Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-10-11 Thread Saibal Mitra

You can still have realism, but it must be the case that at least some of
the things we think of as ``real physical objects´´ like e.g. electrons are
not real.

Suppose you are a virtual person, programmed by me and living in a virtual
environment. You do some experiments to find the laws of physics. You try to
break up things and look what they are ``made of´´. Would you ever discover
how the pentium processor works if you proceed this way?

Similarly would you ever discover anything about neurotransmitters and
neurons while you are asleep (and dreaming about doing experiments).

It is more likely that you would be stuck with theories that promote
nonexisting artefacts of  the virtual world to real physical entities.

Saibal




- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: donderdag 10 oktober 2002 14:55
Onderwerp: Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they
here?




 If Gerard 't Hooft's  deterministic account of Quantum field
 is both realist and Lorentz invariant, it would contradict Bell's theorem
 or Kochen and Specker theorem, or GHZ (Greenberger, Horn, Zeilinger),
 ... or it would be equivalent with Everett (accepting that quantum
 contextuality + realism implies the many-things).

 Bruno


 Original message by Saibal Mitra:

 - Oorspronkelijk bericht -
 Van: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Aan: Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Verzonden: vrijdag 4 oktober 2002 18:13
 Onderwerp: Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they
 here?
 
 
   At 9:36 -0700 1/10/2002, Tim May wrote:
 
   MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal realism. To
   wit, there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and another in
   which Germany won the Second World War, but these universes are
   forever and completely out of touch with us.
 
   Not quite due to possible interferences. We do have empirical
evidences
   for those worlds imo. (if only the two slits + Bell or better GHZ)
 
 But quantum field theory can be derived from a completely classical
 deterministic theory. See.e.g.:
 
 1) Quantum Gravity as a Dissipative Deterministic System
 
 Class.Quant.Grav. 16 (1999) 3263-3279
 
 http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084
 
 
 2) Quantum Mechanics and Determinism
 
 http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105
 
 3) How Does God Play Dice? (Pre-)Determinism at the Planck Scale
 
 http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219







Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-10-11 Thread George Levy



Saibal Mitra wrote:


Suppose you are a virtual person, programmed by me and living in a virtual
environment. You do some experiments to find the laws of physics. You try to
break up things and look what they are ``made of´´. Would you ever discover
how the pentium processor works if you proceed this way?

Interesting problem.

I would set up experiments to test the limit of my world. I would find 
out that  I get a exception interrupt when I blow the stack, run out of 
memory or divide by zero. This information would enable me to measure 
the size of my space (memory) and the limitations of the physics 
underlying my world.

I would test the speed of each operation in my world, and find out that 
some operations such as MOVE and TEST IF ZERO are relatively  more 
or less time consuming . From this information, I would formulate 
theories on how these operations may be implemented at a higher level 
and what kind of mechanism or architecture may be responsible for such 
timing relationships. I would watch for white rabbits, which in my world 
may be unexplained events such as INPUTS and try to understand what 
these INPUTS imply and by what mechanism they may be generated.

I would generate certain events, behavior (OUTPUTS) and observe how the 
INPUTS are affected by my OUTPUTS. From this information I may infer 
that there is an intelligence lurking beyond my world and I may even 
deduce that its name is Saibal Mitra.

George





Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-10-07 Thread Saibal Mitra


- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: vrijdag 4 oktober 2002 18:13
Onderwerp: Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they
here?


 At 9:36 -0700 1/10/2002, Tim May wrote:

 MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal realism. To
 wit, there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and another in
 which Germany won the Second World War, but these universes are
 forever and completely out of touch with us.

