Re: Private Minds in 3rd Person views?
Hi Stephen, At 20:00 30/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, I missed something that you wrote earlier! Do you truly think that the solution to the mind/body problem involves explaining how a private mind can be attached to anything third-person describable? I don't see how this makes any kind of sense! The mere fact that you cannot have a 1st person experience of what it is like to be Stephen Paul King unless you are, actually, Stephen Paul King tells me that it is impossible for a 3rd person description to exist. Ah Ah Ah ... OK. I agree, but it is not among the axioms, it is among the theorems. What is not yet clear to me is what you accept without proving and what you try to prove. What I see is that we have agreements and/or coincedances in the 1st person views of many SASs. Nobody knows. (Well we should say no-soul knows that). These give rise to the idea of 3rd person views, but such do not actually exist. We can postulate some 3rd person axioms. As you know the enterprise I advocate relies on accepting the notion of number, and accepting usual partial axiomatisation as third person correct. I do hope you accept that the proposition 17 is prime is either true or false. It makes it 3-person well definite. At best we can associate an inferability of a private mind, ala Turing Test, or someother kind of justification of the belief in private minds, to some aspect of our individual experience. For example, I assume that you (and your private mind) are not merely a computational simulation generated by the same computation that generates my own experienciable actuality Too much ambiguity here. The expression same computation could have more than 1 interpretation. because if I did so I should be able to induce a transformation of my 1st person experience directly and smothly into yours. After all, the simulations would all be within the same repetuoir of possible simulations. This is classic problem of solipsism! Don't you agree? I am not sure. Arithmetic is the repertoir of all possible simulations, and this does not lead necessarily to solipsism. Best Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Private Minds in 3rd Person views?
Dear Bruno, I missed something that you wrote earlier! Do you truly think that the solution to the mind/body problem involves explaining how a private mind can be attached to anything third-person describable? I don't see how this makes any kind of sense! The mere fact that you cannot have a 1st person experience of what it is like to be Stephen Paul King unless you are, actually, Stephen Paul King tells me that it is impossible for a 3rd person description to exist. What I see is that we have agreements and/or coincedances in the 1st person views of many SASs. These give rise to the idea of 3rd person views, but such do not actually exist. At best we can associate an inferability of a private mind, ala Turing Test, or someother kind of justification of the belief in private minds, to some aspect of our individual experience. For example, I assume that you (and your private mind) are not merely a computational simulation generated by the same computation that generates my own experienciable actuality because if I did so I should be able to induce a transformation of my 1st person experience directly and smothly into yours. After all, the simulations would all be within the same repetuoir of possible simulations. This is classic problem of solipsism! Don't you agree? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 10:05 AM Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer? snip [BM] But that's the point of the whole work. Now, if you have follow a little bit the literature on the mind body problem you surely know that nobody has succeed in explaining how a private mind can be attached to anything third-person describable, be it physical or mathematical. All what I say is that if we survive the digital brain substitution, then any fundamental explanation of what matter *cannot* rely on anything like Aristotelian substances or even to anything *primitively* physical. With comp the mind-body problem is just two times more difficult in the sense that we must explain not only the mind but also the matter, and this from the mind. The UDA (alias the 1-8 reasoning) just show that: comp *must* explain matter by a mind theory. Wait perhaps I say more to Kory so that you can be made your objection more specific.