Wei Dai wrote:
> > But in fact, the only thing that privileges the set of all
> > computational operations that we see in nature, is that they are instantiated by
> > the laws of physics.
>
> I would dispute this. The set of computable operations may also be
> privileged in that only a universe w
> But in fact, the only thing that privileges the set of all
> computational operations that we see in nature, is that they are instantiated by
> the laws of physics.
I would dispute this. The set of computable operations may also be
privileged in that only a universe with laws of physics that ins
PROTECTED]>Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 9:19 AMSubject: Re: Fw: Something for Platonists>> Dear Stephen,>> Given that, were it not for Plato the question you ask me would not > make sense and could not probably be formulated, I should not have to > answer it.>&g!
t; If
that
Please take [EMAIL PROTECTED] off of this mailing list.
-Original Message-
From: CMR [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 12:50 PM
To: Joao Leao
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Fw: Something for Platonists
shameless indeed
Cheers
CMR
<--enter gratuit
At 10:46 16/06/03 -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Yes, a Platonist can feel as certain of the statement "the axioms of Peano
> arithmetic will never lead to a contradiction" as he is of 1+1=2, based on
> the model he has of what the axioms mean in terms of arithmetic. It's hard
> to
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
But in fact, the only thing that privileges the set of all
computational
operations that we see in nature, is that they are instantiated by
the laws of physics. It is only through our knowledge of the physical
world
that we know of the di.erence between computable a
Joao Leao wrote:
>
> > James N Rose wrote:
> >
> > "If there are no qualia but there are universals --
> > which cannot be identified except via qualia --
> > something is awry.
>
> Why so? Why can universals only be identified
> via qualia if they are, by definition, what
> is not reducible t
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Joao Leao wrote:
>
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> > > As I think Bruno Marchal mentioned in a recent post, mathematicians use
> >the
> > > word "model" differently than physicists or other scientists. But again,
> >I'm
> > > not sure if model theory even makes sense if you drop a
Joao Leao wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> As I think Bruno Marchal mentioned in a recent post, mathematicians use
the
> word "model" differently than physicists or other scientists. But again,
I'm
> not sure if model theory even makes sense if you drop all "Platonic"
> assumptions about math.
You
Joao Leao wrote:
>
> James N Rose wrote:
>
> > Joao Leao wrote:
> > >
> > > James N Rose wrote:
> > >
> > > > Joao,
> > > >
> > > > :-) of course Plato wasn't aware of QM,
> > > > but, he was also unaware of the importance
> > > > that -mechanism- -real communication involvements-
> > > > are
James N Rose wrote:
> Joao Leao wrote:
> >
> > James N Rose wrote:
> >
> > > Joao,
> > >
> > > :-) of course Plato wasn't aware of QM,
> > > but, he was also unaware of the importance
> > > that -mechanism- -real communication involvements-
> > > are resident in any information relation situatio
Joao Leao wrote:
>
> James N Rose wrote:
>
> > Joao,
> >
> > :-) of course Plato wasn't aware of QM,
> > but, he was also unaware of the importance
> > that -mechanism- -real communication involvements-
> > are resident in any information relation situation,
> > as would be that which connect
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >From: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Subject: Re: Fw: Something for Platonists]
> >Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 10:46:56 -0700
> >
> >Jesse Mazer writes:
> > > Yes, a
James N Rose wrote:
> Joao,
>
> :-) of course Plato wasn't aware of QM,
> but, he was also unaware of the importance
> that -mechanism- -real communication involvements-
> are resident in any information relation situation,
> as would be that which connects the Ideal and Real
> and gives validat
Joao,
:-) of course Plato wasn't aware of QM,
but, he was also unaware of the importance
that -mechanism- -real communication involvements-
are resident in any information relation situation,
as would be that which connects the Ideal and Real
and gives validation/meaning to any correspondences
c
From: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Fw: Something for Platonists]
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 10:46:56 -0700
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Yes, a Platonist can feel as certain of the statement "the axioms of
Peano
> arit
The answer is that an incomplete arithmetic axiom system could presumably
by consistent, but who cares? If it is incomplete there will be true statements
that it cannot prove and we are back to the platonist position! The alternative
of an inconsistent system that is complete may actually be more
James N Rose wrote:
>
> You have glossed over the issue I was establishing.
>
I am sorry if I did. That was not my intention. I still
think you are mixing "platonic apples" with "not so
platonic oranges", but let us see if I can make out
what you are saying.
> Godel pretty well specified a dis
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Yes, a Platonist can feel as certain of the statement "the axioms of Peano
> arithmetic will never lead to a contradiction" as he is of 1+1=2, based on
> the model he has of what the axioms mean in terms of arithmetic. It's hard
> to see how non-Platonist could justify the
Joao Leao wrote:
CMR wrote:
> Gödel's incompleteness theorems have and justly should be
judged/interpreted
> purely on the merits of the arguments themselves, not the author's
> subjective(prejudiced?) interpretation, no?
>
> He was as much a victim(beneficiary?) of his "discoveries" as was
any
CMR wrote:
> Gödel's incompleteness theorems have and justly should be judged/interpreted
> purely on the merits of the arguments themselves, not the author's
> subjective(prejudiced?) interpretation, no?
>
> He was as much a victim(beneficiary?) of his "discoveries" as was anyone...
Precisely! T
Gödel's incompleteness theorems have and justly should be judged/interpreted
purely on the merits of the arguments themselves, not the author's
subjective(prejudiced?) interpretation, no?
He was as much a victim(beneficiary?) of his "discoveries" as was anyone...
CMR
<--enter gratuitous quotatio
Joao Leao wrote:
>
> James N Rose wrote:
>
> > Joao wrote:
> >
> > "Speaking as a devout Platonist ..."
> >
> > About 7 years ago I realized there was
> > a severe contradiction resident in modern
> > concepts of Being.
> >
> > Godel's Incompleteness Theorems have
> > established a condition-of
ginal Message -
> > From: "Joao Leao" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: "Lennart Nilsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Cc: "Everything List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 11:18 AM
> > Subject: Re:
hat bases their belief in faith or
> reason?
>
> Sincerly,
>
> Stephen
> - Original Message -
> From: "Joao Leao" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Lennart Nilsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: "Everything List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
IL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 11:18 AM
Subject: Re: Fw: Something for Platonists
> Speaking as a devout Platonist I see nothing much to contemplate
> in Deutsch's statement! Whether the Universe is computable, as
> he states without argument, or the computable su
Joao wrote:
"Speaking as a devout Platonist ..."
About 7 years ago I realized there was
a severe contradiction resident in modern
concepts of Being.
Godel's Incompleteness Theorems have
established a condition-of-knowledge which seem
to challenge if not negate Platonic thought.
I'd like to g
Speaking as a devout Platonist I see nothing much to contemplate
in Deutsch's statement! Whether the Universe is computable, as
he states without argument, or the computable subrealm of the
mathematical world coincides with the physical, which he
believes for unstated reasons, is of no concern to m
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