbable has happened to him
> > since he could only be asking the question if he had been a winner?
>
> Should he?
The impr
On 11/18/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On 18/11/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > How is this different to arguing that a person who wins the lottery
> > > should not ask how come something so improbable has happened to him
> > > since he could only b
Dear Stathis,
> The improbable thing is that the person should transition from the
> state of buying a lottery ticket to winning the lottery, given the
> much greater weight of non-winning tickets. Answering my own question,
> the way this is different to asking why I was born me rather than one
On 18/11/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yes, but there's no point in 'wondering' after winning the lottery
> either. 'Wondering' is a technique to update probability of winning
> after you experienced winning, but it's only applicable when this
> probability is unknown and you
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
>
> On 11/18/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > On 18/11/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > > How is this different to arguing that a person who wins the lottery
> > > > should not ask how come something so improbable has happe
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