 Not quite due to possible interferences. We do have empirical evidences
 for those worlds imo. (if only the two slits + Bell or better GHZ)


But quantum field theory can be derived from a completely classical
deterministic theory. See.e.g.:

1) Quantum Gravity as a Dissipative Deterministic System

Class.Quant.Grav. 16 (1999) 3263-3279

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084


2) Quantum Mechanics and Determinism

http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105

3) How Does God Play Dice? (Pre-)Determinism at the Planck Scale

http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219








Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

At 9:36 -0700 1/10/2002, Tim May wrote:

MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal realism. To 
wit, there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and another in 
which Germany won the Second World War, but these universes are 
forever and completely out of touch with us.

Not quite due to possible interferences. We do have empirical evidences
for those worlds imo. (if only the two slits + Bell or better GHZ)






BTW, Tim, I am discovering n-categories. Quite interesting. John Baez
has written good papers on that, like his categorification paper.
Have you read those stuff. Could be useful for the search of coherence
condition in many world/observer realities ...

I've been reading Baez for a while. An excellent teacher. I hear 
he's working on a book on n-categories. And Baez and my namesake, J. 
Peter May--unrelated to me, are leading a consortium to research 
n-categories more deeply. I confess that I have only vague ideas 
what they aresort of generalizations of natural transformations, 
I sense.




A very natural generalisation (!). Just replace the hom Sets by hom Categories.
In which you can again replace the hom sets by hom categories 
What is intriguing is the existence of coherence conditions making those
constructions apparently very genuine for many stuff from quantum 
field theories.




(I'm still studying categories at a more basic level, having jumped 
ahead to other areas, as is my wont.)

His From Categories to Feynman Diagrams (co-authored with James 
Dolan) and several of his related papers are good introductions.



Thanks. I didn't see this one. Very nice. http://arxiv.org/abs/math.QA/0004133




Chris Isham is also very good on drawing the connections between 
conventional quantum mechanics (i.e., stuff in the lab, not 
necessarily quantum gravity or quantum cosmology) and category/topos 
theory. (In particular, the collapse of the wave function and 
measurement looks like a subobject classifier, or, put another way, 
the usual transition from neither true nor false in a Heyting 
algebra to the one or the other we _always_ see once there is any 
chance to observe/measure/decide. That is, Heyting -- Boolean is 
what the mystery of QM centers around.


Boolean or Heyting Toposes or cartesian closed categories have exponentials.
They describes subjects (first or plural). They are distributive categories.
You always seem to forget the non distributive categories (nicely introduced in
Lawvere Shanuel book), which are akin to linear and quantum logic, 
and quantum algebra.
Technically linearity seems to be a consequence of the non distributivity,
I'm not sure I really grasp the idea yet.



(I am intrigued to find that Jeffrey Bub, in his Interpreting the 
Quantum World, 1997, makes central use of possible worlds, 
lattices, and such. While he does not explicitly mention Heyting 
algebras, the connection is close, and is implicit in the math. Had 
I encountered this approach when I was studying QM, I might have 
pursued it as a career. Instead, I was bored out of my mind solving 
partial differential equations for wave functions inside boxes. Ugh.)

I'm reading Graham Priest's An Introduction to Non-Classical 
Logic, 2001, which covers various modal logics, conditional logics, 
intuitionist logic, many-valued logics, and more (first degree 
entailment, relevant logic, etc.).


I should read it. One day I will make a comment about its use of Godel in his
book In contradiction.



The tableaux approach is new to me. They look like the trees of 
Smullyan, and hence like semilattices.


I have used the smullyan trees for the G and Co. theorem provers. The tableaux
structure reflects  in some way the Kripke structure. Posets appears with
S4-like modal logic.
You should study Gentzen presentation of logic which are naturally related
to categories. An indigest but brilliant introduction to many (intuitionnist)
logics is the North-Holland logic book by Szabo: Algebra of proofs.
To bad he miss the braided monoidal categories ... For a categorician, knots
theory is a branch of logic.



(I'm also reading Davey and Priestley's Introduction to Lattices 
and Order, along with parts of Birkhoff's classic, and the 
lattice/poset approach continues to appeal to me greatly.

