Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
On 9/3/2012 9:36 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Natural numbers are monads because 1) the are inextended substances, which is redundant to say. 2) they have no parts. That's a definition of a monad. Except to add that monads are alive, except that numbers are not very alive. I imagine one could write an entire scholarly paper on this issue. OK-- thanks-- there is a level of description that is comp Yes, there are a number of differences between Aristotle's substances and Leibniz's. I would go so far as tpo say that they have little in common: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei "Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's /monads/—which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object /has to/ possess and those that it possesses /throughout its existence/ coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce…And he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways…the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is…a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) Hi, I must point out that this quote precisely describes an infinite NP-Complete problem! Consider the simple example of the Traveling Salesman that must consider all possible routes to the cities she must visit to find the path that is the shortest that covers all the stops she must made. Finding the solution requires a computation that consumes resources that increase exponentially with the number of differing possibilities. This it would require aleph_1 resourses to compute such a problem what had only aleph_0 different possibilities. Even God itself cannot contradict mathematical facts. Thus there is no Pre-established (or ordained) Harmony, as such is a self-contradictory idea. So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasised. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. It is not possible to investigate here Leibniz's reasons for these apparently very strange views. Our present concern is with whether, and in what sense, Leibniz's substances are subjects of change. One can say that, in so far as, at all times, they reflect the whole of reality, then they do not change. But in so far as they reflect some parts of that reality more vividly than others, depending on their position in space and time, they can be said to change. " There are whole talks on monadic change on Youtube. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
Roger, Every natural number is distinct from all others. So your characterization of them as simple with no internal parts has to be incorrect. Leibniz himself says that every monad is distinct: "In a confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions." http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm Also nowhere in the Monadology do the words extend, inextended, unextended or nonextended appear. So could you give us a link to where he says they are inextended. Richard On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:36 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Natural numbers are monads because > > 1) the are inextended substances, which is redundant to say. > 2) they have no parts. > > That's a definition of a monad. Except to add that monads are alive, > except that numbers are not very alive. I imagine one could write > an entire scholarly paper on this issue. > > OK-- thanks-- there is a level of description that is comp > > Yes, there are a number of differences between Aristotle's substances > and Leibniz's. I would go so far as tpo say that they have > little in common: > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei > > "Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in > a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian > individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The > accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over > time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential > properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses > throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's > monads—which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or > uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an > object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence > coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the > properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are > essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its > nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have > been a different entity. > > Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each > other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a > different perspective. > > For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the > general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce…And he > considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways…the result of each > view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is…a substance > which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) > > So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective > emphasised. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the > features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own > time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with > temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives > on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, > there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its > content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of > time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. > > It is not possible to investigate here Leibniz's reasons for these apparently > very strange views. Our present concern is with whether, and in what sense, > Leibniz's substances are subjects of change. One can say that, in so far as, > at all times, they reflect the whole of reality, then they do not change. But > in so far as they reflect some parts of that reality more vividly than > others, depending on their position in space and time, they can be said to > change. " > > There are whole talks on monadic change on Youtube. > > > > > > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 9/3/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him > so that everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-09-02, 08:37:43 > Subject: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics > > Hi Roger, > > > On 01 Sep 2012, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote: > > > A Dialog comparing
Re: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
