Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
All members of [is,is not] definitional pairs including the [All,
Nothing] pair have a "conceptual" foundation within the All. Why would
the [All, Nothing} pair be the only one denied a mutual and concurrent
"physical" expression?
Well... It seems that we do not share the same conception of
what nothing(ness) might be. It seems that I am even unable to
figure out what your conception of it might be. I see no problem
with that. I suppose that this just means that we are different
human beings.
I feel that the {all, nothing} pair requires a kind of frame
it would have to fit into while the {something, nothingness}
do not. The best image I can get of our two views would be
that in yours "nothing" would be the empty set while in mine
"nothingness" would be the absence or inexistence of any set.
But I am probably still out.
I do not see either why "the [All, Nothing] pair should have a
"conceptual" foundation within the All" and I can't even figure
what that might mean.
Still, when you write "Why would the [All, Nothing} pair be the
only one denied a mutual and concurrent "physical" expression?",
I suspect (though that does not truly follows) that you mean the
[All, Nothing} pair would be denied something that would be
granted to some other pairs. This implies that the all have
some internal structure from which one couls identify strict
and non empty subparts. Therefore, "nothing" would not remain
the one and only thing that coud be opposed to the "all".
Last, I am not sure we need to involve anything "physical" here,
even between quotes. Physicality might well just be how things
appear (to SASs for instance) from within the "all".
Quite frustrating. I guess on your side, too.
Georges.