Nice. They have chapters on the non distributive order structures.



It's a vantage point which makes all of this heretofore-boring-to-me 
logic stuff look terribly interesting. I'm viewing most 
programs/trees/refinements/tableaux as branching worlds, as possible 
worlds (a la Kripke), to be further branched or discarded.

Hence my focus on MWI and Everything remains more on the 
mathematics. (I just ordered my own copy of Goldblatt's Mathematics 
of Modality.)

Possible worlds, something I only encountered in any form (besides 
Borges, Everett, parallel universes sorts of references) in the past 
several years, is my real touchstone.

And, more mundanely, I think it applies to cryptography and money. I 
had a 

Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

At 12:26 -0700 30/09/2002, Tim May wrote:
If the alternate universes implied by the mainstream MWI (as opposed 
to variants like consistent histories) are actual in some sense, 
with even the slightest chance of communication between universes, 
then why have we not seen solid evidence of such communication?


I am not sure I understand why you oppose the mainstream MWI and the
consistent histories (although many does that, I don't know why).
In all case, if QM is right (independently of any interpretation), parallel
histories or parallel universes cannot communicate, they can only
interfere(*). The same happens with comp. Probability measures are global
and depends on the whole collection of relative computational histories, but
this does not allow the transfer of one bit from one computation to
another.

BTW, Tim, I am discovering n-categories. Quite interesting. John Baez
has written good papers on that, like his categorification paper.
Have you read those stuff. Could be useful for the search of coherence
condition in many world/observer realities ...

(*) Unless Plaga is right, and it exists 100% non elastic interaction,
which I doubt ...

Bruno




Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-10-01 Thread Tim May


On Tuesday, October 1, 2002, at 06:37  AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 At 12:26 -0700 30/09/2002, Tim May wrote:
 If the alternate universes implied by the mainstream MWI (as opposed 
 to variants like consistent histories) are actual in some sense, 
 with even the slightest chance of communication between universes, 
 then why have we not seen solid evidence of such communication?


 I am not sure I understand why you oppose the mainstream MWI and the
 consistent histories (although many does that, I don't know why).
 In all case, if QM is right (independently of any interpretation), 
 parallel
 histories or parallel universes cannot communicate, they can only
 interfere(*). The same happens with comp. Probability measures are 
 global
 and depends on the whole collection of relative computational 
 histories, but
 this does not allow the transfer of one bit from one computation to
 another.

I of course was not claiming such communication (or travel, whatever) 
would be easy. Just doing a thought experiment settting some very rough 
bounds on how impossible the communication or travel would be.

One of the conclusions of How come they're not here? is that, in 
fact, such communication or travel is essentially impossible (else 
they'd _be_ here).

MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal realism. To wit, 
there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and another in which 
Germany won the Second World War, but these universes are forever and 
completely out of touch with us.


 BTW, Tim, I am discovering n-categories. Quite interesting. John Baez
 has written good papers on that, like his categorification paper.
 Have you read those stuff. Could be useful for the search of coherence
 condition in many world/observer realities ...

I've been reading Baez for a while. An excellent teacher. I hear he's 
working on a book on n-categories. And Baez and my namesake, J. Peter 
May--unrelated to me, are leading a consortium to research n-categories 
more deeply. I confess that I have only vague ideas what they 
aresort of generalizations of natural transformations, I sense. 
(I'm still studying categories at a more basic level, having jumped 
ahead to other areas, as is my wont.)

His From Categories to Feynman Diagrams (co-authored with James 
Dolan) and several of his related papers are good introductions.

Chris Isham is also very good on drawing the connections between 
conventional quantum mechanics (i.e., stuff in the lab, not necessarily 
quantum gravity or quantum cosmology) and category/topos theory. (In 
particular, the collapse of the wave function and measurement looks 
like a subobject classifier, or, put another way, the usual transition 
from neither true nor false in a Heyting algebra to the one or the 
other we _always_ see once there is any chance to 
observe/measure/decide. That is, Heyting -- Boolean is what the 
mystery of QM centers around.