Hi Bruno Marchal Natural numbers are monads because 1) the are inextended substances, which is redundant to say. 2) they have no parts. That's a definition of a monad. Except to add that monads are alive, except that numbers are not very alive. I imagine one could write an entire scholarly paper on this issue. OK-- thanks-- there is a level of description that is comp Yes, there are a number of differences between Aristotle's substances and Leibniz's. I would go so far as tpo say that they have little in common: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei "Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads梬hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce匒nd he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways卼he result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is卆 substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasised. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. It is not possible to investigate here Leibniz's reasons for these apparently very strange views. Our present concern is with whether, and in what sense, Leibniz's substances are subjects of change. One can say that, in so far as, at all times, they reflect the whole of reality, then they do not change. But in so far as they reflect some parts of that reality more vividly than others, depending on their position in space and time, they can be said to change. " There are whole talks on monadic change on Youtube. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/3/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-02, 08:37:43 Subject: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics Hi Roger, On 01 Sep 2012, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics Abstract The principal conclusion of this discussion is that there is a striking similarity between comp and the metaphysics of Leibniz, I agree. that is why two years ago I have followed different courses on Leibniz. But it is quite a work to make the relationship precise. It is far more simple with Plato, neoplatonists, and mystics. for example that the natural numbers of comp are indeed monads, I am glad you dare to say so, but that could be confusing. You might define monad, and define precisley the relationship. but a critical difference is that not all monads are natural numbers. And not all substances are monads. For students of comp, this should be of no practical importance as long as the computational field is confined to natural numbers. It is, by definition. Which is the basic method of comp. However, if one goes outside of that field, a reassessment of the additional mathematical forms in terms of substances would have to be made. ROGER (a Leibnizian): Hi Bruno Marchal Perhaps I am m
Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
Hi Roger, On 01 Sep 2012, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics Abstract The principal conclusion of this discussion is that there is a striking similarity between comp and the metaphysics of Leibniz, I agree. that is why two years ago I have followed different courses on Leibniz. But it is quite a work to make the relationship precise. It is far more simple with Plato, neoplatonists, and mystics. for example that the natural numbers of comp are indeed monads, I am glad you dare to say so, but that could be confusing. You might define monad, and define precisley the relationship. but a critical difference is that not all monads are natural numbers. And not all substances are monads. For students of comp, this should be of no practical importance as long as the computational field is confined to natural numbers. It is, by definition. Which is the basic method of comp. However, if one goes outside of that field, a reassessment of the additional mathematical forms in terms of substances would have to be made. ROGER (a Leibnizian): Hi Bruno Marchal Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless a mechanical model of brain and man activity. BRUNO (a comp advocate):... I am not a comp advocate. I use comp because it gives the opportunity to apply the scientific method to biology, philosophy and theology. I search the key under the lamp, as I know I will not find it in the dark, even if the key is in the dark. I am just a technician in applied logic. I inform people that IF comp is correct, then physics arise from elementary arithmetic, which includes a theology of number. The fundamental science, with comp, is the thology of numbers (that is: the study about the truth on numbers: this includes many form of truth: provable, feelable, observable, knowable, etc. With the usual classical definition. It masp closely with the theology of the neoplantonists and of the mystics, and certainly some aspect of Leibniz. ... Not really. Comp is the hypothesis that there is a level of description of my brain or body such that I can be emulated by a computer simulating my brain (or body) at that level of description. ROGER: Very good. "At that level of description" is exactly the point of view I have adopted regarding Leibniz's metaphysics, discussed below. OK. This is wholly my own version, since a possible problem arises in understanding what a Leibnizian substance is. The reason is that Leibniz describes a substance as potentially any "whole" entity, that being either extended body or inextended mind. But because extended bodies (despite L's familiarty with atomism)* can always be divided into smaller inextended bodies, extended bodies cannot be substances in L's metaphysics. Hence L substances are the inextended representations of extended bodies. OK. (Of course here 'substances' are not the Aristotelian primary matter). *[In my view, the issue that fundamental particles cannot be subdivided, can be replaced by the the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle, which in effect allows one to consider corporeal bodies as inifinitely divisible in the sense that one cannot arrive at final separate pieces without uncertainty. So one cannot come to a final state, holding up L's argument that corporeal bodies cannot be sustances. There's nothing left that one can point to. ] I can agree, but Heisenberg uncertainties are an open problem in the comp theory, as the existence of particles, space, physical time, etc. Natural numbers qualify as Leibnizian substances, since they are inextended and not divisible. Well, 24 is divisible by 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 24. OK, you can take it as a joke. But I fear you put too much importance in the particular notion of numbers, ad we can use LISP programs instead of numbers. This plays some role in the derivation of physics from the comp first person indeterminacy. I do see your point that numbers "are not divisible", though. But Fortran program, machines, neither, in such a similar sense. They also do not have parts, so in L's terms, they are simple substances, which is another name for monads. Natural numbers are thus (Platonic) monads, although not all monads are natural numbers. A man-- me, for example-- is not a natural number even in the Platonic realm, but yet is a monad, separates comp from L's metaphysics. I'm afarid that your notion of monad becomes to general, as with comp, a term like a man is ambiguous. Either we refer to his body, and that is a (relative) number, or to its soul, in which case, comp prevents us to take it as a number. It is nothing third person describable. Todays machines already know that, if you listen carefully (which asks for work à-la Gödel-Löb, but terrribly simplified by the use of Solovay theorem on G and G*. In addition, not all substances a