(I am intrigued to find that Jeffrey Bub, in his Interpreting the 
Quantum World, 1997, makes central use of possible worlds, lattices, 
and such. While he does not explicitly mention Heyting algebras, the 
connection is close, and is implicit in the math. Had I encountered 
this approach when I was studying QM, I might have pursued it as a 
career. Instead, I was bored out of my mind solving partial 
differential equations for wave functions inside boxes. Ugh.)

I'm reading Graham Priest's An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 
2001, which covers various modal logics, conditional logics, 
intuitionist logic, many-valued logics, and more (first degree 
entailment, relevant logic, etc.).

The tableaux approach is new to me. They look like the trees of 
Smullyan, and hence like semilattices. (I'm also reading Davey and 
Priestley's Introduction to Lattices and Order, along with parts of 
Birkhoff's classic, and the lattice/poset approach continues to appeal 
to me greatly. It's a vantage point which makes all of this 
heretofore-boring-to-me logic stuff look terribly interesting. I'm 
viewing most programs/trees/refinements/tableaux as branching worlds, 
as possible worlds (a la Kripke), to be further branched or discarded.

Hence my focus on MWI and Everything remains more on the mathematics. 
(I just ordered my own copy of Goldblatt's Mathematics of Modality.)

Possible worlds, something I only encountered in any form (besides 
Borges, Everett, parallel universes sorts of references) in the past 
several years, is my real touchstone.

And, more mundanely, I think it applies to cryptography and money. I 
had a meeting/party at my house a few weeks ago with about 50 people in 
attendance (gulp!). We had a series of very short presentations. I gave 
a very rushed 10-minute introduction to intuitionistic logic, mainly 
focused on my time as a poset, a lattice example, citing the natural 
way in which not-not A is not necessarily the same as A. If the past 
of an event is A, then not-A is its future. But the not-future is 
larger than the 

Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-09-30 Thread Russell Standish

It could just mean that communication between the universes is
impossible. Which is not surprising, really, as the division between
universes in the MWI is what allows conscious thought to exist.

It is perhaps of more interest to other multi-universe scenarios that
are independent of the anthropic principle - I'm thinking here of
Smolin's black hole universes, and also patches that lie outside our
lightcone, which is almost the same thing. There is a cosmic
censorship conjecture, that singularities can never be naked. Perhaps
the Fermi Where are they argument almost proves the case.

Cheers

Tim May wrote:
 
 If the alternate universes implied by the mainstream MWI (as opposed to 
 variants like consistent histories) are actual in some sense, with 
 even the slightest chance of communication between universes, then why 
 have we not seen solid evidence of such communication?
 
 Amongst the universes, many (many is a huge number, obviously)  of 
 them will be way ahead of us. Some will have had galactic civilizations 
 for a billion years. Some will be versions of Earth except that the 
 Egyptians pioneered electronics and hence the world is a few thousand 
 years ahead of our world...even assuming time is commensurate with 
 ours.
 
 And so on. You can all imagine the rich possibilities.
 
 If these universes are even remotely able to affect each other, through 
 perhaps enormously advanced technology, then the vast number of such 
 possible worlds would suggest that at least some of them have figured 
 out how to do so.
 
 And yet they aren't here. No visitors from alternate universes. No 
 signals sent in, a la Benford's Timescape.
 
 Perhaps we don't know how to listen. Perhaps there are so many possible 
 universes to potentially visit that we just haven't been gotten to yet. 
 Perhaps in a multiverse of so many possibilities, ours is just not an 
 interesting destination. Maybe there's a kind of MWI censorship going 
 on: since we are still debating the validity of MWI, we obviously are 
 in a universe where MWI has not been proved through such a visit.
 
 (There are many divergent series here, making even crude estimates 
 difficult and probably worthless.)
 
 Hmmm
 
 
 --Tim May Prime, resident of Earth Prime
 




A/Prof Russell Standish  Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax   9385 6965, 0425 253119 ()
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02





Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here?

2002-09-30 Thread r strasser
Let's consider Tim May's question, "why have we not seen solid evidence of such communication," and Russell Standish's statement, "It could just mean that communication between the "universes" is impossible."  Now lets list the relevant constants andsome interpretationsof quantum theory as they could apply to the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett). 1. The theory mandates multiple states for every particle in existence. 2. The collapse model says our observations affect the outcome of experiments: it assigns a central role to consciousness. 3. Photons, electrons, and other subatomic particles are not hard and indivisible. They behave as both waves and particles. 4. Particles can appear out of nothing - a pure void - and disappear again. 5. Physicists have teleported atoms and moved them from one place to another without passing through intervening space. 6. A single particle occupies not just one position, but exists here, there, and many places in between. 7. Quantum theory must hold at every level of reality - not just the subatomic world (David Deutsch). 8. The double slit experiment offers a rare example of two overlapping realities, in which photons in one universe interfere with those in another. 9. All quantum states are equally real, and if we see only one result of an experiment, other versions of us must see all the remaining possibilities. 10. "I don't think there are any interpretations of quantum theory other than many worlds.The others deny reality." (David Deutsch).   Given the constants and some interpretations of quantum theory, I would like a wide variety of views on what's theoretically required to communicate with "many worlds," and what would present "solid evidence of such communication."  For starters, let's consider David Deutsch's conjecture: "In fact, says Deutsch, a quantum computer could in theory perform a calculation requiring more steps than there are atoms in the entire universe. To do that, the computer would have to be manipulating and storing all that information somewhere. Computation is, after all, a physical process; it uses real resources, matter and energy. But if those resources exceed the amount available in our universe, then the computer would have to be drawing on the resources of other universes. So Deutsch feels that if such a computer is built, the case for many worlds will be compelling."  -Bob Strasser   - Original Message - From: Russell Standish Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 6:49 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many Fermis Interpretation Paradox -- So why aren't they here? It could just mean that communication between the "universes" isimpossible. Which is not surprising, really, as the division between"universes" in the MWI is what allows conscious thought to exist.It is perhaps of more interest to other multi-universe scenarios thatare independent of the anthropic principle - I'm thinking here ofSmolin's black hole universes, and also patches that lie outside ourlightcone, which is almost the same thing. There is a "cosmiccensorship conjecture", that singularities can never be naked. Perhapsthe Fermi "Where are they argument" almost proves the case.CheersTim May wrote:  If the alternate universes implied by the mainstream MWI (as opposed to  variants like consistent histories) are "actual" in some sense, with  even the slightest chance of communication between universes, then why  have we not seen solid evidence of such communication?  Amongst the universes, many ("many" is a huge number, obviously) of  them will be way ahead of us. Some will have had galactic civilizations  for a billion years. Some will be versions of Earth except that the  Egyptians pioneered electronics and hence the world is a few thousand  years "ahead" of our world...even assuming time is commensurate with  ours.  And so on. You can all imagine the rich possibilities.  If these universes are even remotely able to affect each other, through  perhaps enormously advanced technology, then the vast number of such  possible worlds would suggest that at least some of them have figured  out how to do so.  And yet they aren't here. No visitors from alternate universes. No  signals sent in, a la Benford's "Timescape."  Perhaps we don't know how to listen. Perhaps there are so many possible  universes to potentially visit that we just haven't been gotten to yet.  Perhaps in a multiverse of so many possibilities, ours is just not an  interesting destination. Maybe there's a kind of MWI censorship going  on: since we are still debating the validity of MWI, we obviously are  in a universe where MWI has not been proved through such a visit.  (There are many divergent series here, making even crude estimates  difficult and probably worthless.)  Hmmm   --Tim